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CROWDFUNDING AND THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
C. Steven Bradford*
Crowdfunding-the use of the Internet to raise money
through small contributions from a large number of
investors-could cause a revolution in small-business
financing. Through crowdfunding, smaller entrepreneurs,
who traditionally have had great difficulty obtaining capital,
have access to anyone in the world with a computer, Internet
access, and spare cash to invest. Crowdfunding sites such as
Kiva, Kickstarter, and IndieGoGo have proliferated, and the
amount of money raised through crowdfunding has grown to
billions of dollars in just a few years.
Crowdfunding poses two issues under federal securities
law. First, crowdfunding sometimes involves the sale of
securities, triggering the registration requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933. Registration is prohibitively expensive
for the small offerings that crowdfunding facilitates, and
none of the current exemptions from registration fit the
crowdfunding model. Second, the web sites that facilitate
crowdfunding may be treated as brokers or investment
advisers under the ambiguous standards applied by the SEC.
This article considers the costs and benefits of
crowdfunding and proposes an exemption that would free
crowdfunding from the registration requirements, but not the
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antifraud provisions, of federal securities law. Securities
offerings for an amount less than $250,000-500,000 would be
exempted if (1) each investor invests no more than the greater
of $500 or 2% of the investor's annual income; and (2) the
offering is made on an Internet crowdfunding site that meets
the exemption's requirements.
To qualify for the exemption, crowdfunding sites would
have to: (1) be open to the general public; (2) provide public
communication portals for investors and potential investors;
(3) require investors to fulfill a simple education requirement
before investing; (4) prohibit certain conflicts of interest; (5)
offer no investment advice or recommendations; and (6) notify
the SEC that they are hosting crowdfunding offerings. Sites
that meet these requirements would not be treated as brokers
or investment advisers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Small businesses, especially startups, have a difficult
time raising money. The usual sources of business finance-
bank lending, venture capital, retained earnings-are
difficult to obtain for small and micro-businesses. Wealthy
individuals known as "angel investors" fill part of the
funding gap, but angel investing is limited, and even angel
investors tend to focus on larger investments.
Entrepreneurs who lack the personal resources needed to
finance their businesses turn to friends, family members,
and personal acquaintances, but those sources are often
insufficient. As a result, many potentially successful small
businesses do not get funded.
Crowdfunding, sometimes called peer-to-peer lending
when it involves debt financing, is a possible solution to the
small business funding problem. Crowdfunding, is, as its
name indicates, funding from the crowd-raising small
amounts of money from a large number of investors. Unlike
typical business financing, which comes primarily from
wealthy individuals and institutional investors,
crowdfunding raises money from the general public. In the
past, the transaction costs associated with raising small
amounts from a large number of investors would have made
crowdfunding unworkable, but the Internet has significantly
reduced those transaction costs. Web-based crowdfunding
services such as Kickstarter, Lending Club, Prosper,
ProFounder, IndieGoGo, and, the paragon of crowdfunding,
Kiva have proliferated. Through these sites, entrepreneurs
have access to anyone in the world with a computer, Internet
access, and free cash. Billions of dollars have been raised
through Internet-based crowdfunding since its inception just
a few years ago-possibly the beginning of a revolution in
how the general public allocates capital.
JEFF HowE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS
DRIVING THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS 247 (2008).
2 See KEVIN LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION:
SOCIAL NETWORKING MEETS VENTURE FINANCING 3 (2010) ("[In the same
CRO WDFUNDING AND SECURITIES LA WS 5No. I: 1]
A recent campaign by two ad executives, Michael
Migliozzi II and Brian William Flatow, to raise $300 million
to buy Pabst Brewing illustrates the power of crowdfunding.'
They promised investors "certificates of ownership" and beer
with a value equal to the amount invested. According to
their lawyer, the two were only conducting an online
experiment and never actually intended to buy Pabst.' But
they reportedly received $200 million in pledges from over
five million individuals in the six-month period before the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") shut them
down for failing to register.
As this example illustrates, crowdfunding does not mesh
well with federal securities regulation. Entrepreneurs
seeking debt or equity financing through crowdfunding will
often be selling securities, and securities offerings must be
registered under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities
Act") unless an exemption is available. Registration would
be prohibitively expensive. A couple of peer-to-peer lending
sites have registered, but to do so, they substantially
restructured their operations in a way unlikely to prove
useful for most crowdfunding, particularly for equity
offerings.
The current exemptions from the registration
requirement also do not fit crowdfunding well. Crowdfunding
sites trying to fit within these exemptions have had to
restrict access either to sophisticated, wealthy investors or to
preexisting acquaintances of the entrepreneur seeking funds.
way that social networking changed how we allocate our time,
crowdfunding will change how we allocate capital.").
' See Michael Migliozzi II, Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist
Proceedings Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933, Making
Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order, Securities Act Release
No. 9216 (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin
/2011/33-9216.pdf [hereinafter Migliozzi Cease-and-Desist Order]; Chad
Bray, Huge Beer Run Halted by Those No Fun D.C. Regulators, WALL ST.
J. L. BLOG (June 8, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/1aw/2011/06/
08/huge-beer-run-halted-by-those-no-fun-d-c-regulators/?mod=WSJBlog.
* Migliozzi Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 3, at 2.
* See Bray, supra note 3.
* Migliozzi Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 3, at 3.
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Such restrictions eliminate the power of crowdfunding-
access to the public crowd of small investors. Securities-
based crowdfunding is practicable only if a new exemption is
created.
Several proposals have been made to exempt
crowdfunding and certain other small business securities
offerings from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act. All of these proposals would cap both the dollar amount
of a crowdfunded offering and the amount that each
individual investor could invest.
But the Securities Act's registration requirement is not
the only potential obstacle to crowdfunding. The web sites
that facilitate crowdfunding face their own regulatory issues.
If crowdfunding entrepreneurs offer securities on these sites,
the sites could be acting as unregistered brokers or
investment advisers under opaque SEC standards. Any
proposal designed to facilitate crowdfunding must deal with
these issues as well.
The White House recently endorsed a crowdfunding
exemption,' and the SEC has promised to consider
crowdfunding as part of a general review of regulatory
constraints on capital formation. But Congress may not wait
for the SEC to act. The House has passed a bill to add a
crowdfunding exemption to the Securities Act and two bills
have been introduced in the Senate. Some of those bills
incorporate some of the recommendations made in this
article. According to one source, crowdfunding sites are
"gearing up for a boom" if a crowdfunding exemption passes.'
The CEO of one crowdfunding site, ProFounder, indicated in
' See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary issues
Fact Sheet and Overview for American Jobs Act (Sept. 8, 2011)
[hereinafter Fact Sheet and Overview for AJA], available at http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/08/fact-sheet-and-overview.
' Angus Loten, Crowd-Fund Sites Eye Boom, WSJ.coM (May 12,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487038063045762453
60782219274.html?mod=ITPmarketplace_4. The CEO of IndieGoGo, a
crowdfunding site, indicated that a regulatory change would "significantly
boost activity" on her site. Id.
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May 2011 that she was "working with a legal team to lay the
groundwork for online equity sales."'
The devil is in the details. Crafting a crowdfunding
exemption requires a careful balancing of investor protection
and capital formation. If the SEC leans strongly toward
investor protection, as it usually does, the resulting
exemption is likely to be too costly for many small
businesses. If, on the other hand, a crowdfunding exemption
ignores investor protection concerns entirely, the resulting
losses may create a regulatory and public relations backlash
that will set back crowdfunding for years.
This Article argues for an exemption that would free both
crowdfunded offerings and the web sites on which they are
made from the regulatory requirements, but not the
antifraud provisions, of federal securities law. Under the
exemption, the total dollar amount of an entrepreneur's
offerings would be limited to $250,000-$500,000 a year, with
individual investments limited to the greater of $500 or 2%
of the investor's annual income. The offerings would have to
be made on publicly accessible crowdfunding web sites that,
among other things, meet conflict-of-interest standards and
do not provide investment advice.
Part II of this article is an introduction to the
crowdfunding phenomenon. It defines crowdfunding and
briefly explores its precursors: crowdsourcing and
microfinance. Part II also distinguishes among five different
models of crowdfunding: the donation model; the reward
model; the pre-purchase model; the lending model,
sometimes called peer-to-peer lending; and the equity model.
The models differ in what, if anything, contributors are
promised in return for their contributions.
Part III discusses whether crowdfunding investments are
securities subject to the Securities Act registration
requirements and concludes that the answer depends on the
particular form of crowdfunding. Crowdfunding
contributions on donation, reward, and pre-purchase sites
are not securities. Crowdfunding investments on equity
9 Id.
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sites would be securities in the usual case where investors
are promised some investment return other than the return
of their capital. The answer with respect to lending sites is a
little less certain. If investors are promised interest on their
loans, those investments are probably securities. If no
interest is offered, lending sites would not be offering
securities.
Part IV discusses the regulatory issues faced by
crowdfunding sites. Even if crowdfunded offerings are
exempted from registration, the web sites that facilitate
crowdfunding could still be in violation of federal securities
laws. They might be acting as unregistered brokers,
investment advisers, or, less likely, exchanges.
Part V discusses the various proposals to exempt
crowdfunding from federal securities law and also briefly
examines the SEC's authority to exempt crowdfunding,
concluding that crowdfunding exemptions such as those
proposed would fall within that authority.
Part VI addresses the benefits and costs of crowdfunding.
Crowdfunding would help to ease the capital gap faced by
startups and very small businesses. It would extend the
geographical reach of small-business fundraising and make
capital available to poorer entrepreneurs whose family,
friends, and acquaintances have insufficient funds. But
these gains come at a potential cost. Crowdfunding exposes
relatively unsophisticated investors to the greater risks
associated with small business offerings-illiquidity, fraud,
business failure, and entrepreneurial self-dealing. Properly
structured, crowdfunding reduces, but does not eliminate,
those risks. However, investors are already exposed to those
same risks in the existing, non-securities models of
crowdfunding. A crowdfunding securities exemption would
increase those investors' potential gains while mitigating
associated risks.
Part VII considers what a crowdfunding exemption
should look like.
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II. AN INTRODUCTION TO CROWDFUNDING
A. What Is Crowdfunding?
The basic idea of crowdfunding is to raise money through
relatively small contributions from a large number of
people.10 Using the Internet, an entrepreneur can "in real
time and with no incremental cost . . . [sell] . . . to literally
millions of potential investors."n No intermediary such as a
bank or an underwriter is needed. 2 Anyone who can
convince the public he has a good business idea can become
an entrepreneur, and anyone with a few dollars to spend can
become an investor.
The aspiring entrepreneur begins the process by
publishing a request for funding on a crowdfunding web site.
The request describes what the entrepreneur intends to do
with the money-the proposed product and a business plan.
It also indicates what, if anything, people who contribute
money to finance the business will receive in return for their
contributions. Investors browse through entrepreneurs'
listings, and, if they find one (or more) that interests them,
they can contribute anything from a few dollars to the total
amount the entrepreneur is seeking. The web site on which
the funding request is published typically facilitates the
exchange of funds-the initial contributions from the
investors to the entrepreneurs and, if investors are to receive
money back, the payments from the entrepreneur back to the
investors.
10 See Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert & Armin Schwienbacher,
Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd 2 (Center for Operations
Discussion and Research, Discussion Paper No. 2011/32, 2011), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1836873.
n Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC's
Continuing Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4
N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 1, 6 (2007). Crowdfunding can also be used for non-
business purposes, but this article focuses only on crowdfunding as a way
for businesses to raise money.
2 See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Peer-to-Peer Lending, 45
U.C. DAvIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1823763.
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Crowdfunding offerings are typically rather small. One
study found that the median amount raised was only
$28,583.13 But crowdfunding is not necessarily limited to
very small offerings. The largest amount raised in that same
study was over $82 million.14 And, in the aggregate,
crowdfunding is huge. As of December 2011, 600,000
different Kiva lenders had loaned more than $270 million
dollars to more than 700,000 entrepreneurs.' Peer-to-peer
lending, just one form of crowdfunding, has alone been
responsible for more than $1 billion dollars in funding, and
some industry analysts believe peer-to-peer lending could
exceed $5 billion annually by 2013.1
The basic concept of crowdfunding is not new. Politicians
have been collecting small campaign donations from the
general public for generations. That, in essence, is
crowdfunding." But Internet-based crowdfunding is
relatively new. Kiva, the leading crowdfunding site today,
did not open for business until 2005,8 and the term
"crowdfunding" did not appear until 2006.1 In the brief time
since Internet-based crowdfunding appeared, it has grown
exponentially. It "is becoming a big business, with a steady
13 Belleflamme et al., supra note 10, at 32-33 tbl. 2. The mean was
$3.5 million. Id.
14 Id. See also Armin Schwienbacher & Benjamin Larralde,
Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, in HANDBOOK OF
ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE (Douglas Cumming ed., forthcoming 2012),
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1699183 (discussing plans of
Trampoline Systems, a British software company, to raise £l million in
four tranches).
" See About Us - Statistics, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/aboutlstats (last
visited Mar. 5, 2012).
16 Verstein, supra note 12.
" Crowdfunding has "been the backbone of the American political
system since politicians started kissing babies." HOWE, supra note 1, at
253.
m See About Us - History, KIVA, http://www.kiva.orglabout/history
(last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
19 LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 2, at 66.
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parade of services joining the fray."2 Kiva is now so popular
that it sometimes exhausts its available lending
opportunities.21
Crowdfunding has been especially popular in the
entertainment industry,2 2 but there are crowdfunding sites
for all types of projects. Some crowdfunding sites are limited
to specific businesses or industries, such as book
publishing,23 gaming mUSiC,25 journalism,26 or agriculture
20 Brian Oliver Bennett, Crowdfunding 101: How Rising Startups Use
the Web as a VC Firm, LAPTOPMAG.COM (July 9, 2011), http://blog.laptop
mag.com/crowdfunding-101-how-rising-startups-use-the-web-as-a-vc-firm.
21 See HOWE, supra note 1, at 248; Jilian Mincer, Microlending for
Microbankers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2008, at D2.
22 See Belleflamme et al., supra note 10, at 2-3; Tim Kappel, Ex Ante
Crowdfunding and the Recording Industry: A Model for the U.S.?, 29 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 375, 375-76 (2009) ("[Crowdfunding] has been
increasingly used in the entertainment industry by independent
filmmakers, artists, writers, and performers."). Not surprisingly,
politicians have adapted their crowdfunding to the Internet as well.
Barak Obama used the Internet in his 2008 presidential campaign to raise
over $750 million from just under four million donors. Tahman Bradley,
Final Fundraising Figure: Obama's $750M, ABC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2008),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/Story?id=6397572&page=1.
13 See, e.g., UNBOUND: BOOKS ARE Now IN YOUR HANDS, http://www.
unbound.co.uk/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). See also Keith Wagstaff, Is
Crowdfunding the Future of Book Publishing?, THE UTOPIANIST (June 22,
2001), http://utopianist.com/2011/06/is-crowdfunding-the-future-of-book-
publishing/ (discussing how crowd-funding works in book publishing).
24 See 8-BIT FUNDING, http://www.8bitfunding.com/index.php (last
visited Mar. 5, 2012). See also The Power of Crowd Funding, EDGE (June
20, 2011), http://www.next-gen.biz/features/powertothepeoplefeature
(discussing how crowdfunding works in the video game industry).
25 See MY MAJOR COMPANY, http://www.mymajorcompany.co.uk/ (last
visited Mar. 5, 2012); SELLABAND, https://www.sellaband.com/ (last visited
Mar. 5, 2012). Crowdfunding works in the music industry "because most
of the market is controlled by a handful of risk-averse major labels and
there's a huge underground that wants to break in." John Tozzi, Scoring
Money from an Online Crowd, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 10, 2007,
8:15 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/sep2007/sb
20070910_540342.htm (quoting Pim Tetist, one of the founders of
Sellaband).
26 See SPOT.Us: COMMUNITY-FUNDED REPORTING, http://spot.us/ (last
visited Mar. 5, 2012).
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and ranching.27 Crowdfunding is even being used to fund
scientific research projects.28 Other sites are open to broader
categories, such as "creative projects"29 or "sustainable or
Fair Trade" projects."o Others are directed at particular
types of entrepreneurs, such as women" or the poor.3 2 Many
crowdfunding sites are open to entrepreneurial projects
generally."
Crowdfunding is not just a U.S. innovation. There are
crowdfunding sites serving, among other countries and
regions, Great Britain,34 Hong Kong, Brazil," Germany,37
27 See HEIFER INTERNATIONAL, http://www.heifer.org/ (last visited Mar.
5, 2012).
28 See Thomas Lin, Scientists Turn to Crowds on the Web to Finance
Their Projects, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2011, at D3.
29 See Learn More, ROCKETHuB, http://rockethub.com/1eammore/intro
(last visited Mar. 5, 2012) ("creative products and endeavors"); Frequently
Asked Questions: Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kick
starter.com/help/faq/kickstarter%20basics (last visited Mar. 5, 2012)
("Kickstarter is focused on creative projects. We're a great way for artists,
filmmakers, musicians, designers, writers, illustrators, explorers, curators,
performers, and others to bring their projects, events, and dreams to life.").
31 See THE HooP FUND, http://www.hoopfund.com/learn.webui (last
visited Mar. 5, 2012).
' See INUKA, http://inuka.org/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
3 See How MicroPlace Works, MICROPLACE, https://www.microplace
.com/howitworks/what wedo (last visited Mar. 5, 2012); About Us, KIvA,
http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
3 See, e.g., PROFOUNDER, https://www.profounder.com (last visited
Mar. 5, 2012); GROW VC, http://www.growvc.com/main/ (last visited Mar. 5,
2012); PEERBACKERS: CROWDFUNDING BIG IDEAS, http://www.peerbackers.
com/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012); INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/
(last visited Mar. 5, 2012); MICROVENTURES, http://www.microventures.
com/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
" See MY MAJOR COMPANY, supra note 25; Company Information,
UNBOuND, http://www.unbound.co.uk/company (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
See generally Catherine Burns, Small Firms Seek Crowd Funding, BBC
(May 26, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13569912.
* See About, GROW VC, http://www.growvc.conmain/about/ (last
visited Mar. 5, 2012).
" See Janet Gunter, Brazil: Crowdfunding Potential, GLOBAL VOICES:
ENGLISH (May 24, 2011, 1:15 PM), http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/05/24
/brazil-crowdfunding-potential/.
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the Netherlands," and sub-Saharan Africa." Some sites
claim to be global, open to investors and entrepreneurs
everywhere.4 0
Not surprisingly, given the international reach of the
Internet, some of those foreign sites also sell to U.S.
investors," and some of the investments they sell would
almost certainly qualify as securities under U.S. law. That
raises a host of jurisdictional issues,42 but this article focuses
on the issues posed by domestic crowdfunding sites-web
sites operated by U.S. companies that bring together U.S.
entrepreneurs and U.S. investors.
B. Types of Crowdfunding
One can categorize crowdfunding into five types,
distinguished by what investors are promised in return for
their contributions: (1) the donation model; (2) the reward
model; (3) the pre-purchase model; (4) the lending model;
" See generally Karsten Wenzlaff, Crowdfunding is on the Rise in
Germany, CROWDSOURCING.ORG (June 27, 2011, 9:47 AM), http://www.
crowdsourcing.org/editorial/crowdfunding-is-on-the-rise-in-germany/4962.
" See SYMBID, http://www.symbid.com/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012);
About Us, SELLABAND, https://www.sellaband.com/en/pages/aboutus (last
visited Mar. 5, 2012).
" See Introducing Inuka, INUKA, http://inuka.org/ (last visited Mar. 5,
2012).
4 See, e.g., About, GROW VC, supra note 35 ("Grow Venture
Community (Grow VC) is the first global, transparent, community-based
platform dedicated to entrepreneurs and their needs. . . . We are located
all over the world and growing constantly. We wish to establish a
presence in all the most entrepreneurial countries on the planet."); About
Us, KIVA, supra note 32 ("Kiva works with microfinance institutions on
five continents.").
" For instance, an in-depth study of Sellaband found that its
investors were concentrated in Europe and the eastern United States.
Ajay Agrawal, Christian Catalini & Avid Goldfarb, The Geography of
Crowdfunding 8 (NET Institution, Working Paper No. 10-08, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1692661.
42 See generally 6 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 403-21 (6th ed. 2009). The answers to these
questions are complicated by the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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and (5) the equity model. Some crowdfunding sites
encompass more than one model; it is especially common to
see the reward and pre-purchase models on a single web site.
Other sites rely on only a single model.
1. Donation Sites
The contributions on donation sites are, as the name
would indicate, donations. Investors receive nothing in
return for their contributions-not even the eventual return
of the amounts they contributed. However, although the
contributor's motive is charitable, the recipient's motive need
not be. Donations may fund for-profit enterprises.
Pure donation sites are rare, and those that exist focus on
requests by charities and other non-profit institutions,
rather than requests by businesses." Some of the reward
and pre-purchase sites also allow unrewarded requests for
donations," but one study found that only 22% of all
crowdfunding initiatives were requests for donations, with
no rewards offered.
GlobalGiving is an example of a pure donation site." It
allows donors to direct contributions to development projects
around the world.47  The GlobalGiving Foundation, which
operates the site, takes a 15% fee48 and guarantees that the
remainder of the donation will reach the project within sixty
4 See, e.g., GLOBALGIVING, http://www.globalgiving.org/ (last visited
Mar. 5, 2012); DONORSCHOOSE.ORG, http://www.donorschoose.org (last
visited Mar. 5, 2012).
" For example, IndieGoGo recommends, but does not require that
fundraisers offer what it calls "perks." See Frequently Asked Questions:
Creating a Campaign, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/about/faqs
(last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
4' Belleflamme et al., supra note 10, at 9.
4 GLOBALGIVING, supra note 43. Another example is
DonorsChoose.org, which allows donors to donate to specific classroom
projects in public schools. See DONORSCHOOSE.ORG, supra note 43.
" About Globalgiving, GLOBALGIVING, http://www.globalgiving.org/
aboutus/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
4 Id.
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days.4 9 However, GlobalGiving, like other pure donation
sites, is limited to non-profit organizations. 0 None of the
leading crowdfunding sites available to business
entrepreneurs uses the pure-donation model.
2. Reward and Pre-Purchase Sites
The reward and pre-purchase crowdfunding models are
similar to each other, and often appear together on the same
sites. The reward model offers something to the investor in
return for the contribution, but does not offer interest or a
part of the earnings of the business. The reward could be
small, such as a key chain, or it could be something with a
little more cachet, such as the investor's name on the credits
of a movie."
The pre-purchase model, the most common type of
crowdfunding,5 2 is similar. As with the reward model,
contributors do not receive a financial return such as
interest, dividends, or part of the earnings of the business.
Instead, they receive the product that the entrepreneur is
making. For example, if the entrepreneur is producing a
music album, contributors would receive the album or the
right to buy the album at a reduced price upon completion.
Kickstarter 3 and IndieGoGo4 are the leading reward/pre-
purchase crowdfunding sites. 5 The two sites are similar.
4 How Global Giving Works, GLOBALGIVING, http://www.global
giving.org/howitworks.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
5o See GlobalGiving is Always Looking for More Incredible Grassroots
Projects, GLOBALGING, http://www.globalgiving.org/non-profits/join-global
giving/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
" See, e.g., Kappel, supra note 22, at 376 (Patrons receive perks "such
as the use of their name in the film credits or album liner notes, advanced
autographed copies of the work, or backstage access at a performer's
show.").
52 Belleflamme et al., supra note 10, at 34-35 tbl. 3 (66.7% of
crowdfunding offerings not involving pure donations offered the right to
receive a product).
1 Kickstarter: A New Way to Fund & Follow Creativity, KICKSTARTER,
http://www.kickstarter.com/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
4 INDIEGOGO, supra note 33.
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Kickstarter requires its projects to offer what it calls
"rewards," 6 typically of the pre-purchase variety. According
to Kickstarter, "Rewards are typically items produced by the
project itself-a copy of the CD, a print from the show, a
limited edition of the comic."" Typically, the "donation"
required to receive the product is below the planned retail
price. For example, Dan Provost and Tom Gerhardt, who
designed a tripod mount for the iPhone, offered one of the
mounts to anyone who donated $20.8 They planned to sell
the mount for a retail price of $34.95." But Kickstarter's
rewards are not limited to pre-purchase. Other suggested
rewards include "a visit to the set, naming a character after
a backer, [or] a personal phone call."6 0 The creators of the
iPhone tripod mount, for example, offered to dine with
anyone who contributed $250.61
IndieGoGo, unlike Kickstarter, does not require
campaigns to offer what it calls "perks," although it does
recommend them.6 2 Many of the perks offered on the
IndieGoGo site follow the pre-purchase model, but some go
well beyond that. The table below lists some of the perks
" There are a number of other rewards/pre-purchase sites. See, e.g.,
8-BIT FUNDING, supra note 24; PEERBACKERS, supra note 33; ROcKETHUB,
http://www.rockethub.com/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
5 Frequently Asked Questions: Creating a Project, KICKSTARTER, supra
note 29.
7 Id.
" Farhad Manjoo, Adopt a Genius: Kickstarter, the Brilliant Site that
Lets You Fund Strangers' Brilliant Ideas, SLATE (Jan. 27, 2011, 3:44 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2282436.
" See, e.g., TikTok+LunaTik Multi-Touch Watch Kits, KICKSTARTER,
http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1104350651/tiktok-lunatik-multi-touc
h-watch-kits (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). For a twenty-five dollar pledge,
donors would receive a watch kit that will sell for $34.95. For a fifty dollar
pledge, donors would receive a watch kit that would sell for $69.95.
' Frequently Asked Questions: Creating a Project, KICKSTARTER, supra
note 29.
61 Manjoo, supra note 58.
62 Frequently Asked Questions: Creating a Campaign, INDIEGOGO,
supra note 44.
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that Josh Freese of the band Nine Inch Nails offered to help
fund an album. 63
TABLE 1: SELECTED PERKS FOR FUNDERS
Contribution Perk
Amount
$7 Digital download of the album and videos
$15 CD/DVD set and digital download
$50 CD/DVD set
T-shirt




Tour with Josh for a few days
Have Josh write, record and release a 5-
song EP about you and your life story
One of Josh's drum sets
"Take shrooms and cruise Hollywood in
Danny from Tool's Lamborghini OR play
quarters and then hop on the Ouija board
for a while"
"Josh will join your band for a month ...
play shows, record, party with groupies,
' See, e.g., Danae Ringelmann, Want Ideas for VIP Perks? Listen to
Nine Inch Nail's Former Drummer, GOGO BLOG (Feb. 20, 2009, 7:23 PM),
http://www.indiegogo.com/blog/2009/02/want-ideas-for-vip-perks-listen-to-
nine-inch-nails-former-drummer.html. One hopes that at least a couple of
the listed perks are intended as jokes.
$75,000
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Contribution Perk
Amount
$75,000 etc. If you don't have a band he'll be your
personal assistant for a month (4-day work
weeks, 10 am to 4 pm)."
"Take a limo down to Tijuana and he'll
show you how it's done (what that means
exactly we can't legally get into here)"
"If you don't live in Southern California
(but are a U.S. resident) he'll come to you
and be your personal assistant/cabana boy
for 2 weeks"
"Take a flying trapeze lesson with Josh
and Robin from NIN, go back to Robin's
place afterwards and his wife will make
you raw lasagna"
Both Kickstarter and IndieGoGo take a cut of the money
collected. Kickstarter uses an "all-or-nothing" funding model
and does not allow projects to be funded unless they reach
their stated funding goal." If a project reaches its funding
goal, Kickstarter collects a 5% fee; 6 if not, Kickstarter does
not charge a fee.66 IndieGoGo allows project creators to draw
on pledged funds immediately, whether or not the funding
goal is reached, 67 but the fee depends on whether the funding
" Frequently Asked Questions: All or Nothing Funding, KICKSTARTER,
supra note 29.
6 Frequently Asked Questions: Creating a Project, KICKSTARTER, supra
note 29.
6 Id.
6 Frequently Asked Questions, INDIEGOGO, supra note 44. However,
this requires that the entrepreneur elect the web site's "Flexible Funding"
option. If an entrepreneur chooses the "Fixed Funding" alternative and
fails to reach her fundraising goal, the web site refunds all pledged
contributions.
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goal is met. IndieGoGo charges a 4% fee if the funding goal
is reached"6 and a 9% fee if it is not."
3. Lending Sites (Peer-to-Peer Lending)
The lending model of crowdfunding is often called peer-to-
peer lending. Peer-to-peer lending involves loans.
Contributors provide funds on a temporary basis, expecting
repayment. In some cases, investors are promised interest
on the funds they loan. In other cases, they are only entitled
to receive the return of their principal.
a. Sites Not Offering Interest
Kiva is, without a doubt, the leading crowdfunding site
using the lending model,0 and probably the leading
crowdfunding site of any type. One source calls Kiva "the
hottest nonprofit on the planet."'
Kiva does not lend directly to entrepreneurs, but instead
partners with microfinance lenders around the world, which
Kiva calls "field partners."72 The local institutions make
' Frequently Asked Questions: General FAQs, INDIEGOGO, supra note
44.
6 Frequently Asked Questions: Creating a Campaign, INDIEGOGO,
supra note 44. However, an entrepreneur who elects the web site's Fixed
Funding option and fails to reach the funding goal is charged no fee, and
all pledged contributions are refunded to investors.
"o See KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). Another
example of a lending site that does not charge interest is Inuka, which is
limited to requests from female entrepreneurs. See Introducing Inuka,
INUKA, supra note 31.
71 Jeffrey M. O'Brien, The Only Nonprofit That Matters, CNNMONEY
(Feb. 26, 2008, 11:31 AM), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/for
tunearchive/2008/03/03/103796533/index.htm?postversion=2008022611.
Kiva was originally not open to entrepreneurs in the United States. That
policy was changed in 2009. See Tamara Schweitzer, Microloans for All?,
INC. (June 10, 2009), http://www.inc.com/the-kiva-connection/2009
/06/microloansforall.html; Michael Liedtke, Kiva to Feed Cash-Starved
US Small Businesses, USA TODAY (June 10, 2009, 9:51 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/hotsites/2009-06-10-kivaN.htm.
72 How Kiva Works, KIvA, http://www.kiva.orglabout/how (last visited
Mar. 5, 2012).
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loans to entrepreneurs, often before the loan request is even
posted on Kiva.7" Each entrepreneur's loan request is posted
on the Kiva web site, where potential lenders can browse the
requests and fund each one in any amount from $25 to the
full amount of the loan.7 ' Kiva collects and distributes this
money back to the field partners and credits lenders with
any repayments the entrepreneurs make. 5 Lenders on the
Kiva site only receive their principal back; the field partners
use any interest received to cover their operating costs."
b. Sites Offering Interest
Prosper and Lending Club are the two leading peer-to-
peer lending sites that offer interest.7 Not all of the loans on
these sites are for business purposes. Most of the loans are
for personal expenses,"' but the amount of the small business
lending on these sites is increasing.
" Id. See also Stephanie Strom, Confusion On Where Money Lent Via
Kiva Goes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, at B6 (noting that "[tihe person-to-
person donor-to-borrower connections created by Kiva are partly fictional"
and that "most Kiva users do not realize this").
" How Kiva Works, KIVA, supra note 72.
7 Id.
76 Id.
7 PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012);
LENDING CLUB, http://www.lendingclub.com/home.action (last visited Mar.
5, 2012). See also Verstein, supra note 12 (Prosper and Lending Club
"dominate . . . [peer-to-peer lending] . . . in America."). Other lending sites
that offer interest are Microplace and the Calvert Foundation. See
MICROPLACE, http://www.microplace.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2012);
CALVERT FOUNDATION, http://www.calvertfoundation.org/ (last visited Mar.
5, 2012).
" See Angus Loten, Peer-to-Peer Loans Grow: Fed Up With Banks,
Entrepreneurs Turn to Internet Sites, WSJ.com (June 17, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487034212045763311417799
53526.html?mod=ITP-marketplace_3 [hereinafter Loten, Peer-to-Peer
Loans]; Jonnelle Marte, Credit Crunch Gives 'Microlending' a Boost,
WSJ.cOM (Sept. 26, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405 2 748
703905604575514340314712872.html?KEYWORDS=credit+crunch.
" Loten, Peer-to-Peer Loans, supra note 78. As of May 2011, about
7.5% of Lending Club's loans and about 11% of Prosper's loans were for
small business. Id.
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Prosper and Lending Club operate similar, but not
identical, platforms.80 Borrowers submit requests for loans
in amounts ranging from $1,000 to $25,000.81 Potential
lenders review those requests and decide which to fund.82
The minimum investment for each loan request is $25."
When a loan receives sufficient commitments to close, the
borrower executes a three-year unsecured note for the
amount of the loan.84
The nature of investors' participation in these loans has
changed since Prosper and Lending Club first launched.
Originally, borrowers on both sites issued notes directly to
the crowdfunding lenders, with the site maintaining custody
of the notes and servicing them for a 1% fee.5 Now,
however, lenders on the two sites do not make loans directly
to the underlying borrowers.6 Instead, lenders purchase
8o For a more detailed discussion of the operations of Prosper and
Lending Club, see generally Verstein, supra note 12 (describing the
operations of Prosper and Lending Club).
" See Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Amendment No. 6 to Registration
Statement 8 (Form S-1) (July 13, 2009), available at http://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000141626509000017/prospers-1a6.
htm [hereinafter Prosper Registration Statement]; LendingClub Corp.,
Amendment No. 3 to Registration Statement 8 (Form S-1) (Oct. 9, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/0000950134
08017739/f41480a3sv1za.htm [hereinafter Lending Club Registration
Statement].
82 All of the Lending Club lenders must meet suitability standards
based on gross income and/or net worth. Lending Club Registration
Statement, supra note 81, at 5. Prosper imposes suitability standards only
on lenders living in certain states. Prosper Registration Statement, supra
note 81, at 6.
" Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 12; Lending Club
Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 48.
' Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 8; Lending Club
Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 7. Prosper has said it plans to
vary the terms of its loans in the future, with a range between three
months and seven years. Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81,
at 8.
85 Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 76; Lending Club
Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 89.
8 See Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 8; Lending
Club Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 7. The change resulted
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notes issued by Prosper or Lending Club themselves, and the
sites use those funds to make loans through WebBank 7 to
the underlying borrowers.*8 - Although the sites are the
issuers of the notes that the lenders purchase, the sites are
obligated to pay only if the underlying borrowers repay the
corresponding loans." In effect, the sites act as conduits for
borrower payments, taking 1% of the payments before
passing them along to the lenders."0 Both Prosper and
Lending Club also charge borrowers an origination fee on
each loan; the amount of the fee depends on the borrower's
credit risk."
Prosper and Lending Club set interest rates on the notes
(and on the underlying loans) differently. Lending Club
evaluates each borrower and sets an interest rate on each
loan based on the "loan grade" it assigns to the loan.92
Prosper also rates each potential loan,9" but those scores are
used only to set a minimum rate." The actual interest rate
is determined by an auction process. Each lender bids the
minimum percentage he is willing to accept,95 and the
interest rate on each loan (and on the notes issued by
directly from the SEC's position that the sites were illegally offering
securities without registration. See Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Securities
Act Release No. 8984 (Nov. 24, 2008).
7 Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 5; Lending Club
Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 6.
' Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 8; Lending Club
Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 7.
" Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 8; Lending Club
Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 7-8. Each loan involves a
different series of note. The notes are registered pursuant to a Form S-1
shelf registration, and each loan requires a different prospectus
supplement. Verstein, supra note 12.
90 Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 5; Lending Club
Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 3.
91 Verstein, supra note 12.
9 Lending Club Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 37-43.
* Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 12, 41-43.
94 Id. at 4.
9 Id.
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Prosper) is the minimum percentage acceptable to enough
lenders to fund the entire loan.9 6
4. Equity Sites
Equity crowdfunding offers investors a share of the
profits or return of the business they are helping to fund.
The equity model is the model that most clearly involves the
sale of a security. Because of the regulatory issues it raises,
the equity crowdfunding model is not common in the United
States. Equity crowdfunding is more common elsewhere,
however. 7 One study found that one-third of all
crowdfunding sites that offered investor rewards offered
stock. "
Until recently, ProFounder was the leading equity-model
crowdfunding site in the United States." However,
ProFounder announced in June 2011 that it would no longer
be offering securities on its site."oo The reason for the change
became apparent when the California Department of
Corporations subsequently issued a consent order barring
ProFounder from selling securities on its web site unless it
first registered as a broker-dealer under California law.o'
96 Id.
9 Eric Markowitz, Coming Soon: More Cash for Start-ups?, YAHOO
SMALL BUSINESS ADVISOR (Dec. 8, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://smallbusiness.
yahoo.com/advisor/why-crowdfunding-bill-good-start-050100895.html.
9 Belleflamme et al., supra note 10, at 33-35 tbl. 3. Another 22%
offered direct cash payments other than dividends on stock. Id.
' PROFOUNDER, supra note 33. See also Nikki D. Pope, Crowdfunding
Microstartups: It's Time for the Securities and Exchange Commission to
Approve a Small Offering Exemption, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 973, 978-81
(discussing a few direct Internet offerings not mediated through
crowdfunding sites).
In See Jessica Jackley, Changes to Our Site, PROFOUNDER, THE BLOG
(June 27, 2011), http://profounderblog.wordpress.com/2011/06/27/changes-
to-our-site/. On February 17, 2012, ProFounder announced that it was
shutting down. ProFounder Shutting Down, PROFOUNDER (Feb. 17, 2012),
http://blog.profounder.com/2012/02/17/profounder-shutting-down/.
1o1 See ProFounder Fin., Inc., Cal. Bus., Transp. & Hous. Agency Dep't
of Corps. Consent Order to Desist and Refrain (Aug. 31, 2011), available at
www.corp.ca.gov/ENF/pdf/20 11/ ProFounderCO.pdf.
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As a result of this change, there are now no major, publicly
accessible equity crowdfunding sites in the United States,
although there are sites that facilitate private equity
offerings to sophisticated and accredited investors.'0 2
When it was operating, ProFounder offered two different
types of investment, which it called "public rounds" and
"private rounds."'0 3 The types of offerings differed in two
ways: (1) the return offered to investors; and (2) the
investors allowed to participate. In public rounds, the
amount paid back to investors was limited to the amount
they contributed, without any return on their investment;
investors in private rounds could receive more than what
they invested.104 Public rounds were open to the general
public while private rounds were limited to friends, family
members and existing acquaintances of each entrepreneur-
an attempt to fit within the SEC's Rule 504 exemption from
registration. 0o
Investors on ProFounder were promised a percentage of
the gross revenues of the businesses in which they
invested.'06 The exact percentage of revenues to be paid to
investors and the period over which investors were to receive
those funds was left to the individual entrepreneur to
102 See MICROVENTURES, supra note 33; Terms, GROW VC, http://www.
growvc.com/main/tour/terms/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (limited to
accredited investors).
1o3 See Matt Ferner, Financing for Ecommerce: ProFounder.com Can




105 See infra Part III.B.2.c.
10 David Lang, Entrepreneur-Read This First!, PROFOUNDER (Nov. 4,
2010), http://support.profounder.com/entries/321128-common-questions-
read-this-first (on file with author). ProFounder did not explain why
investors shared gross revenues rather than profits, but this was probably
an attempt to avoid creating a partnership between the entrepreneur and
the investors. Under the Uniform Partnership Act, profit-sharing is
presumptive evidence of the existence of a partnership. UNIF. P'sHIp ACT
§ 202(c)(3) (1997). Sharing gross returns is not. Id. § 202(c)(2).
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determine,1o' but the maximum payout period was five
years.0 This share of revenues was the only equity interest
investors received-they received no stock or any other
ownership interest.'
Entrepreneurs had to pay to list on ProFounder, but the
amount and structure of those payments is a little unclear.
According to the ProFounder web site, entrepreneurs had to
pay an initial fee of $100 to post a fundraising appeal."i0
But, according to ProFounder's CEO, the initial fee for a
private round was $1,000."' For a public round, the
entrepreneur had to pay 5% of the amount raised if the
fundraising succeeded.' If a private round was successful,
both the ProFounder web site and one interview of its CEO
indicated that the entrepreneur had to pay an additional
$1,000.113 But the CEO indicated in another interview that
no additional fee was charged for a private round-that
entrepreneurs paid a flat $1,000 fee, whether or not the
offering succeeded." 4
Entrepreneurs had thirty days to raise the funds
needed."' If entrepreneurs failed to reach their goal, they
10' Lang, supra note 106.
108 Id.
109 Investment Terms, PROFOUNDER, https://www.profounder.com/inve
stors/investment-terms/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
no FAQs, PROFOUNDER, http://www.profounder.com/entrepreneurs/faq
(last visited Mar. 5, 2012). See also Lang, supra note 106.
n. Is ProFounder in Violation of Any Securities Laws with Their
Crowdsourced Model for Funding Startups?, QuORA (Nov. 30, 2010),
http://www.quora.com/ProFounder/Is-ProFounder-in-violation-of-any-secur
ities-laws-with-their-crowdsourced-model-for-funding-startups.
112 Company Terms and Conditions for Services, PROFOUNDER,
https://www.profounder.com/legal/terms-andconditions (last visited Mar.
5, 2012); Is ProFounder in Violation of Any Securities Laws with Their
Crowdsourced Model for Funding Startups?, supra note 111.
113 FAQs, PROFOUNDER, supra note 110. See also Lang, supra note
106; Ferner, supra note 103.
114 See Is ProFounder in Violation of Any Securities Laws with Their
Crowdsourced Model for Funding Startups?, supra note 111 (statement by
Jessica Jackley).
115 FAQs, PROFOUNDER, supra note 110.
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received none of the pledged funds."' Investors did not sign
term sheets or make any payments until the goal was met.
C. The Antecedents of Crowdfunding
Internet-based crowdfunding is a merger of two distinct
antecedents: crowdsourcing and microfinance. "7
Crowdsourcing is, quite simply, "collecting contributions
from many individuals to achieve a goal.""' It divides "an
overwhelming task . . . into small enough chunks that
completing it becomes . . . feasible.""9 Wikipedia is probably
the most prominent example of crowdsourcing-an entire
encyclopedia consisting of articles written and edited by the
general public.120 Linux, the open-source computer operating
system, was developed through crowdsourcing, and other
software companies, including IBM, have adopted the open-
source model.12 ' From astronomy to stock photography to
"prediction markets" to eBay, platforms based on the
116 Company Terms and Conditions for Services, PROFOUNDER, supra
note 112.
117 See Belleflamme et al., supra note 10, at 2 (stating that
crowdfunding is rooted in crowdsourcing); When Small Loans Make a Big
Difference, FORBES.COM (June 3, 2008, 4:08 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
2008/06/03/kiva-microfinance-uganda-ent-fin-cx_0603whartonkiva.html
(noting that crowdfunding is a merger of social networking and
microfinance); Nick Mendoza, How Filmmakers Use Crowdfunding to
Kickstart Productions, PBS MEDIASHIFT (Sept. 21, 2010),
http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2010/09/how-filmmakers-use-crowdfunding-
to-kickstart-productions264.html (describing crowdfunding as a mix of
crowdsourcing, marketing and fundraising); Schwienbacher & Larralde,
supra note 14, at 5.
n.. Tina Rosenberg, Crowdsourcing a Better World, N.Y. TIMES.COM
OPINIONATOR (Mar. 28, 2011, 9:15 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.
nytimes.com/2011/03/28/crowdsourcing-a-better-world.
119 HOWE, supra note 1, at 11.
120 See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF
BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF MORE 65-70 (2006); HOWE, supra note 1, at
56-61; DON TAPScOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIINOMICS: How MASS
COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 71-77 (2006).
" See HOWE, supra note 1, at 47-70; CLAY SHIRKY, Here COMES
EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS 237-43
(2008); TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 77-83.
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collective contributions of a large number of people are
commonplace today.1 22 Even the all-pervasive Google search
system is crowdsourcing; Google's algorithm captures the
sites that everyone collectively is linking to and visiting.'23
The Internet significantly reduces the transaction costs of
decentralized group action 2 ' and "opens . . . the economy to
new Linux-like projects every day."'25 The "rigid
institutional structures" previously required to organize
economic action are, in many cases, no longer necessary.'26
The other antecedent of crowdfunding is microlending,
sometimes called microfinance. Microlending involves
lending very small amounts of money, typically to poorer
borrowers. 2 7 Microlending can be traced back to Irish loan
funds in the 1700s,'128 but it became prominent in recent
times through the work of Muhammad Yunus and the
Grameen Bank.129 Yunus's project began when he loaned $27
122 For a more detailed look at crowdsourcing, see generally HOWE,
supra note 1; TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 120.
123 YOcHm BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 76 (2006). See also
JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER
THAN THE FEW AND How COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS,
ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 16-17 (2004) (describing Google as an
example of the wisdom of the crowds).
124 BENKLER, supra note 123, at 3; SHIRKY, supra note 121, at 48.
125 TAPSCOT & WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 24. However,
crowdsourcing predates the Internet. For example, since 1900, the
National Audubon Society has been organizing bird-watchers to do an
annual count of birds in the Western hemisphere. See Rosenberg, supra
note 118. The famous Pillsbury Bake-Off is a long-standing means of
crowdsourcing recipes. See id.
126 SHIRKY, supra note 121, at 21-22.
127 See Mincer, supra note 21.
121 Sarah B. Lawsky, Money for Nothing: Charitable Deductions for
Microfinance Lenders, 61 SMU L. REV. 1525, 1529 (2008).
129 See Mincer, supra note 21; Olivia L. Walker, The Future of
Microlending in the United States: A Shift from Charity to Profits?, 6 OHIO
ST. Bus. L.J. 383, 384 (2011); Kathleen Kingsbury, Microfinance: Lending
a Hand, TIME (Apr. 5, 2007), http://www.time.com/time/magazine
/article/0,9171,1607256,00.html.
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of his own money to 42 villagers in Bangladesh.'3 0 He
subsequently established a multi-branch bank, the Grameen
Bank, that specialized in such loans. 3 1 In 2006, Yunus and
the Grameen Bank shared the Nobel Peace Prize. Micro-
lending has its detractors,132 but it has ballooned into a
multi-billion-dollar industry.3 3
Micro-lending is defined primarily by the recipient-very
small entrepreneurial ventures. Crowdsourcing is defined
primarily by the contributor-small contributions from a
large number of people to achieve a common goal.
Crowdfunding is just a combination of those two ideas-
small contributions from a large number of people to fund
small entrepreneurial ventures.
III. ARE CROWDFUNDING INVESTMENTS
SUBJECT TO THE REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECURITIES ACT?
Crowdfunding raises two different sets of issues under
federal securities laws. The first issue relates to the
offerings themselves: are the entrepreneurs raising funds on
crowdfunding sites offering securities subject to the
registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933? The
second set of issues relates to possible violations of securities
laws by the crowdfunding sites that facilitate those offerings.
This section addresses the first issue; the next section
focuses on the securities law status of the crowdfunding
sites.
Section 5 of the Securities Act and the SEC rules
associated with Section 5 are a morass of prohibitions,
"o MUHAmmAD YuNuS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICRO-LENDING AND THE
BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY 49-50 (2003).
131 Id. at 89-97.
132 See Kingsbury, supra note 129 (noting complaints that microcredit
does little to alleviate overall poverty, crowds out locally owned banks, and
can leave the poor drowning in debt).
"' See id. As of 2007, about 10,000 microfinance institutions held
more than $7 billion in outstanding loans.
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exceptions, conditions, and exceptions to exceptions, 13 4 but
the basic prohibitions are clear. Absent an exemption, an
issuer may not offer a security for sale until a registration
statement has been filed with the SEC.' And an issuer may
not sell a security 36 until that registration statement has
become effective.' But the registration requirements apply
only if the entrepreneurs on crowdfunding sites are offering
securities. 3 8 If crowdfunding investments are not securities,
the federal securities laws do not apply.
A. Are Crowdfunding Investments Securities?
Each federal securities statute has its own definition of
"security," but the language of the various definitions, for
purposes of the issues raised here, is roughly the same.39
The most expansive part of the definition of security, the
catch-all category, is the term "investment contract." In SEC
v. W. J. Howey Co., the Supreme Court defined an
investment contract as (1) an investment of money (2) in a
common enterprise (3) with an expectation of profits (4)
13' Consider, for example, Securities Act Rule 433. Whether a
communication falls within the Rule 433 safe harbor can depend on,
among other things: whether the issuer has filed a registration statement,
Rule 433(a); characteristics of the company issuing the securities, such as
its size and how long it has been a reporting company, Rule 433(b); the
content of the communication, Rule 433(b)(2)(i), (c); who is making the
communication, Rule 433(d), (f); where the information in the
communication originally came from, Rule 433(d)(1)(i)(B), (h)(2); whether
the information in the communication is otherwise available to the general
public, Rule 433(d)(8)(ii); and whether the issuer or anyone else associated
with the offering paid for the communication, Rule 433(b)(2)(i), (f)(1)(i).
" Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2010).
136 "Selling" includes entering into a contract of sale. See id. §
77b(a)(3).
3 Id. § 77e(a)(1).
1 Even if they are offering securities, an exemption may be available.
See infra Part III.B.2.
. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10); Investment Company Act of
1940 § 2(a)(36), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (2010); Investment Advisers Act of
1940 § 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (2010). For convenience, this
article generally refers to the Securities Act definition unless there is some
relevant difference.
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arising solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party.14o Both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have
refined the Howey test over the years, but its basic elements
remain unchanged-with one significant exception. The
word "solely" has been eliminated from the efforts-of-others
part of the test. Instead, the question is "whether the efforts
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably
significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which
affect the failure or success of the enterprise."141
Crowdfunding offerings of the donation, reward, and pre-
purchase type clearly do not involve securities for purposes
of federal law. Crowdfunding sites organized on the lending
model probably are offering securities if the lender is
promised interest. Crowdfunding sites organized on the
equity model are usually offering securities. 42
1. The Donation Model
Donation-model crowdfunding sites are not offering
securities to investors. Contributors receive absolutely
nothing in return for their contributions, so they clearly have
no expectation of profits, a requirement for something to be
an investment contract under Howey. And contributors to
donation-model sites are offered nothing else, such as stock'43
or notes, 4 that would fall within the general definition of a
14 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
141 SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.
1973); accord SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th
Cir. 1974).
142 Heminway and Hoffman have similarly concluded that at least
some crowdfunding offerings are securities under the Howey investment
contract test. See Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman,
Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78
TENN. L. REV. 879, 892-906 (2011).
" See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (holding
that ordinary corporate stock is a security).
'" See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (applying the
"family resemblance" test to determine whether a note is a security).
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security."' Gratuitous contributions, even to a business
entity, simply are not securities.
2. The Reward and Pre-Purchase Models
The reward and pre-purchase models also do not involve
securities under federal law, as long as the reward or the
pre-purchased product is all the investor is promised in
return for her contribution. The Supreme Court has drawn a
clear distinction between investment and consumption. An
investment contract is present only when an investor is
offered a financial return on his investment, such as capital
appreciation or a participation in earnings 4 6 or even a fixed
rate of interest."4 If "a purchaser is motivated by a desire to
use or consume the item purchased . .. the securities laws do
not apply."148 It does not matter that the contributor is
promised a lower price for the product than the general
public will pay.
Contributors on reward or pre-purchase sites are offered
no financial return of any kind. They are promised only a
product or service-a consumption item. Therefore, no
investment contract is being offered. And, because investors
on reward or pre-purchase sites are not offered stock, notes,
or anything else that falls within the definition of security,
federal securities law does not apply.
.. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2010).
1" United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 853 (1975).
147 SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 397 (2004).
"n United Hous. Found., 421 U.S. at 852-53. It is possible that these
might be securities under state law. Some states use a risk capital test to
define securities. The risk capital test has three elements: "(1) an
investment, (2) in the risk capital of an enterprise, and (3) the expectation
of a benefit." JOSEPH C. LONG, 12 BLuE SKY L. 2:80 (2011). The benefit
expected need not be an interest in profits, but can be any benefit that
motivates the investor to invest. Id. See also Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961) (finding a security where a country club
pre-sold club memberships to raise startup capital); HAZEN, supra note 42,
at 110.
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3. The Equity Model
Equity-model crowdfunding would usually involve
securities. If investors receive ordinary corporate stock in
exchange for their contributions, they clearly are purchasing
securities. The definition of security includes "stock,"'49 and
the Supreme Court has held that ordinary corporate stock is
a security, with no additional analysis required.',o Even if
crowdfunding investors are offered some participation in the
return of the business that does not involve corporate stock,
their investments would still be securities. Interests in
partnerships and limited liability companies, and other non-
stock equity interests, are analyzed under the Howey
investment contract test.1 ' The interests offered to investors
on equity-model sites would clearly be investment contracts
under Howey.
Crowdfunding almost by definition involves a common
enterprise among many different investors. The whole point
of crowdfunding is to collect small amounts of money from a
number of different investors. The business pools these
investors' funds, and the investors share in the returns of the
business. Although there is some disagreement among the
lower courts about what exactly constitutes a common
enterprise, all courts agree that horizontal commonality of
this sort meets the Howey test.'52
Investors on equity-model sites would also have an
expectation of profits. Contributors are providing cash in
return for some sort of revenue- or profit-sharing.'53 The
14 Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
..o Calling something stock is not alone enough to make it a security.
United Hous. Found., 421 U.S. at 848. However, "[ilinstruments that bear
both the name and all of the usual characteristics of stock seem to us to be
the clearest case for coverage by the plain language of the definition."
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 693 (1985).
1. See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2008)
(LLCs); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981) (partnerships).
152 See HAZEN, supra note 42, at 98 ("Horizontal commonality clearly
satisfies the Howey common enterprise requirement.").
11 Even if investors are offered a fixed return, rather than one that
depends on how well the business does, that would still meet the Howey
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"public raise" type of funding offered by ProFounder 5 4 would
not meet this requirement, however. Public-raise investors
are promised a share of the entrepreneur's revenues, but
only until their original contributions are repaid. A person
who contributed $1,000 would receive, at most, only $1,000
back, no matter how well the business did. Since no profits
are expected, public-raise investments would not be
securities.
Finally, the profits expected are to come solely from the
efforts of the promoters or other third parties. Crowdfunding
investors will not usually be involved in the operation of the
business in which they invest, and, even if the crowdfunding
site allows them some minor role, the "essential managerial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise 15 5
will be those of the entrepreneur.
4. The Lending Model
The analysis is most complicated for lending-model
crowdfunding. 66 The federal securities laws are not limited
to equity interests in businesses. The definition of security
encompasses some forms of debt,"' and an investment may
be a security even though the return consists of a fixed
requirement of an expectation of profits. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S.
389 (2004) (holding that an agreement to pay investors $82 a month
constituted a security).
1 See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
... SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.
1973).
156 Many lending sites offer consumer loans, and not just loans to
business entrepreneurs. The following discussion is limited to loans to
businesses and business projects. Loans for consumer purposes are less
likely to be treated as securities. See Verstein, supra note 12 (arguing that
consumer notes would not be securities under either the Howey or Reves
tests). For a general introduction to peer-to-peer lending, see Kevin E.
Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer-to-Peer Financing for Development:
Regulating the Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1209 (2010);
Verstein, supra note 12.
... The definition of a security includes, among other things, "notes,"
"bonds," "debentures," and "evidence of indebtedness." See Securities Act
of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2010).
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payment or a fixed rate of interest. 5 8 Howey is still relevant
but, if investors are offered notes, the Supreme Court's
analysis in Reves v. Ernst & Young, discussed below, must
also be considered. Under that analysis, sites like Kiva that
offer investors no interest or other return, only a return of
their principal, are probably not offering securities, but, if
investors are promised interest, their investments probably
are securities.
Consider first whether crowdfunding sites offering
interest are selling investment contracts. Contributors are
investing money with an expectation of profits. A fixed rate
of interest, such as that which is offered on the Lending Club
and Prosper sites, would be "profit" for purposes of Howey."
If more than one lender contributes to each business, there is
a horizontal common enterprise. And the profits are going to
result solely, or at least primarily, from the efforts of the
entrepreneur. Thus, investments made on lending sites that
offer investors interest would be investment contracts under
the Howey test. However, if the site, like Kiva, offers
investors only a return of their principal, without any
interest or other gain, investors would have no expectation of
profits. 160 Consequently, the investment contract test would
not be met.16 1
15 Edwards, 540 U.S. at 397 (holding that an investment offering a
fixed return of $82 a month was an investment contract).
159 Id.
160 See Verstein, supra note 12 (setting forth a similar analysis). This
is why Kiva does not offer interest to investors. According to Matt
Flannery, a co-founder of Kiva, Kiva would like to offer investors interest.
Matt Flannery, Kiva and the Birth of Person-to-Person Microfinance, 2
INNOVATIONS 31, 53 (2007). Kiva decided not to offer interest after
Flannery had a conversation with an attorney in the SEC's Office of Small
Business Policy and concluded that the key to avoiding SEC interference
was not to pay interest. Id. at 41.
161 See Global Dev. Co-operative, SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL
5013895 (Oct. 19, 2011) (granting no-action relief to a cooperative that
planned to sell interest-free notes to help fund capital investment projects
in developing countries). See also Davis & Gelpern, supra note 156, at
1241, 1258-59 (conceding that sites like Kiva are not offering securities
under current law, but arguing that such investments should be
regulated).
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Investments made through lending-model sites might
also involve notes, and thus be securities under another part
of the definition.162 Some of the lending sites, such as Kiva,
do not give investors a formal note in return for their
investments; others, such as Lending Club and Prosper, do.
The term "note" appears in the definition of a security,163 but
not all notes are securities.
The Supreme Court applies a different analysis, first
articulated in Reves v. Ernst & Young,'64 to determine
whether a note is a security. Crowdfunding notes that
promise to pay interest to investors would probably be
securities under the Reves test. The Reves analysis, known
as the "family resemblance test," begins with a rebuttable
presumption that every note is a security.' It then looks to
a list of notes that are not securities, but crowdfunding loans
to businesses would not fit any of the categories on that
list.166  The final step of the Reves analysis is therefore
162 When an instrument is a note, the applicability of the Howey
investment contract analysis is a little unclear. Most courts have applied
the Howey investment contract test and the Reves note test in the
alternative with little analysis. See, e.g., SEC v. U.S. Reservation Bank &
Trust, 289 F. App'x 228, 230-31 (9th Cir. 2008); Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1539 (10th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Novus Tech., LLC, No.
2:07-CV-235-TC, 2010 WL 4180550 (D. Utah Oct. 20, 2010); In re Tucker
Freight Lines, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 884, 888-89 (W.D. Mich. 1991); Reeder v.
Succession of Palmer, 736 F. Supp. 128, 131-32 (E.D. La. 1990). See also
Dennis S. Corgill, Securities as Investments at Risk, 67 TUL. L. REV. 861,
900 (1993) (concluding that a note that is not a security under the Reves
test could still be a security under the Howey investment contract test).
But see Robert Anderson IV, Employee Incentives and the Federal
Securities Laws, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1195, 1231 (2003) (arguing against
applying a second-stage investment contract analysis to something that is
not a security under Reves).
* See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2010).
1 494 U.S. 56, 63-68 (1990).
165 Id. at 63.
1 Reves accepted the following categories of non-securities:
[Tihe note delivered in consumer financing, the note
secured by a mortgage on a home, the short-term note
secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets,
the note evidencing a 'character' loan to a bank customer,
36 COL UMBIA B USINESS LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 2012
CRO WDFUNDING AND SECURITIES LAWS
decisive: applying a four-part test to determine whether
crowdfunding notes bear sufficient "family resemblance" to
the listed non-securities such that crowdfunding notes
should also not be treated as securities. The four factors are
(1) the motivations of the buyer and seller of the note; (2) the
plan of distribution of the notes; (3) the reasonable
expectations of the investing public; and (4) "whether some
factor such as the existence of another regulatory scheme
significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby
rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary. "167
In applying this test, it is important to keep in mind that the
presumption is in favor of treating notes as securities.
The last factor is easily dismissed. Crowdfunding loans,
like the notes at issue in Reves, are uncollateralized and
uninsured, and no other federal regulatory scheme covers
them. They "would escape federal regulation entirely if
the . . . [federal securities laws] . . . were held not to apply."1 68
The motivations factor supports treating interest-bearing
crowdfunding notes as securities. The entrepreneur's
purpose-or in the case of sites like Lending Club and
Prosper that issue their own notes to finance entrepreneurs,
the site's purpose-"is to raise money for the general use of a
business," a securities purpose." Investors are "interested
primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate,"7 e
with profit defined by the Court to include ordinary
interest. 7 1  This is also a securities purpose. However,
investors on sites that offer no interest are not interested in
short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts
receivable, . . . a note which simply formalizes an open-
account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business
(particularly if, as in the case of the customer of a broker, it
is collateralized), . . . [and] . . . notes evidencing loans by
commercial banks for current operations.
Id. at 65.
'6' Id. at 67.
168 Id. at 69.
'69 Id. at 66.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 68 n.4.
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profit because no profit is expected. 17 2 Their motivations are
of a more charitable nature, which cuts against security
status. This alone might be enough to keep the loans on
sites like Kiva from being securities.
The plan-of-distribution factor also appears to point
toward securities status. Some of the crowdfunding sites are
tied to trading markets where investors buy notes from, or
sell them to, other investors. Notes purchased on the
Lending Club and Prosper sites, for example, may be traded
on a platform maintained by FOLIOfn Investments, a
registered broker-dealer."1 3 But notes can meet the plan-of-
distribution test even if there is no trading market. After
first indicating that the plan-of-distribution factor depends
on whether "there is 'common trading for speculation or
investment,""74 the Reves opinion said that it was sufficient if
the notes are "offered and sold to a broad segment of the
public," even if, as in Reves, there is no market to trade the
notes."' Crowdfunding lending sites are open to the public,
and, by definition, crowdfunding involves investments by a
number of small investors. The number of investors will not
always be as many as the 1600 purchasers in Reves,176 but it
will typically be more than a few. Thus, notes sold on
crowdfunding sites could meet this part of the Reves test
even if there is no trading market.
The final factor to consider is the investing public's
reasonable expectations. Reves said little about this factor,
other than to indicate that notes might be treated as
securities on the basis of such public perceptions, "even
where an economic analysis of the circumstances of the
particular transaction" would suggest otherwise."' In
applying this factor, the Reves Court observed only that the
172 See Verstein, supra note 12 (setting forth a similar analysis).
"' See Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 11; Lending
Club Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 11.
"' Reves, 494 U.S. at 66 (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
U.S. 344, 351 (1943)).
15 Id. at 68.
176 Id. at 59.
"1 Id. at 66.
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notes were characterized as investments, and nothing "would
have led a reasonable person to question this
characterization.""" The question, as analyzed in the lower
courts, seems to be "whether a reasonable member of the
investing public would consider these notes as
investments."1 79 That, in turn, probably depends on whether
interest is offered and on whether or not the note is
presented to investors as an investment.8 0 If purchasers are
buying the notes for the interest they promise, they appear
to be investments, no matter how the crowdfunding site
characterizes them."' Sites like Kiva that offer no interest
are less likely to meet this factor.'
As indicated earlier,'8 3 Lending Club and Prosper have
changed their business models since their inception.
Originally, lenders on those sites made loans directly to the
underlying borrowers and received notes from those
borrowers in return. Now, Lending Club and Prosper issue
their own notes to lenders, and lenders are not directly
lending to the underlying borrowers. As far as the
definitions of "investment contract" and "note" are
17 Id. at 69. See also Stoiber v. SEC, 161 F.3d 745, 751 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (describing this factor as a "one-way ratchet" that does not allow
notes that are securities under the other factors to escape the securities
laws).
179 McNabb v. SEC, 298 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002); accord SEC v.
Wallenbrock, 313 F.3d 532, 539 (9th Cir. 2002); Stoiber, 161 F.3d at 751.
180 Stoiber, 161 F.3d at 751 ("When a note seller calls a note an
investment, in the absence of contrary indications it would be reasonable
for a prospective purchaser to take the [offeror] at its word . . . .
Conversely, when note purchasers are expressly put on notice that a note
is not an investment, it is usually reasonable to conclude that the
'investing public' would not expect the notes to be securities.") (quotations
omitted). But see Wallenbrock, 313 F.3d at 539 (noting that the failure of
the promoter to "use the term 'investment' to describe the notes is of little
import, given the nature of the transactions").
... See Wallenbrock, 313 F.3d at 539 (noting that the reasonable
expectations factor is closely related to the motivations factor and that the
failure to describe the notes as investments is "of little import").
182 See Verstein, supra note 12 (setting forth a similar analysis).
"o See supra text accompanying notes 87-92.
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concerned, this difference is irrelevant.'84 Nothing in the
analysis above depends on who the issuer is.' 5
The SEC certainly believes that interest-bearing
crowdfunding notes are securities. It has forced both
Lending Club and Prosper to register the notes they offer.18 6
Prior to that registration, the SEC entered a consent cease-
and-desist order against Prosper, finding that Prosper was
improperly selling securities without registration. "' Both
companies' registration statements indicate that it is
"reasonably possible" that the sites will be liable to lenders
for securities sold prior to registration,' and Prosper is
currently fighting a class action lawsuit brought by pre-
registration lenders."'
m See Prosper Marketplace, Inc., supra note 86 (taking the position
that the notes offered by Prosper, under its original model, were
securities).
18 The identity of the issuer might matter for purposes of registration.
If Lending Club and Prosper have no obligation on the notes they issue
and payment depends entirely on the success of the underlying borrower,
should the sites really be considered the issuers for purposes of
registration and the disclosure requirements? See Stefan J. Padfield, Peer-
to-Peer Lending: Who Is the Issuer?, Bus. LAw PROF BLOG (June 16, 2011),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/businesslaw/2011/06/peer-to-peer-lendin
g-who-is-the-issuer.html. See also Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 142,
at 922-27 (discussing whether the entrepreneur, the crowdfunding site, or
both are the issuer for purposes of registration).
186 See Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81; Lending Club
Registration Statement, supra note 81.
1 Prosper Marketplace, Inc., supra note 86.
1 Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at F-40; Lending
Club Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 90.
189 Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 75. A blog has
been set up to monitor and report on that case. See PROSPER CLASS ACTION
SUIT MONITOR, http://prosperclassaction.wordpress.com/ (last visited Mar.
5, 2012). Prosper has also entered into a settlement with the North
American Securities Administrators Association of regulatory claims
under state securities law and has agreed not to sell securities unless it
complies with state securities laws. See Prosper Registration Statement,
supra note 81, at 75; Prosper Marketplace Inc. Enters Settlement With
State Securities Regulators Over Sales of Unregistered Securities, N. AM.
SEC. ADM'RS AsS'N (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.nasaa.org/5622/prosper-
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The use of notes adds one additional complication. The
definition of a security in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act") excepts notes with "a maturity at
the time of issuance not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which
is likewise limited.""'o The Securities Act definition of
security includes no such exception. However, Section
3(a)(3) of the Securities Act exempts from some, but not all,'9 '
of the Act's requirements:
Any note . . . which arises out of a current
transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are
to be used for current transactions, and which has a
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding
nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise
limited.'92
Crowdfunders might try to avoid the application of
federal securities law by promising repayment within nine
months. 93 However, both the Exchange Act exception and
the Securities Act exemption have traditionally been read to
cover only prime-quality commercial paper bought by
sophisticated traders."' Four dissenters in Reves questioned
marketplace-inc-enters-settlement-with-state-secuiities-regulators-over-sa
les-of-unregistered-securities/.
190 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)
(2010).
' See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 12(a)(2), 17(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(a)(2),
77q(c) (2010).
192 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3).
193 It appears that no crowdfunding site currently requires repayment
within nine months. Prosper and Lending Club, for example, sell notes
with three-year terms. Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at
8; Lending Club Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 7.
1 See HAZEN, supra note 42, at 460 (Exemption in Section 3(a)(3) of
the Securities Act "applies only to prime quality negotiable commercial
paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public."); Wendy
Gerwick Couture, The Securities Acts' Treatment of Notes Maturing in Less
Than Nine Months: A Solution to the Enigma, 31 SEC. REG. L.J. 496, 505
(2003) ("Almost every court addressing the issue has held that the § 3(a)(3)
exemption and the § 3(a)(10) exclusion apply to the same notes.").
No. 1:1]1 41
this interpretation of the Exchange Act exception,"' but that
long-standing reading still stands. The risky debt issued by
startup entrepreneurs to the general public would not
qualify as commercial paper. 96
B. Registration and Exemption of Crowdfunded
Securities Offerings
1. Registration
Offerings of securities must be registered with the SEC
unless an exemption is available.' Unfortunately,
registration is not a viable option for early-stage small
businesses seeking relatively small amounts of capital.' It
is too expensive and too time-consuming for crowdfunded
offerings.
First, the cost of registration will in most cases exceed the
amount small entrepreneurs want to raise."' The direct
costs of preparing and filing the registration statement-
registration fees, accounting fees, legal fees, and printing
costs--can be hundreds of thousands of dollars, even
excluding underwriting costs.200 Smaller offerings are less
195 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 76 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
" For a full discussion of the commercial paper test, see Couture,
supra note 194, at 512-31.
117 Section 5(c) of the Securities Act provides that no one may offer
securities until a registration statement has been filed with the SEC.
Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2010). Section 5(a)(1) of
the Act prohibits sales of those securities until the registration statement
has become effective. Id. § 77e(a)(1).
" See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 11, at 7-8; Jeffrey J. Hass, Small
Issue Public Offerings Conducted Over the Internet: Are They 'Suitable' for
the Retail Investor?, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 67, 75 (1998); William K. Sjostrom,
Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It's Time to Allow General Solicitation and
Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004)
[hereinafter Sjostrom, Relaxing the Ban].
. See Kappel, supra note 22, at 384.
200 A GAO report estimated the average cost for a $25 million
underwritten public offering to be $2.3 million, but much of that was
underwriting discounts and commissions. U.S. GOV'T. AcCOUNTABILITY
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expensive to register than larger ones,2 01 but the cost is
disproportionately greater for smaller offerings.
Second, registration takes too much time. Small
companies often need to raise capital quickly.2 02 Today's
rapid changes in technology result in "a compressed life-time
and a quicker requisite time-to-market." 203  A 1996 report
indicated that the average delay between filing and
effectiveness for an initial public offering on special,
simplified forms then available to small businesses was
103.7 days. 204  That does not include the time required to
prepare for filing. The total time from inception to
effectiveness can be six months-or even longer.2 05
Registration, however, is not impossible. Peer-to-peer
lenders Prosper and Lending Club register the notes they
offer, but they had to completely restructure their business
OFFICE, GAO, GAO/GGD-00190, SMALL BUSINESS: EFFORTS To FACILITATE
EQUITY CAPITAL FORMATION 23 (2000) [hereinafter GAO Report]. The
estimated cost included $9,914 for SEC registration fees, $160,000 for
accounting fees and expenses, $200,000 for legal fees and expenses, and
$100,000 for printing fees and expenses. Id. Another source provides the
following estimates for a Form S-1 public offering: underwriting fees 7-
15% of the offering amount; registration fees 1/29 of 1%; printing costs
$2,500-75,000; engraving of certificates $2,500-4,000; legal costs -3% of
the offering amount; accounting costs $25,000-250,000; experts $300-
15,000; state filing fees $150-4,000 per state; and NASD filing fees $500-
30,500. WILLIAM M. PRIFTI, 24 SECURITIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS
§ 1A:17 (2d ed. 2010). See also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Going Public
Through an Internet Direct Public Offering: A Sensible Alternative for
Small Companies?, 53 FLA. L. REV. 529, 575-76 (2001) [hereinafter
Sjostrom, Going Public] (finding that legal, accounting, filing, and other
fees for an underwritten public offering generally range from $300,000 to
$500,000).
201 Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure and
Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1, 32 (1981).
202 LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 2, at 37-38; Cohn & Yadley, supra
note 11, at 80.
2' LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 2, at 37.
204 SEC, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CAPITAL
FORMATION AND REGULATORY PROCESSES [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,834, at 88,439 tbl. 2 (July 24, 1996), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform.htm.
20' See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 11, at 7.
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models to make it work. Instead of investors providing
money directly to the underlying entrepreneurs, investors
loan money to the sites themselves, and the sites issue non-
recourse notes dependent on payment by the underlying
borrower.2 06  Prosper and Lending Club each file a single
shelf registration statement for all of the notes they issue,
with each funding treated as a separate series requiring its
own prospectus supplement.2 07 This mechanism is costly,
burdensome, and does not translate easily to equity
crowdfunding.
2. Possible Exemptions Under Current Law
Companies selling securities on crowdfunding sites could
avoid registration if an exemption were available.2 08 Several
exemptions might possibly apply: the private offering
exemption in Section 4(2) of the Securities Act209 or its
regulatory safe harbor, Rule 506 of Regulation D;21o Section
4(5) of the Securities Act;2 1' Rule 504 of Regulation D;21 2 Rule
505 of Regulation D;213 or Regulation A.2 14 Unfortunately,
none of those exemptions is conducive to crowdfunding.21 5
2" See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
207 See Verstein, supra note 12. This requires platforms to file two or
three times a day. Id. at 45-46. Each of those prospectus, supplements
must contain all of the borrower information available on the platform, "no
matter how trivial." Id. at 44.
200 These exemptions would only free entrepreneurs from the
registration requirements of the Securities Act. Entrepreneurs selling
securities would still be subject to the antifraud provisions of the
Securities and Exchange Act, including Rule 10b-5.
2" Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2) (2010).
210 Securities Act Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2012).
211 15 U.S.C. § 77d(5).
212 17 C.F.R. § 230.504.
213 17 C.F.R. § 230.505.
214 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 et seq.
215 See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 11, at 35 ("[Slmall companies are
hard pressed to find an exemption consistent with their timing, financing,
and marketing needs.").
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a. Section 4(2), Rule 506, and Section 4(5)
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts "transactions
by an issuer not involving any public offering."216 The exact
boundaries of this exemption are hazy,2 17 but the Supreme
Court held in Ralston Purina that the exemption's
availability turns on whether offerees "need the protection of
the Act" or are "able to fend for themselves."21 8 Subsequent
cases have focused on the sophistication of the offerees and
their access to information about the issuer."'
Crowdfunded offerings are not limited to sophisticated
investors. Most crowdfunding sites are open to the general
public-the whole point of crowdfunding is to appeal to this
"crowd." Because of that, Section 4(2) would not be
available.
The SEC has adopted a regulatory safe harbor for Section
4(2), Rule 506 of Regulation D,22 0 but that safe harbor would
also not be helpful. Purchasers in a Rule 506 offering must
either be "accredited investors" or meet a sophistication
requirement.2 21 Accredited investors are primarily
sophisticated institutions or individual investors who meet
wealth or income standards.22 2 Not all of the purchasers on a
216 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2010).
217 See HAZEN, supra note 42, at 573 ("[A]n issuer relying on the
statutory section 4(2) exemption . . . may be subjecting itself to a great
deal of uncertainty.").
218 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
219 See HAZEN, supra note 42, at 565.
220 Offers and sales that satisfy the conditions of Rule 506 "shall be
deemed to be transactions not involving any public offering within the
meaning of section 4(2) of the Act." Securities Act Rule 506(a), 17 C.F.R. §
230.506(a) (2012).
221 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). If a purchaser is not an accredited
investor, she or her purchaser representative must have "such knowledge
and experience in financial and business matters that [s]he is capable of
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment." Id. The
rule is satisfied even if the purchaser does not meet this standard, as long
as the issuer reasonably believes that she does. Id.
222 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
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publicly accessible crowdfunding site would meet these
requirements.
In addition, Rule 506 prohibits "general solicitation" and
"general advertising" of the offering.22 3 The SEC and its staff
take the position that any solicitation of an investor with
whom the issuer or its sales representatives do not have a
preexisting relationship violates the general solicitation
restriction.2 24 Offerings to the general public on crowd-
funding sites would clearly violate this prohibition.2 25
Finally, sales under Rule 506 are limited to no more than
thirty-five non-accredited investors.22 6 Some crowdfunding
offerings might meet this limit on the number of purchasers,
but, given the small amounts contributed by each investor,
others would not.227
Section 4(5) of the Securities Act, until recently Section
4(6), is similar to Rule 506. 228 It allows offers and sales
solely to accredited investors provided that there is no
"advertising or public solicitation."229 Thus, Section 4(5), like
Rule 506, is of little use to small businesses engaged in
crowdfunding.2"
223 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c).
224 See, e.g., Kenman Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 21,962, 32
S.E.C. Docket 1352 n.6 (Apr. 19, 1985). See generally HAZEN, supra note
42, at 540; Sjostrom, Relaxing the Ban, supra note 198, at 13-14.
According to Sjostrom, the SEC has indicated that a preexisting
relationship is not the only way to avoid the general solicitation ban, but it
has not granted any no-action relief where a preexisting relationship is
absent. Id.
225 See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 142, at 918 ("The most
serious obstacle to the use of Regulation D to exempt crowdfunded
offerings from Securities Act registration is Regulation D's overall
prohibition of general solicitation and general advertising.").
226 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i).
227 See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 11, at 12 (noting that small
companies are likely to need to sell to a large number of investors and
cannot do that within the numerical limits imposed by Rules 505 and 506).
22 Unlike Rule 506, Section 4(5) limits the amount of the offering to
$5 million. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(5), (2010).
229 Id.
230 See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 11, at 24.
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b. Rule 505
Rule 505 exempts offerings of up to $5 million.2 3 1 Rule
505 is not restricted to accredited or sophisticated
purchasers, but it is subject to the same general solicitation
prohibition as Rule 506.232 Also, as under Rule 506, an issuer
may sell to no more than thirty-five non-accredited
investors.2 33 These conditions make Rule 505 unsuitable for
crowdfunding.
c. Rule 504
Rule 504 exempts offerings of up to $1 million,234 but Rule
504, like Rules 505 and 506, is subject to the general
solicitation restriction.2 35 The only exception is if the Rule
504 offering is subject to state registration requirements or
sold pursuant to a state exemption that limits sales to
accredited investors.23 6 One major crowdfunding site,
ProFounder, attempted to fit within this rule2 37 by limiting
access to friends, family members, and preexisting
acquaintances of each entrepreneur-in other words, those
231 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i).
232 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c).
233 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (permitting no more than thirty-
five purchasers); 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (excluding accredited investors from
that limited number of purchasers).
234 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2).
235 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c). The SEC eliminated the general solicitation
ban for Rule 504 offerings in 1992, but reinstated it in its current form in
1999. See Sjostrom, Relaxing the Ban, supra note 198, at 25.
236 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (stating that Regulation D offerings may
not sell securities by solicitation or advertising "[e]xcept as provided in §
230.504(b)(1) . . ."); 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1) (exempting offerings sold in
one or more states requiring registration and delivery of a disclosure
document to investors or pursuant to a state exemption allowing general
solicitation in offerings limited to accredited investors).
237 See Lang, supra note 106 ("ProFounder facilitates compliance with
Regulation D, Rule 504."). As previously discussed, ProFounder is no
longer selling securities. See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
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with whom the issuer has a preexisting relationship.2 38 This
may solve the general solicitation problem, but it eliminates
much of the value of crowdfunding. A publicly accessible
crowdfunding offering could not use Rule 504 unless the
offering was registered at the state level, and that state
registration would be prohibitively expensive.239
d. Regulation A
Regulation A is available to offerings by non-reporting
companies2 40 of up to $5 million.24 1 Unlike Regulation D,
Regulation A does not prohibit general solicitation. It does,
however, require issuers to file a disclosure document,2 42 and,
like Section 5 of the Securities Act, Regulation A includes
rather extensive limits on communications with investors,
tied to the filing and disclosure requirements. 2 43 Regulation
A is, in effect, a "mini-registration," a less expensive version
of what the Act itself requires absent an exemption.24 4
Regulation A is not cheap; the average cost of a Regulation A
offering in 1997 was $40,000-60,000.245 This is too expensive
for the very small offerings that crowdfunding attracts.24 6
238 Entrepreneurs were instructed to "invite investors who are friends,
family, or others who you know in your community." Lang, supra note
106. Entrepreneurs were cautioned not to invite anyone with whom the
company "does not personally have a substantial, pre-existing personal
relationship." Company Terms and Conditions for Services, PROFOUNDER,
supra note 112.
239 See infra Part VII.D. See also Heminway & Hoffman, supra note
142, at 919-20.
240 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2).
241 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b).
242 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(d)(1)(i), 230.252.
24 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d).
2" See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 3A SECURITIES AND
FEDERAL CORPORATE LAw 6-67 (2011 rev.) ("The Regulation A procedures
are designed to emulate the procedures relating to the filing and
processing of registration statements with some insubstantial
exceptions."); HAZEN, supra note 42, at 509 (calling Regulation A a "mini-
registration").
245 HAZEN supra note 42, at 512 n.20. See also PRIFTI, supra note 200,
at 1A:17 (listing costs of a Regulation A offering, including: filing fee $100;
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IV. THE STATUS OF CROWDFUNDING SITES
UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
The proposals to exempt crowdfunding focus primarily on
the offerings themselves and the need for an exemption from
Securities Act registration." But crowdfunding can function
effectively only through web sites that bring entrepreneurs
and potential investors together. The operation of those sites
raises a different set of issues under federal securities law.
If the investments offered on crowdfunding sites are
securities, crowdfunding site operators could be brokers
subject to regulation under the Exchange Act or investment
advisers under the Investment Advisers Act. They would
not, however, be regulated as exchanges.
underwriting costs 10-18% of the offering amount; printing costs $7,500-
15,000; engraving stock certificates $1,500; legal costs %-3% of the
offering amount; accounting costs $5,000-20,000; expert fees $300-5,000;
state filing fees $150-4,000 per state; and NASD filing fees $500 plus
0.01% of the offering amount).
2 See Rutheford B Campbell, Regulation A: Small Businesses' Search
for A Moderate Capital," 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 111 (2006) ("On the small
offering end of the Regulation A spectrum .. . issuers are discouraged from
using Regulation A by the complexities of the filing, disclosure, and other
requirements and by the difficulties in many instances of meeting state
blue sky law requirements. Together, the costs of meeting these federal
and state requirements overwhelm any benefit a small business would
attain from utilizing Regulation A."). See also BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF,
supra note 244, at 6-49 (noting that small businesses do not use
Regulation A much); Sjostrom, Relaxing the Ban, supra note 198, at 26
("Preparing a Regulation A offering statement can cost a small company a
significant amount of money and management time.").
247 See, e.g., Letter from Woodie Neiss, Member, SBE Council Advisory
Committee, to Gerald J. Laporte, Chief, Office of Small Business Policy,
Division of Corporate Finance, SEC (Dec. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/2010gbforum/20Ogbforum-sbe.pdf
[hereinafter SBE Council Proposal]; Request for Rulemaking to Exempt
Securities Offerings Up to $100,000 With $100 Maximum Per Investor
From Registration, SEC, File No. 4-605, available at http://www.sec.gov
/rules/petitions.shtml; Factsheet and Overview for AJA, supra note 7;
About Us, STARTUP EXEMPTION, http://www.startupexemption.com/
?page id=91#axzzlT9YWT6vM (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
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Unfortunately, the definitions of "broker" and
"investment adviser" are ambiguous, so the status of
crowdfunding sites is uncertain. There is a strong possibility
that crowdfunding site operators would be brokers and a
somewhat smaller chance that they would be investment
advisers.
A. Are Crowdfunding Sites Exchanges?
At first blush, crowdfunding sites might seem to be
securities "exchanges" required to register under the
Exchange Act. Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act defines
"exchange" as an "organization, association, or group of
persons" that "constitutes, maintains, or provides a market
place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and
sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect
to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock
exchange as that term is generally understood . . . ."248
Crowdfunding sites bring together investors buying
securities and the entrepreneurs selling them and facilitate
execution of the sales much as a securities exchange would.
In spite of this superficial resemblance, it is reasonably
clear that crowdfunding sites, unless they engage in
additional activities, would not be exchanges under federal
securities law. Rule 3b-16 provides that, to fall within the
definition of exchange, a trading system must, among other
things, "[bring] together the orders for securities of multiple
buyers and sellers."2 49 In other words, for a system's trading
of a particular security to make it an exchange, there must
be more than one person on each side of the transactions in
that security. The SEC made it clear that "systems in which
there is only a single seller, such as systems that permit
issuers to sell their own securities to investors, would not be
included within Rule 3b-16."250
248 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1)
(2010).
249 Exchange Act Rule 3b-16, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16 (2012).
250 Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed.
Reg. 70844-01, 70849 (Dec. 22, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 202,
50 COL UMBfIA BUSINESS LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 2012
CRO WDFUNDING AND SECURITIES LAWS
Crowdfunding sites fit this single-seller model, and
therefore are not exchanges. Although each company's
security has a large number of buyers, meeting the multiple-
buyer requirement, there is only one seller-the issuer itself.
Crowdfunding sites list the securities of a number of
different sellers, but the question is not whether there are
multiple sellers on the site, but whether there are multiple
sellers for a particular security. According to the SEC, "a
system that has multiple sellers, but only one seller for each
instrument, . . . would not . . . meet the 'multiple parties'
requirement."2 5 ' Unless crowdfunding sites get involved in
post-funding trading of listed company's securities,25 2 none of
the securities offered would have multiple sellers. Therefore,
crowdfunding sites would not be exchanges.
B. Are Crowdfunding Sites Brokers?
Section 3(a)(4) of the Exchange Act defines a "broker" as
"any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions
in securities for the account of others."253 The Exchange Act
provides no further guidance as to what it means to be
"engaged in a business" or "effecting transactions in
securities," and the law in this area is uncertain.2 54 Whether
242), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1998-12-22/pdfl98-3329
9.pdf.
251 Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed.
Reg. 23504-01, 23508 (Apr. 29, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1998-04-29/pdf/98-10945.pdf
(interpreting the proposed rule that became Rule 3b-16).
252 See infra Part VII.C.3 for a discussion of issues involving the resale
of crowdfunded securities.
253 Exchange Act § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4). The Exchange Act
distinguishes a "dealer," who is "engaged in the business of buying and
selling securities for such person's own account." Id. § 78c(a)(15)
(emphasis added). In other words, a dealer acts as a principal, trading for
herself, whereas a broker acts as an agent for someone else. However, the
distinction "often becomes blurred," with cases and administrative
analyses indiscriminately using the two terms together. See DAVID A.
LIPTON, 15 BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 1-42 (2010).
254 See HAZEN, supra note 42, at 228 ("[Ilt is not always easy to tell
when a finder's activities would require broker-dealer registration.");
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an individual or entity is a broker is "one of the more
nebulous questions in U.S. securities regulation."255
The case law is limited, so most of the guidance in this
area comes from SEC no-action letters."' The SEC staff
"does not typically provide a rationale for its position" in
those letters, forcing the reader "to speculate which of
numerous facts recited in the response and/or letter of
inquiry triggered the staff reaction."2 57 The analysis is
"extremely flexible"258  and therefore inherently
unpredictable.
It is impossible to state definitively whether
crowdfunding sites would be brokers if they hosted securities
offerings. None of the major crowdfunding sites has received
NORMAN S. POSER & JAMEs A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND
REGULATION 5-15 (4th ed. 2009) (indicating "some uncertainty" as to
whether finders who bring together two parties who wish to engage in a
securities transaction are brokers); Abraham J. B. Cable, Fending for
Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should Encourage Angel Groups,
13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 107, 136 (2010) ("[Ilt is difficult to derive ... a single,
comprehensible framework for evaluating broker-dealer status, and this
can be a source of frustration when trying to analyze the regulatory status
of new developments .. .").
255 John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance
Market: A Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the
Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 861, 903 (2005).
" LIPTON, supra note 253, at 1-222. No-action letters express the
views of the staff and are not the official view of the SEC. 17 C.F.R. §
202.1(d). The SEC does not consider them binding precedent. Press
Release, SEC, Adoption of Section 200.81 (17 CFR 200.81), Concerning
Public Availability of Requests for No-Action and Interpretative Letters
and the Responses Thereto by the Commission's Staff, and Amendment of
Section 200.80 (17 CFR 200.80) (Oct. 29, 1970), 1970 WL 10582, at *2.
"Nonetheless, as a practical matter, practitioners place significant reliance
on" them and "they clearly influence judicial opinions." LIPTON, supra note
253, at 1-224.
257 LIPTON, supra note 253, at 1-226 ("Even comparing the facts cited
in one no-action letter with those in numerous other letters does not
necessarily indicate which factors were most persuasive for the staff
because the staff has placed different emphasis on the same factors at
varying times.").
258 Id. at 1-48.
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no-action relief from the SEC.259 However, the SEC's view of
what constitutes a broker is expansive, and crowdfunding
sites deviate in important ways from what the SEC has
allowed in other contexts. Because of this, there is a strong
possibility that sites hosting crowdfunded securities offerings
would be required to register as brokers.260
1. Engaged in the Business
Crowdfunding sites would satisfy the "engaged in the
business" part of the definition. To be "engaged in the
business," one must be effecting securities transactions with
some regularity-a single, isolated transaction does not
make one a broker.261 However, securities transactions need
not be the sole, or even the primary, business of the
companies operating such sites.262 One can be a broker even
though securities transactions are "only a small part of ...
[one's] . . . business activity."263
If the crowdfunding sites are effecting transactions in
securities, they undoubtedly are "engaged in the business" of
doing so. Their activity is regular; they match investors and
entrepreneurs on a continuous basis. And, with the
exception of sites like Kiva that operate on a donation basis,
they do so for a business purpose-to earn a profit.264 Thus,
259 Prosper, one of the peer-to-peer lending sites, submitted a no-action
request shortly after its launch but withdrew it before the staff responded.
Verstein, supra note 12.
260 At least one state, California, has taken the position that a
crowdfunding site that sells securities is a broker for purposes of state law.
See ProFounder Fin., Inc., Consent Order to Desist and Refrain (Aug. 31,
2011), available at www.corp.ca.gov/ENF/pdfl2011/ProFounder CO.pdf.
261 SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1998);
Mass. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 411 F. Supp. 411,
415 (D. Mass.), affd, 545 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1976); HAZEN, supra note 42,
at 213; LIPTON, supra note 253, at 1-42.4-1-42.5; POSER & FANTO, supra
note 254, at 5-11.
262 UFITEC, S.A. v. Carter, 571 P.2d 990, 994 (Cal. 1977); LIPTON,
supra note 253, at 1-42.8; POSER & FANTO, supra note 254, at 5-11.
263 Kenton Capital, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
264 See infra Part IV.B.2.e.
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the real question is whether crowdfunding sites are effecting
transactions in securities.
2. Effecting Transactions in Securities
a. General Guidance
What exactly does it mean to effect transactions in
securities? The stereotypical stock broker who buys and
sells securities on a stock exchange for a customer's account
is clearly covered, 265 but crowdfunding sites do not fit that
stereotype. The definition also includes companies whose
involvement in securities transactions is less direct, "so long
as the person participates in significant stages or points of a
securities transaction, such as solicitation, structuring,
negotiation, and receipt or transmission of funds."266 The
question, broadly phrased, is whether the person has "a
certain regularity of participation in securities transactions
at key points in the chain of distribution."26 7
It does not matter how the site and its users characterize
the site's services. One cannot avoid being a broker by
"describing the work . . . in terms which suggest a non-
broker-client relationship."268 Therefore, statements such as
that on ProFounder's web site that it "is not a broker, dealer
or underwriter of securities" 26 9 have no effect.
265 Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, SEC (Apr. 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm [hereinafter Guide to
Registration].
266 POSER & FANTO, supra note 254, at 5-14. See also HOWARD M.
FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE 16-5 (3d ed. 2005)
[hereinafter FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION].
267 Mass. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 411 F.
Supp. 411, 415 (D. Mass.), affd, 545 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1976); accord SEC
v. Martino, 255 F. Supp. 2d 268, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); SEC v. Nat'l Exec.
Planners, Ltd., 503 F. Supp. 1066, 1073 (M.D.N.C. 1980).
268 LIPTON, supra note 253, at 1-51. See also Martino, 255 F. Supp. 2d
at 284 (finding a broker even though the written agreements described the
work as "consulting services").
269 Profounder Terms and Conditions for Services, PROFOUNDER, supra
note 112.
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The SEC has cautioned that the operators of web sites
that match investors with issuers need to consider
registration as brokers when those sites are not affiliated
with registered broker-dealers. 27 0  Additionally, a guide
released by the SEC's Division of Trading and Markets
warns that anyone finding investors for a company,
including venture capital, angel financings, and private
placements, may need to register as a broker.27 1 The guide
poses four questions and indicates that a "yes" answer to any
of the four questions may indicate a need to register. The
questions are:
(1) "Do you participate in important parts of a
securities transaction, including solicitation,
negotiation, or execution of the transaction?"
(2) "Does your compensation for participation in the
transaction depend upon, or is it related to, the
outcome or size of the transaction or deal? . . . Do
you receive any other transaction-related
compensation?"
(3) "Are you otherwise engaged in the business of
effecting or facilitating securities transactions?"
(4) "Do you handle the securities or funds of others in
connection with securities transactions?" 27 2
More specific guidance comes from a series of no-action
letters involving Internet- or computer-based matching
services that connect entrepreneurs seeking funds with
potential investors.27 3 The services granted relief in those
letters share a number of important features:
270 Use of Electronic Media, Securities Act Release No. 33-7856, 2000
WL 502290, at *12-13 (Apr. 28, 2000).
271 Guide to Registration, supra note 265.
272 Id.
273 See Angel Capital Elec. Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL
636094 (Oct. 25, 1996); Mid-Atlantic Inv. Network, SEC No-Action Letter,
1993 WL 173768 (May 18, 1993); Private Investor Network, SEC No-
Action Letter, 1987 WL 108869 (Nov. 2, 1987); VCN of Tex., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1987 WL 108250 (June 18, 1987); Venture Match of N.J.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108917 (June 11, 1988); Atlanta Econ.




(1) They were run by non-profit entities, and any fees
collected were used only to cover administrative
expenses.
(2) Fees did not depend on whether a successful
match occurred or whether the entrepreneur raised
the desired funds.
(3) The matching site's role was essentially
completed when the entrepreneur and the investor
were introduced. From that point forward,
everything occurred off-site.
(4) The matching service was not involved in
negotiating or closing any transactions between the
entrepreneur and investors.
(5) The matching service did not handle any funds or
securities in connection with the financing.
(6) The matching service provided no advice to either
entrepreneurs or investors and did not assist them in
completing the financing.
b. Transaction-Based Compensation
Unlike the matching services in the no-action letters,
many of the crowdfunding sites charge fees that depend on
whether the financing is successful. 274 Kickstarter's fee is
5% of the funds raised; however, if the fundraising is
unsuccessful, entrepreneurs pay no fee."' IndieGoGo takes
4% or 9% of the funds raised, depending on whether the
entrepreneur meets her funding goal.2 76 Prosper and
Dev. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 107835 (Mar. 19, 1987);
Venture Capital Res., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55644 (Nov.
25, 1985).
14 Kiva, however, operates exclusively on a donation basis. It does
not receive a fee from either entrepreneurs or borrowers, although it does
accept donations from its lenders. See About Us, KIVA, supra note 32.
275 See Frequently Asked Questions: Fees, KICKSTARTER, supra note 29.
276 See Pricing, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/about/pricing
(last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
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Lending Club each charge a 1% fee.277 When ProFounder
was selling securities, at least part of its fee apparently
depended on whether the offering was successful.27 8
The SEC staff has indicated that transaction-based
compensation like this "is a key factor in determining
whether a person or entity is acting as a broker-dealer."27 9
According to an American Bar Association Task Force,
"[t]ransaction-based compensation has come under intense
scrutiny by the SEC,"280 and the staff may be moving to a
position where transaction-based compensation in connection
with a securities transaction is alone sufficient to make one a
broker.2 8' The staff's concern is apparently that transaction-
based compensation would give the person "a 'salesman's
stake in the proposed transactions and .. . create heightened
incentive for . .. [the person] . . . to engage in sales efforts." 2 82
However, it is possible to receive transaction-based
compensation in connection with securities transactions
without being considered a broker. A recent district court
277 Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 5; Lending Club
Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 3.
271 See supra Part II.B.4.
279 See Guide to Registration, supra note 265 ("Does your
compensation for participation in the transaction depend upon, or is it
related to, the outcome or size of the transaction or deal? . . . Do you
receive any other transaction-related compensation?"). See also SEC v.
Margolin, No. 92 Civ. 6307 (PKL), 1992 WL 279735 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
1992) (listing transaction-based compensation as one factor); HAZEN, supra
note 42, at 210 (same); LIPTON, supra note 253, at 1-70.1 (same).
280 Task Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers, ABA Section of
Business Law, Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Private
Placement Broker-Dealers, 60 Bus. LAw. 959, 975 (2005). See also Orcutt,
supra note 255, at 908 (noting that transaction-based compensation has
"garnered substantial attention").
281 Task Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers, supra note 280,
at 977. See also POSER & FANTO, supra note 254, at 5-17 (noting that
transaction-based compensation "may be the determinative factor").
282 Brumberg, Mackey & Wall, P.L.C., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL
1976174 (May 17, 2010); 1st Global, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL
499080 (May 7, 2001). See also Orcutt, supra note 255, at 910; John
Polanin, Jr., The "Finder's" Exception from Federal Broker-Dealer
Registration, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 787, 814 (1991).
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case recognized that transaction-based compensation "is the
hallmark of a salesman,"28 3 but nevertheless held that an
individual who received transaction-based compensation for
merely bringing people together for a securities transaction
was not a broker.284 The SEC staff has also occasionally
granted no-action relief to finders who received transaction-
based compensation. The most well-known of these no-
action letters involved the entertainer Paul Anka, who
provided the names of potential investors to the Ottawa
Senators Hockey Club in return for a finder's fee equal to
10% of the amount the investors invested.8
The Paul Anka letter and the other no-action letters
allowing transaction-based compensation involved finders
who were not involved in negotiations, consummation of the
financing, or transferring funds or securities to effect the
deal.8 Anka, for instance, only provided the names of
potential investors to the Club; he did not solicit or even
contact the potential investors and was not involved in
negotiations between the Club and the investors. 287  David
Lipton reads these letters as allowing finders to receive
transaction-based compensation only if the finder is "totally
isolated from the process of selling the units."288 In such
cases, the finder cannot act on the incentive "to engage in
21 SEC v. Kramer, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1334 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
284 Id. at 1336, 1338-39.
285 Paul Anka, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176891 (July 24, 1991)
[hereinafter Anka No-Action Letter].
28 See Dana Inv. Advisers, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 WL
718968 (Oct. 12, 1994); John DiMeno, SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL
13717 (Apr. 1, 1979) (reconsidering John DiMeno, SEC No-Action Letter,
1978 WL 12130 (Oct. 11, 1978)); Moana/Kauai Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1974 WL 8804 (Aug. 10, 1974).
287 Anka No-Action Letter, supra note 285. Anka was doing this on a
one-time basis, so, even if he was effecting transactions in securities, he
arguably was not in the business of doing so, and would not be a broker for
this reason as well.
28 LIPTON, supra note 253, at 1-87.
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abusive or sharp selling practices" that transaction-based
compensation might otherwise create.28 9
Finders who go beyond simple introductions risk being
treated as brokers if they receive transaction-based
compensation. Involvement in structuring or negotiating the
terms of a securities transaction would make one a broker
under the SEC's analysis.290 If one receives transaction-
based compensation, merely contacting investors and
describing the deal in general terms may cross the line
between broker and non-broker.29 1 Paul Anka had originally
proposed to contact the investors to describe the potential
investment and forward investors' names to the Club only if
they expressed interest. The SEC staff granted the request
only after a follow-up letter limited Anka's role to providing
names. 292
The SEC staff may no longer accept even the limited
position it took in the Paul Anka letter.293 It currently views
the limited activity of introducing a potential buyer and
seller of securities "with skepticism when coupled with
transaction-based compensation. "294
289 Orcutt, supra note 255, at 911-12. See also LIPTON, supra note
253, at 1-87; Polanin, supra note 282, at 814.
290 See., e.g., Ram Capital Res., LLC, Exch. Act Release No. 34-60149,
96 S.E.C. Docket 459, 2009 WL 1723950 (June 19, 2009); Mike Bantuveris,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 10654 (Sept. 23, 1975); May-Pac Mgmt.
Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 10806 (Nov. 20, 1973); Fulham & Co.,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 9129 (Nov. 20, 1972).
29' See Richard S. Appel, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30911, at *1
(Jan. 13, 1983) (denying a no-action request from a finder whose only role
would be to contact existing business associates and friends, describe
potential oil and gas investments in general terms, and provide the
approximate cost of drilling a well).
292 Anka No-Action Letter, supra note 285.
293 See Task Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers, supra note
280, at 977 ("Based on staff comments at a recent Business Law Section
meeting, the SEC staff may ... be reconsidering its position in the Paul
Anka letter situation and might not issue such a letter today.").
294 Id. at 966.
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Consider, for example, the staffs recent response in
Brumberg, Mackey & Wall, P.C."' A law firm proposed to
introduce potential investors to a company seeking financing
in return for a percentage of the money raised from those
investors. The firm was not going to be involved in
negotiations, provide the potential investors with any
information about the company, recommend or have any
responsibility for the terms of any agreement, or have any
other involvement in obtaining financing for the
transactions. In rejecting the request, the staff noted that
transaction-based compensation "is a hallmark of broker-
dealer activity. Accordingly, any person receiving
transaction-based compensation in connection with another
person's purchase or sale of securities typically must register
as a broker-dealer or be an associated person of a registered
broker-dealer."29 6
As discussed below, crowdfunding sites typically do more
than just bring entrepreneurs together with potential
investors. They solicit investors and are actively involved in
the resulting transactions. This, coupled with transaction-
based compensation, puts them at serious risk of being
treated as brokers.
Unfortunately, a relatively recent district court case
muddies the water and casts doubt on the validity of the
SEC staffs position with respect to transaction-based
compensation. In SEC v. M & A West, Inc.,297 the defendant
worked with the shareholders of private companies to
identify suitable public companies for reverse mergers,
actually prepared the documents for those transactions, and
coordinated among the parties.2 98 The defendant (or his
295 Brumberg, Mackey & Wall, P.L.C., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL
1976174 (May 17, 2010).
2" Id. Even in this letter, it is hard to isolate transaction-based
compensation as the sole determining factor. The staff also believed that
the firm's introduction of only contacts with a potential interest in the
company would necessarily involve some "pre-selling" of the company and
some "pre-screening" of potential investors. Id.
2' No. C-01-3376 VRW, 2005 WL 1514101 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2005).
298 Id. at *3.
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nominees) received shares in the completed transactions for
his work 29 9-clearly transaction-based compensation-but
the court nevertheless held that he was not a broker.
According to the court, although the defendant facilitated
securities transactions, his actions were not "effecting"
transactions in securities. 0
c. Involvement in the Transactions
The extent of a site's involvement in the actual securities
transactions is also important. The matching sites and other
finders approved in the favorable no-action letters merely
brought investors and entrepreneurs together. Once that
introduction was made, the matching site's work was done.
The site "was not assisting the purchase or sale of specific
securities""0 ' and was not otherwise involved in the
transactions.30 2
Crowdfunding sites do more than just bring
entrepreneurs and investors together. They provide a
platform for investors and entrepreneurs to negotiate; they
facilitate ongoing communications between investors and
entrepreneurs; and they transmit funds and investment
documents back and forth between investors and
entrepreneurs. That, coupled with the receipt of transaction-
based compensation, could be enough to make them brokers.
i. Providing Advice or Recommendations
Providing advice or recommendations to investors is a
factor in deciding whether one is a broker,03 but most
crowdfunding sites provide only general advice, and do not
recommend or rate particular investment opportunities.
' Id. at *3-*4.
" Id. at *9. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant
sua sponte.
301 LIPTON, supra note 253, at 1-100-1-101.
302 Id. at 1-102.
303 HAZEN, supra note 42, at 210; LIPTON, supra note 253, at 1-70.1;
POSER & FANTO, supra note 254, at 5-12; Task Force on Private Placement
Broker-Dealers, supra note 280, at 975.
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Kickstarter, for example, provides general advice to
investors about how to avoid fraud.o4 Also, some of the sites
provide general advice to entrepreneurs about how to
structure a successful fundraising campaign. The
Kickstarter site, for example, includes advice about how
much money to ask for and "the secret" to successful
fundraising.so6 IndieGoGo and ProFounder offer general
advice about how to create a fundraising campaign and what
to offer in return for contributions.3 06
Other crowdfunding sites provide more specific advice to
entrepreneurs and investors. Both Lending Club and
Prosper rate borrowers, effectively advising investors as to
the quality of the loans. 0 ProFounder, before it quit offering
securities, helped entrepreneurs structure and complete
their offerings. It agreed to make a good faith effort "to
provide all documents necessary for compliance with
securities and other laws applicable to Company's issuance
of securities and Investor's PRIVATE investment," although
it noted that compliance was ultimately the entrepreneur's
responsibility.0 8 ProFounder also provided term sheets and
"compliance tools" to entrepreneurs' and helped
entrepreneurs track compliance requirements and filing
fees. 310
s' See Frequently Asked Questions, KICKSTARTER, supra note 29.
305 See Start Your Project, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/
start (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
'0' See Frequently Asked Questions, INDIEGOGO, supra note 44; Lang,
supra note 106.
.0. See e.g., Prosper Ratings, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/invest/
how-to-invest/prosper-ratings/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
... Company Terms and Conditions for Services, PROFOUNDER, supra
note 112. See also Lang, supra note 106 ("ProFounder facilitates
compliance with Regulation D, Rule 504.").
311 See Why Crowdfund?, PROFOUNDER, http://www.profounder.com/
entrepreneurs/whyscrowdfund (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
.o See Lang, supra note 106.
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ii. Structuring the Transaction
Involvement in structuring a securities transaction is
another factor pointing toward broker status."' Prosper and
Lending Club each specify the terms of the loans on their
sites.3 12 Other sites restrict the structure of the resulting
transaction. IndieGoGo and ProFounder, for example, limit
how long a funding request may remain open.13 ProFounder
required quarterly payments to investors and imposed a five-
year limit on how long an entrepreneur could share returns
with investors.3 14 ProFounder also allowed entrepreneurs to
exit their commitments early, but only if they paid investors
twice their investment."'
iii. Receipt or Transmission of Funds /
Continued Involvement after the
Financing
The receipt or transmission of funds or securities is
another criterion considered in determining whether
someone is a broker.3 16 All of the major crowdfunding sites
actually collect funds from investors and forward them to the
entrepreneurs."3 The sites where entrepreneurs offer
s" See Orcutt, supra note 255, at 904-05; Guide to Registration, supra
note 265.
312 See generally Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81;
Lending Club Registration Statement, supra note 81.
31 Frequently Asked Questions: Creating a Campaign, INDIEGOGO,
supra note 44 (120-day limit); FAQs, PROFOUNDER, supra note 110.
314 Lang, supra note 106.
... Id. However, this early repayment option is not done through the
ProFounder web site. Id.
"1' LIPTON, supra note 253, at 1-43. See also SEC v. Margolin, No. 92
CIV. 6307 (PKL), 1992 WL 279735 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1992) ("possessing
client funds and securities"); POSER & FANTO, supra note 254, at 5-12
("taking custody of clients' funds and securities"); Guide to Registration,
supra note 265 ("Do you handle the securities or funds of others in
connection with securities transactions?").
117 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions: Pledging, KICKSTARTER,
supra note 29; How Kiva Works, supra note 72; Frequently Asked
Questions, INDIEGOGO, supra note 44; Lang, supra note 106 (ProFounder).
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financial rewards also transfer those funds back to
investors."' Sites are also involved in other ways after
completion of the transaction. At ProFounder,
entrepreneurs had to report their revenues on a quarterly
basis and even upload their tax returns each year to verify
the reported revenues." 9  Similarly, Kickstarter and
IndieGoGo encourage entrepreneurs to post project
updates.320
iv. Involvement in Negotiations
Another relevant factor is involvement in negotiations
between investors and entrepreneurs. A person involved in
the negotiation of securities transactions is "virtually
always" treated as a broker.3 21 Crowdfunding sites are not
actively involved in negotiations between the entrepreneurs
who list on the sites and potential investors. The
communications portals on crowdfunding sites obviously
facilitate negotiations, but merely facilitating the exchange
of information or documents is not sufficient to make one a
broker.322
d. Solicitation and Advertising
Another factor relevant to broker status is whether the
person is actively advertising or otherwise soliciting
investors.323 Solicitation is defined fairly broadly. The
318 See, e.g., How Kiva Works, supra note 72; Lang, supra note 106.
319 See Lang, supra note 106.
33o See Frequently Asked Questions: Project Updates, KICKSTARTER,
supra note 29; Frequently Asked Questions: Creating a Campaign,
INDIEGOGO, supra note 44.
321 LIPTON, supra note 253, at 1-74. See also HAZEN, supra note 42, at
210 (listing involvement in negotiations as a factor pointing towards
broker status); POSER & FANTO, supra note 254, at 5-12 (same).
322 Task Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers, supra note 280,
at 978.
323 See SEC v. Margolin, No. 92 Civ. 6307 (PKL), 1992 WL 279735, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1992); SEC v. Nat'l Exec. Planners, Ltd., 503 F.
Supp. 1066, 1073 (M.D.N.C. 1980); HAZEN, supra note 43, at 210; LIPTON,
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question is whether the possible broker is contacting
investors with whom it has a preexisting relationship or is
instead actively identifying previously unknown third
parties; the latter qualifies as a solicitation.32 4 A public web
site, by definition, is engaged in continued public solicitation,
even if it does not otherwise advertise. Moreover, "mere
repeated advertising to purchase or sell securities would
trigger the broker-dealer registration requirement."3 2 5
However, the SEC staff has approved several web-based
electronic matching systems, so a web presence alone is not
sufficient to make one a broker. The line between acceptable
and unacceptable solicitation and advertising is hazy. The
SEC "has not provided much guidance on what activities
constitute solicitation or advertising sufficient to trigger
broker-dealer registration . ."326 For example, the SEC
staff granted no-action relief to Venture Capital Resources,
Inc., which planned to publicize its system through one-on-
one discussions with potential investors, contacting the
clients of accountants and attorneys, a "selected mailing
program," press releases, advertisements, and the
distribution of brochures through local financial
institutions.32 7 The SEC also granted relief to a non-profit
matching service that planned to publicize the system
through accounting firms, law firms, local universities, and
non-profit organizations interested in economic development,
as well as by distributing pamphlets and brochures to
interested individuals and groups. 328  But the SEC has
indicated that a for-profit web site would be a broker
because, among other things, it "actively solicits investors to
supra note 253, at 1-42.13; POSER & FANTO, supra note 254, at 5-12; Task
Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers, supra note 280, at 975.
324 Orcutt, supra note 255, at 914.
325 LIPTON, supra note 253, at 1-42.13.
326 Task Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers, supra note 280,
at 979.
327 Venture Capital Res., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55644
(Oct. 25, 1985).
328 Atlanta Econ. Dev. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 107835
(Feb. 17, 1987).
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purchase oil and gas interests (for example, by targeting
potential investors with direct mailings and follow-up e-
mail)."329
e. For-Profit Status
Finally, many crowdfunding sites are for-profit entities.
Almost all of the no-action letters have involved "state
instrumentalities, private non-profit corporations, and quasi-
governmental organizations,"3 30 and the staff has generally
required representations that these systems would be run
solely on a cost-recovery basis, and not for profit.31 For-
profit status does not automatically make one a broker. The
SEC staff has granted no-action relief to a few private
matching sites. However, none of those sites received
transaction-based compensation, and in all those cases the
securities transactions were negotiated and completed, and
funds were transferred, off the site.332
3. Conclusion: Would Crowdfunding Sites Be
Brokers?
Given the messy state of the law, no definitive answer is
possible, but there is a strong possibility that crowdfunding
sites would be considered brokers if they listed offerings of
securities. The crowdfunding sites' receipt of transaction-
based compensation, continued involvement in the investor-
entrepreneur relationship, public advertising, and for-profit
329 Oil-N-Gas, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 1119244 (June 8,
2000).
30 Cf Polanin, supra note 282, at 821.
331 Id.
332 See Investex Inv. Exch. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL
286331 (Apr. 9, 1990); Petroleum Info. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989
WL 246625 (Nov. 28, 1989); Internet Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
1997 WL 796944 (Dec. 24, 1997). But see OilOre.com, SEC No-Action
Letter, 2000 WL 546573 (Apr. 21, 2000) (denying no-action relief to a for-
profit entity that was to receive compensation contingent on the investor
making an investment).
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status may cumulatively be too much to allow them to avoid
broker status.
C. Are Crowdfunding Sites Investment Advisers?
Crowdfunding sites might also be investment advisers.
within the meaning of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
Unfortunately, the definition of "investment adviser" in this
context is as unclear as the definition of "broker"-if
anything, there is less guidance available on the investment-
adviser question. Two issues must be addressed. First, do
crowdfunding sites fall within the general definition of
"investment adviser"? Second, if so, do they qualify for the
"publisher" exception in that definition?
1. The General Definition of Investment Adviser
The basic definition of investment adviser, in Section
202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act," has two parts,
either of which suffices to make one an investment adviser.
First, a person is an investment adviser if she, "for
compensation, engages in the business of advising others,
either directly or through publications or writings, as to the
value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in,
purchasing, or selling securities."3 34 Alternatively, a person
is an investment adviser, if she, "for compensation and as
part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or
reports concerning securities."3 Under either part of the
definition, three basic requirements must be met:
(1) The person must be providing advice or issuing
reports or analyses concerning securities;
(2) The person must be in the business of doing so;
and
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(3) The person must be doing so for compensation.336
Though crowdfunding sites clearly meet the last two
requirements, it is unclear whether they satisfy the first.
2. In the Business
The business requirement is phrased slightly differently
in the two parts of Section 202(a)(11). The first alternative
uses the phrase "engages in the business" and the second
alternative requires that the analysis be given "as part of a
regular business," 3 3  but the SEC interprets the business
element of both parts identically.3
Some regularity is required-isolated instances of
investment advice do not make one an investment adviser.3
But investment advice does not have to be the person's
principal business, as long as the advice is given on a regular
basis. 34 o Crowdfunding sites would undoubtedly meet this
regularity requirement. If their services constitute securities
advice or analysis, they are providing that service on an
ongoing, regular basis.
As with broker status, transaction-based compensation is
important. The SEC has indicated that a person meets the
"business" requirement if she "receives transaction-based
compensation if the client implements the investment
3" Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners,
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment
Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, 52 Fed.
Reg. 38400-01, 38402 (Oct. 16, 1987) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. pt. 276)
[hereinafter Investment Advisers Release]. See also United States v.
Elliott, 62 F.3d 1304, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 1995).
3 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).
338 Investment Advisers Release, supra note 336, at 38402.
3 Id. See also Zinn v. Parrish, 644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1981); HAZEN,
supra note 42, at 29.
340 Investment Advisers Release, supra note 336, at 38402; HAZEN,
supra note 42, at 27; THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINs, REGULATION OF
INVESTMENT ADvisoRs 5 (2011).
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advice."341 Thus, it is reasonably clear that for-profit
crowdfunding sites would meet the "business" requirement.
3. For Compensation
For one to be an investment adviser, analysis or advice
must be provided for compensation.34 2 Any economic benefit
is sufficient to meet this requirement; the adviser does not
have to charge a separate fee for the advisory portion of the
services.34 3 Most crowdfunding sites charge a fee of some
kind, usually either a flat fee, a percentage of the amount
raised, or interest.344 This satisfies the compensation
requirement.34 5
4. Advice, Analyses, or Reports Concerning
Securities
Most crowdfunding sites are not offering advice "as to the
value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in,
..n According to the SEC, a person is in the business if "(i) [he] holds
himself out as an investment adviser or as one who provides investment
advice, (ii) receives any separate or additional compensation that
represents a clearly definable charge for providing advice about securities,
regardless of whether the compensation is separate from or included
within any overall compensation, or receives transaction-based
compensation if the client implements in the investment advice, or (iii) on
anything other than rare, isolated and non-periodic instances, provides
specific investment advice." Investment Advisers Release, supra note 336,
at 38402 (emphasis added).
342 See HAZEN, supra note 42, at 29 ("The rendering of investment
advice without compensation is likely to take the person rendering the
advice out from under the purview of the Investment Advisers Act.").
" Investment Advisers Release, supra note 336, at 38403. See also
Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1164 (10th Cir.
2011); United States v. Elliott, 62 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 1995); LEMKE
& LINS, supra note 340, at 4.
' Kiva is an exception. It funds itself through donations.
345 FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 266, at 17-5 ("If a
website offering investment advice grants access only to those who pay a
subscription fee, clearly its sponsor is receiving compensation for
investment advice."). Friedman notes that the question would be more
difficult if the web site were funded only by advertisements. Id.
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purchasing, or selling securities."34 6 They may, however, be
issuing "analyses or reports concerning securities,"347
assuming that securities are being offered on the site. The
case law and guidance from the SEC are simply too
uncertain to offer a definitive conclusion.
Consider first the advice portion of the definition. Most of
the existing crowdfunding sites do not advise investors as to
the merits of particular opportunities, or evaluate or rate the
potential investments. Advice does not have to relate to
specific securities to make one an investment adviser.3 48 A
discussion of the relative advantages of investing in
securities rather than other investments would suffice,3 49 but
crowdfunding sites typically do not even do this.
The obvious exceptions are Prosper and Lending Club,
which assign ratings to individual loans. If Prosper and
Lending Club were selling those loans directly to lenders, as
they did prior to registration, the case for investment adviser
status would be strong. Their current pass-through
programs cloud the analysis. Now they are, in effect,
commenting on the value of their own notes, not advising
investors as to securities issued by others. Almost every
issuer of securities discusses the value of the securities it
issues. If that were enough to make one an investment
adviser, then every company would be an investment
adviser. Thus, as long as the SEC continues to treat Prosper
and Lending Club as the "issuers" of these securities, it is
difficult to see them as investment advisers.
For the other crowdfunding sites, the problem, if there is
one, comes under the second part of the definition.
Crowdfunding sites may be issuing "analyses or reports
concerning securities." The SEC staff has indicated that
someone providing investors with statistical data on
companies or a listing of investment opportunities is not
issuing analyses or reports if (1) the information is readily
" See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(11) (2006).
3 Id.
3 Investment Advisers Release, supra note 336, at 38402.
3 Id. See also LEMKE & LINS, supra note 340, at 6-7.
70 COL UMIA B USINESS LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 2012
available to the public in its raw state; (2) the categories of
information presented are not highly selective; and (3) the
information is not organized or presented in a manner that
suggests the purchase, holding, or sale of any security.so
These requirements seem problematic for crowdfunding
sites. The entrepreneur's information is not readily
available to the public other than through the crowdfunding
site. And the whole point of the listing is to suggest that
investors purchase a security by investing in the
entrepreneurs' companies.
However, the SEC staff has granted no-action relief to
several matching services, which, like crowdfunding sites,
are created to promote the purchase of entrepreneurs'
securities and typically provide non-public information. Like
crowdfunding sites, those matching services are created to
promote the purchase of entrepreneurs' securities, and the
information provided by those small business entrepreneurs
is not typically publicly available.
No cases directly address whether crowdfunding sites are
investment advisers, but other investment-adviser cases
support treating crowdfunding sites as investment advisers.
Two cases have held that general partners' financial reports
to limited partners on the status of the partnerships'
investments constituted investment advice for purposes of
the definition.35 ' Those reports, like the company reports
available to investors on some crowdfunding sites, included
financial statements and a calculation of investors'
returns.3 52 Even though the defendants were not offering the
limited partners any actual advice in these reports-they
o See, e.g., Angel Capital Elec. Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996
WL 636094 (Oct. 25, 1996); Mo. Innovation Ctr., Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1995 WL 643949 (Oct. 17, 1995); Media Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 198262 (July 20, 1992); Investex Inv. Exch.
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286331 (Apr. 9, 1990); Charles St.
Sec., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 107616 (Jan. 28, 1987). See
generally FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 266, at 17-3;
LEMKE & LINS, supra note 340, at 7.
" See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 870 (2d Cir. 1977);
SEC v. Saltzman, 127 F. Supp. 2d 660, 669 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
352 See Fleschner, 568 F.2d at 866; Saltzman, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 669.
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were only providing performance data-the courts concluded
that the Investment Advisers Act applied because the
limited partners would use the reports to decide whether to
continue their investments in the partnership."' Similarly,
even though crowdfunding sites are not advising investors to
invest in a particular company, they are providing the
reports that the investors will use to make investment
decisions.
Most crowdfunding sites, however, do not independently
generate reports on the companies listed. They merely post
funding requests and other information produced by the
entrepreneurs themselves. Because they function as mere
conduits for information and do not create anything
themselves, they arguably are not providing any "advice" or
"analyses" or "reports" at all. However, at least two cases
have rejected this "mere conduit" argument. In SEC v. Wall
Street Transcript Corp., the defendant published a weekly
tabloid containing verbatim reprints of reports on securities
issued by brokers. The court concluded that "there can be no
doubt that, for purposes of the . .. [Investment Advisers Act],
. . . [the defendant] . . . 'issues' analyses and reports
concerning securities . . . . That a publication acts as a mere
conduit for investment advice written by others obviously
does not insure against the possibility that the publisher will
engage in the fraudulent activities the Act was designed to
prevent.""' Similarly, in Zinn v. Parrish,3 56 a sports agent
occasionally transmitted to one of his clients securities
recommendations made by others."' The court held that the
agent was not "in the business" of offering investment
3 In those cases, the general partners were also actually making
investment decisions for the partnership, but both courts seemed to see
the reports themselves as sufficient to make one an investment adviser.
" 454 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
3 Id. at 565. However, after finding that the defendant fell within
the general definition of investment adviser, the court concluded that the
exception in that definition for publishers was available. Id. at 567. See
infra Part IV.C.6 (discussion of the exception for publishers).
35 644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1981).
3 Id. at 364.
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advice, but noted that, if the agent had passed along such
recommendations more regularly, he might be an investment
adviser.""
5. SEC No-Action Letters
The primary source of guidance on the investment adviser
issue comes in the form of SEC no-action letters. The SEC
staff has issued a large number of no-action letters to
companies that either attempt to match investors and
entrepreneurs3 9 or merely present investment opportunities
for investors' unguided choice."60 The SEC staff has dealt
with so many no-action requests in this area that it no longer
responds to them "unless they present novel or unusual
issues."3 6' In granting these requests, the staff has
emphasized a number of features of these services without
358 Id.
. See Angel Capital Elec. Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL
636094, at *1 (Oct. 25, 1996); Capital Res. Network, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1993 WL 164600, at *1 (Apr. 23, 1993); Tech. Capital Network,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 175694, at *1 (June 5, 1992);
Heartland Venture Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL
108286 (June 7, 1987); Venture Capital Network of N.Y., Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1986 WL 67371, at *1 (Nov. 10, 1986); Univ. of Ark., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 67354, at *1 (Oct. 27, 1986); Inv. Contacts
Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 68350 (Sept. 24, 1986); Venture
Capital Exch., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 66613, at *1 (Mar. 24,
1986); Indep. Inst. for N.Y. Bus. Ventures, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1986 WL 65138, at *1 (Jan. 10, 1986); Venture Capital Res., Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1985 WL 55644, at *1 (Nov. 25, 1985); Venture Capital
Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45334, at *1 (May 7, 1984).
360 See Mo. Innovation Ctr., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL
643949, at *2 (Oct. 17, 1995); Investex Inv. Exch. Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1990 WL 286331, at *1 (Apr. 9, 1990); Petroleum Info. Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1989 WL 246625, at *1 (Nov. 28, 1989); Richmond
Venture Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 WL 246296, at
*2 (May 12, 1989).
361 See Envtl. Capital Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 LEXIS
1030, at *8 (Dec. 28, 1995); Colo. Capital Alliance, Inc., 1995 WL 271123,
at *2 (May 4, 1995); Mo. Innovation Ctr., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995
WL 643949, at *4 (Oct. 17, 1995); Capital Res. Network, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1993 WL 164600, at *5 (Apr. 23, 1993).
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explaining why those particular features matter.3 62 Those
features include the following:
(1) The network is operated by a non-profit
organization. 36 3
(2) The network does not give any advice on the
merits or shortcomings of particular investments3"
and does not otherwise endorse, analyze, or
recommend the listed investment opportunities.365
(3) The network receives only a small application fee,
typically used to offset administrative costs,M6 and no
employees of the network will receive any
compensation based on the outcome of investment
transactions. 367
(4) The network is not involved in negotiating any
purchase or sale-* and will not provide any
362 Almost all of the letters share these common features. The
following notes cite letters in which the staff expressly noted the feature in
granting relief.
" Capital Res. Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 164600, at
*1 (Apr. 23, 1993); Venture Capital Exch., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1986 WL 66613, at *1 (Apr. 23, 1986). But see Tech. Capital Network, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 175694, at *8 n.2 (June 5, 1992) (non-
profit status "is not solely determinative" of whether a company is an
investment adviser).
' Angel Capital Elec. Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL
636094, at *1 (Oct. 25, 1996); Venture Capital Exch., Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1986 WL 66613, at *1 (Apr. 23, 1986); Venture Capital Res., Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55644, at *1 (Nov. 25, 1985).
365 Mo. Innovation Center, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL
643949, at *10 (Oct. 17, 1995).
" Capital Res. Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 164600
(Apr. 23, 1993); Venture Capital Res., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985
WL 55644 (Nov. 25, 1985); Heartland Venture Capital Network, SEC No-
Action Letter, 1986 WL 65138, at *1 (Mar. 26, 1987) (indicating that the
fee need not be a one-time fee; a renewal fee is acceptable).
367 Capital Res. Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 164600, at
*2 (Apr. 23, 1993); Tech. Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1992 WL 175694, at *7 (June 5, 1992).
36' Angel Capital Elec. Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL
636094, at *2 (Oct. 25, 1996); Capital Res. Network, SEC No-Action
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information concerning how to complete a
transaction.369
(5) The network does not handle any funds or
securities involved in completing a transaction.3 0
Thomas Hazen reads these no-action letters as allowing
the use of "passive" bulletin boards that merely post
information about securities as long as two conditions are
met: (1) the bulletin boards are not involved in any
negotiations regarding investments arising from using of the
bulletin board; and (2) the board operator gives no advice
"regarding the merits or shortcomings of any particular
trade."371 Thomas Lemke and Gerald Lins add a third
condition: the bulletin board operator may not "receive
compensation in connection with the purchase or sale of any
stock listed on the bulletin board."372
Crowdfunding sites differ from these approved matching
networks in several ways that make it more likely that they
will be treated as investment advisers. Crowdfunding sites
typically are operated for profit, not by a non-profit
institution. They often charge transaction-based fees.
Although the site operator does not directly participate in
negotiations, negotiation and completion of the transactions
occur on the crowdfunding site, rather than directly between
the investor and the entrepreneur. Also, crowdfunding sites
do handle funds and securities, since both the initial
investments and the returns paid to investors flow through
the site. Whether these differences from approved services
are enough to make crowdfunding sites investment advisers
is unclear.
However, one important distinction between
crowdfunding sites and matching services points in the
Letter, 1993 WL 164600, at *2 (Apr. 23, 1993); Venture Capital Res., Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55644 (Nov. 25, 1985).
369 Venture Capital Res., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55644,
at *2 (Nov. 25, 1985).
370 Id.
371 7 HAZEN, supra note 42, at 30.
372 LEMKE & LINs, supra note 340, at 10.
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opposite direction. Matching services, by definition, attempt
to match investors with suitable offerings. By making a
match, the service is, in effect, "advising" the investor that
the particular offering fits the investor's needs.
Crowdfunding sites, by contrast, do not typically screen
investment opportunities in this way. Investors can see all
of the opportunities available on the site, and it is up to the
investor to screen them to determine which is appropriate.
The element of "advice or "analysis" being provided by the
site is thus arguably missing.
The SEC staff has in fact granted no-action relief to
several sites that merely posted available opportunities, with
no attempt to match investors to those opportunities.3 "
However, those sites differed in other important ways from
crowdfunding sites. Moreover, only one no-action letter
suggests that this distinction is important for the SEC's
purposes. In its response to Venture Capital Network,
Inc.,374 the staff indicated that a matching network was
issuing analyses or reports concerning securities, and
therefore met the criteria to be an "investment adviser,"
because it "represents that, on the basis of the investors'
responses to the questionnaire drawn up by VCN and the
information provided by the entrepreneurs in response to
questionnaires drawn up by VCN, the information provided
by VCN concerns an investment opportunity in a company or
companies which satisfy the investors' indicated investment
criteria.""5  Crowdfunding sites do not usually pick
opportunities for investors or attempt to match them to
"appropriate" opportunities. However, given the SEC letter's
limited discussion, it is unclear if this distinction from the
" See Mo. Innovation Ctr., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL
643949, at *4 (Oct. 17, 1995); Investex Investors Exch. Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1990 WL 286331, at *2 (Apr. 9, 1990); Petroleum Info.
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 WL 246625, at *2 (Nov. 28, 1989);
Richmond Venture Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 WL
246296, at *1 (May 12, 1989).
" Venture Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL
45334 (May 7, 1984).
7 Id. at *2.
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matching services is sufficient to keep crowdfunding sites
from being investment advisers.
6. The Publisher Exception
Section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act
contains several exceptions to the general definition of
investment adviser. One of those exceptions, the subsection
(D) exception for "the publisher of any bona fide newspaper,
news magazine or business or financial publication of
general and regular circulation,"37 6 might apply to
crowdfunding sites. The exception covers "publications," but
it is "clear that the exclusion for publishers is not limited to
publications or paper media."377 It has been applied to web
sites, 7 Internet postings, 37 ' electronic messages,3 0 and a
private video information network.3 1  Consequently,
Internet-based crowdfunding sites could potentially use the
exception.
The Supreme Court outlined the parameters of the
subsection (D) exception in 1985, in Lowe v. SEC.382
According to the Court, in passing the Investment Advisers
Act, Congress "was primarily interested in regulating the
business of rendering personalized investment advice." 38 3
Communications that "do not offer individualized advice
37 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 80b-2(a)(11)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(11)(D) (2006).
3" FRIEDMAN, supra note 266, at 17-7.
378 SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889, 900-02 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (rejecting
the application of the subsection (D) exception for other reasons).
" See id. at 894-96 (rejecting the application of the subsection (D)
exception for other reasons).
380 See SEC v. Terry's Tips, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 526, 530-32 (D. Vt.
2006) (holding that the publisher exception applies to non-personalized e-
mail, but nevertheless finding the defendants to be investment advisers);
Mr. Russell H. Smith, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WIL 282564, at *2 (May
2, 1996) (noting that a person providing advice through electronic mail
could qualify for the publisher exception).
38' See Reuters Info. Servs., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176539,
at *1-*3 (Jan. 17, 1991).
382 472 U.S. 181, 203-11 (1985).
383 Id. at 204.
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attuned to any specific portfolio or to any client's particular
needs" are not within the purpose of the Act"' and are at
least presumptively within the subsection (D) exclusion. 385 A
few lower court cases since Lowe have concluded that
publications offering non-personalized advice to investors are
not investment advisers. 6
The SEC staff derives three requirements from Lowe.
The publication must (1) offer only impersonalized advice,
i.e., advice not tailored to the individual needs of a specific
client or group of clients; (2) be "bona fide" or genuine, in
that it contains disinterested commentary and analysis as
opposed to promotional material; and (3) be of general and
regular circulation, i.e., not timed to specific market activity
or to events affecting or having the ability to affect the
securities industry.38 7
Crowdfunding sites clearly do not offer personalized
investment advice. Everyone who enters a publicly available
crowdfunding site receives exactly the same information. In
" Id. at 208. Prior to Lowe, courts made no distinction between
personal and impersonal investment advice in applying subsection (D).
See Lani M. Lee, The Effects of Lowe on the Application of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 to Impersonal Investment Advisory Publications, 42
Bus. LAW. 507, 507 (1987).
385 Lowe might be interpreted to require that one offer personalized
advice to be an investment adviser at all, but the majority opinion clearly
indicates that "on its face, the basic definition applies to petitioners."
Lowe, 472 U.S. at 203-04. Thus, the better reading is that the distinction
between personalized and impersonal advice relates to the publisher
exception. See David B. Levant, Financial Columnists as Investment
Advisers: After Lowe and Carpenter, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2061, 2093 (1986).
See also SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889, 894-95 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding
that publications that do not offer personalized advice could still be
investment advisers if the publications are not bona fide).
38. See Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors Servs., Inc., 273 F.
Supp. 2d 914, 916 (E.D. Mich. 2002); SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., 664 F.
Supp. 554, 555 (D.D.C. 1986).
... Nito GmbH, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 473433, at *1-*2
(Aug. 9, 1996). See also, e.g., Mr. Russell H. Smith, SEC No-Action Letter,
1996 WL 282564, at *2 (May 2, 1996); InTouch Global, LLC, SEC No-
Action Letter, 1995 WL 693301, at *2 (Nov. 14, 1995); David Parkinson,
Ph.D., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 619930, at *1 (Oct. 19, 1995).
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fact, unlike most of the electronic matching services, most
crowdfunding sites do not even attempt to collect information
about investors that would allow them to match investors to
particular offerings.
Therefore, crowdfunding sites would fall within the
publisher exception if they are "bona fide" and "of general
and regular circulation.""' These two requirements,
according to Lowe, are designed to eliminate "hit and run
tipsters" and "touts" from using the exception.8 9 In the
Court's view, the exception is intended for publications that
"contain disinterested commentary and analysis as opposed
to promotional material disseminated by a 'tout."'9 o
Crowdfunding sites are not designed to tout particular
stocks or issues; rather, they are open to any entrepreneur
who wishes to raise money. Moreover, they are not "personal
communications masquerading in the clothing of' general
publications.39 ' Every investor who logs on receives exactly
the same content. However, the materials on crowdfunding
sites are not "disinterested commentary"-they are intended
to be "promotional." The whole point of the entrepreneurs'
postings is to convince people to invest in their businesses,
and the crowdfunding sites themselves, which receive
transaction-based compensation, have a pecuniary interest
in investors following that "advice." This alone may be
sufficient to preclude application of the publisher
exception.'9 2
" See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 80b-2(a)(11)(D), 15 U.S.C.
§80b-2(a)(11)(D) (2006).
" Lowe, 472 U.S. at 206.
390 Id.
391 Id. at 209.
" See SEC v. Laurins, No. 89-16708, 1991 WL 57933, at *2 (9th Cir.
Apr. 16, 1991) (where the publisher of an investment report had an
undisclosed pecuniary interest in the advice contained in the report, the
publication was not bona fide, and the publisher therefore was an
investment adviser); SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889, 894 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(publication may not be bona fide, and therefore may not be entitled to the
publisher exception, where the defendants were promoting stocks "in
which they either had an interest or for which they were being paid to
recommend without revealing their interests").




Unfortunately, the case law in this area is somewhat
confused. One district court opinion has essentially read the
"bona fide" requirement out of the Lowe opinion, holding that
publications not offering individualized advice were not
investment advisers, even though they "do not contain
completely disinterested commentary, and do contain
promotional material.""' Another district court held that a
magazine was a bona fide publication that fit within the
exception, even though much of the magazine's content was
provided by featured companies and their public relations
agents.39 4
To fall within the publisher exception, crowdfunding sites
must also be of general and regular circulation. Web sites
are, by definition, continually published, and crowdfunding
sites are open to the general public. But the Supreme Court
indicated in Lowe that a publication is not regular if its
publication is "timed to specific market activity, or to events
affecting or having the ability to affect the securities
industry."'3  It is not clear exactly what this means in the
context of a web site. Although crowdfunding sites are
continually available, they are changed each time an
entrepreneur posts a new fundraising request. Thus, in a
sense, each "new edition" of the site is timed to specific
market activity-a new securities offering by an
entrepreneur. The SEC might seize on this to argue that
crowdfunding sites are timed to specific market activity, and
therefore do not qualify for the exception.
. SEC v. Terry's Tips, Inc. 409 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532 (D. Vt. 2006).
The court still held that the defendants were investment advisers because
of individualized advice they gave to individual investors in phone calls
and e-mail. Id.
" See SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 554, 555 (D.D.C.
1986), rev'd on other grounds, 851 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The
magazine is described in an earlier opinion, SEC v. Wall Street Publishing
Institute, 591 F. Supp. 1070, 1075-77 (D.D.C. 1984), stayed, No. 84-5485,
1984 WL 21133, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1984).
3 Lowe, 472 U.S. at 209.
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V. PROPOSALS TO EXEMPT CROWDFUNDING
As crowdfunding has grown, proponents of crowdfunding
have, not surprisingly, turned their attention to federal
securities law and the possibility of selling securities through
crowdfunding. The result has been several proposals to
exempt crowdfunding from Securities Act registration. Even
the White House has endorsed a crowdfunding exemption.
Some of these crowdfunding exemption proposals are
sketchy. At best, they represent bare frames on which an
exemption could be erected. But all of the proposals share
two common features: (1) an overall cap on the dollar amount
of the offering; and (2) a limit on the amount each investor
may invest.
The SEC, under pressure from Congress, had agreed to
look at crowdfunding even before the White House
announcement. But the White House endorsement definitely
raises the ante and makes it more likely that the SEC will at
least consider rule-making. However, Congress may not wait
for SEC action. Three bills have been introduced that would
create statutory crowdfunding exemptions, and one of those
bills has passed in the House.
A. The Sustainable Economies Law Center Petition
The first exemption proposal came in 2010. The
Sustainable Economies Law Center petitioned the SEC to
exempt offerings of up to $100,000, provided that no single
investor contributed more than $100.396 The proposed
exemption includes additional limitations: (1) the offerors
must be individual U.S residents, not entities;"' (2) each
offeror may make only one offering at a time; and (3) all
396 Sustainable Economies Law Ctr., Request fcr Rulemaking to
Exempt Securities Offerings Up to $100,000 With $100 Maximum Per
Investor From Registration, SEC File No. 4-605, at 2 (July 1, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2010/petn4-605.pdf.
3 Id. at 7. The Center argues that allowing only individuals, and not
companies, to use the exemption would limit fraud because the identity of
each offeror could be verified and no one could "hide behind a corporate
shell."
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offering materials and communications must include a
disclaimer "stating the possibility of total loss of the
investment, and the necessity of careful evaluation of each
offeror's trustworthiness."3 98  The petition itself is an
illustration of the power of crowdfunding: it was funded by a
campaign on the crowdfunding web site IndieGoGo.'"
The SEC dutifully logged the petition.oo and began
accepting comments. Aided by a mention on the blog
BoingBoing,4 0' the petition has generated dozens of
individual comments, almost all supportive, plus almost one
hundred form comments.40 2 The petition even has its own
website. " Moreover, the final report of the 2010 SEC
Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital
Formation recommended a similar exemption, although the
398 Id.
" See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 2, at 187-88; Crowdfunding
Campaign to Change Crowdfunding Law, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiego
go.com/Change-Crowdfunding-Law (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
400 See Request for Rulemaking to Exempt Securities Offerings Up to
$100,000 With $100 Maximum Per Investor From Registration, SEC, File
No. 4-605, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2010/petn4-605.p
df.
4"o See Paul Spinrad, Crowdfunding Exemption Action: File No. 4-605,
BoINGBoING (July 3, 2010, 3:26 AM), http://www.boingboing.net/2010/07
/03/sec-crowdfunding-exe.html.
402 See Comments on Rulemaking Petition: Request for Rulemaking to
Exempt Securities Offerings up to $100 from Registration Under Section 5
of the Securities Act of 1933, SEC, File No. 4-605, available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-605/4-605.shtml. Some of those comments
proposed raising the maximum offering amount and the maximum
individual investment. See, e.g., the comments of Michael Sauvante (Nov.
9, 2010); James J. Angel (Sept. 21, 2010); Andres La Saga (Aug. 24, 2010),
Comments on Rulemaking Petition: Request for Rulemaking to Exempt
Securities Offerings up to $100 from Registration Under Section 5 of the
Securities Act of 1933, SEC, File No. 4-605, available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-605/4-605.shtml. See also Pope, supra
note 99, at 997 (discussing the SELC proposal and arguing that the per-
investor cap should be increased to $1,000 and the aggregate offering limit
should be increased to $250,000).
403 See Change Crowdfunding Law, CROWDFUNDINGLAW.COM
http://crowdfindinglaw.com/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
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recommendation does not specifically name the Center as its
source.404
B. The Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council
Proposal
Near the end of 2010, the Small Business &
Entrepreneurship Council proposed a similar exemption.40 5
The Council's exemption was also included in, but not
directly endorsed by, the final report of the 2010 SEC
Forum.40 6
The maximum offering amount under the Council's
proposal would be $1 million, and the maximum for any
individual investor would be either $10,000 or 10% of the
person's "stated income" for the prior year.40 7 Offerings could
be made on SEC-approved web sites.4 08 To participate in
such an offering, an investor would be required to take an
online test, but if the Council's single proposed question for
this test is representative, the test would be more of an
interactive disclaimer than a test of investment
sophistication. The question asks whether investors
understand that all of their capital is at risk.4 09  The
Council's proposed exemption would not completely free
issuers from SEC disclosure requirements. Issuers would
4 2010 ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL
BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION, FINAL REPORT 21 (2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor29.pdf (recommending that the SEC
"exempt from 1933 Act registration aggregate offerings of up to $100,000,
where each individual may invest no more than a certain maximum
amount, say $100 per individual").
40 See SBE Council Proposal, supra note 247.
4 See 2010 ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL
BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION, supra note 404, at 29-30.
407 SBE Council Proposal, supra note 247, at 4. It is not clear from the
proposal exactly what "stated income" means or whether the individual
limit is supposed to select the greater or the lesser of the two amounts.
4 Id. at 5. The Council's proposal suggests that the organizations
hosting such sites could vet the issuers and investors, a process that might
create issues under the Investment Advisers Act. That aspect of the
Council's proposal is not discussed here.
41 See id.
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have to provide disclosure on something similar to the Small
Company Offering Registration ("SCOR") form used by the
states.o
C. The Startup Exemption Proposal
Entrepreneur Sherwood Neissm1 has created an online
petition in favor of another crowdfunding exemption.4 12 The
petition calls for a $1 million exemption, available only to
businesses with annual gross revenues of less than $5
million during the prior three years. All investors would
have "to complete a questionnaire to determine their
aptitude to participate . . . and answer a series of
disclosures" to demonstrate that they have sufficient
knowledge and experience to invest.' Unaccredited
investors would not be able to invest more than $10,000.m11
The platforms hosting these offerings would be required to
register with the SEC but would not need a broker's
license.416 Offerings pursuant to the exemption would also be
exempted from state registration requirements but would
have to file a notice with the states.1
D. The White House Endorsement
On September 8, 2011, the White House released a "Fact
Sheet and Overview" detailing President Obama's proposed
410 See id. at 4. See also SCOR Forms, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/
industry-resources/corporation-finance/scor-overview/scor-forms/ (last
visited Mar. 5, 2012).
41 See About Us, STARTUP EXEMPTION, http://www.startup
exemption.com/about-us#axzzlidaRGVy9 (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
412 See STARTUP EXEMPTION, http://www.startupexemption.com (last
visited Mar. 5, 2012).
413 See Exemption Framework 1, STARTUP EXEMPTION,
http://www.startupexemption.com/exemption-framework#axzzlidaRGVy9
(last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
414 Id. 3.
415 Id. 2.
416 Id. 6, 8. It is unclear exactly what requirements this
registration would entail.
417 Id. 5.
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job-creating measures.4 1 8 Buried in that ten-page document
is a single sentence about crowdfunding: "The administration
also supports establishing a 'crowdfunding' exemption from
SEC registration requirements for firms raising less than $1
million (with individual investments limited to $10,000 or
10% of investors' annual income) . . . ."r Th1 Telease
provides no further details. The proposed offering and
individual investment limits match those in the Small
Business & Entrepreneurship Council proposal, but the
release neither acknowledges that proposal nor indicates
whether the President supports the other requirements in
that proposal.
E. SEC Activity
The SEC has not yet proposed a crowdfunding exemption
or officially responded to any of the exemption proposals
detailed above. It has, however, agreed to consider some
kind of special treatment for crowdfunding. On March 22,
2011, Congressman Darrell Issa, Chairman of the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, sent a
seventeen-page letter to Mary Schapiro, Chairman of the
SEC, criticizing the SEC's treatment of private capital
formation and posing numerous questions about regulation
of the capital formation process.42 o Congressman Issa's letter
specifically asked whether the SEC had considered creating
exemptions for crowdfunding.4 21
Chairman Schapiro responded to Congressman Issa on
April 6, 2011.422 In her letter, she informed him that she was
4" Fact Sheet and Overview for AJA, supra note 7.
419 Id. at 2.
420 Letter from Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight
& Gov't Reform, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC (Mar. 22, 2011),
available at www.knowledgemosaic.com/resourcecenter/Issa.041211.pdf
[hereinafter Issa Letter].
421 Id. at 11.
422 Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, to Darrell E. Issa,
Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform (Apr. 6, 2011),
available at www.sec.gov/news/press/schapiro-issa-letter-040611.pdf
[hereinafter Schapiro Letter].
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creating a new Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging
Companies and that the SEC staff was "taking a fresh look
at our rules to develop ideas for the Commission about ways
to reduce the regulatory burdens on small business capital
formation."423 She noted the Sustainable Economies Law
Center proposal for a crowdfunding exemption,4 24 said that
the SEC staff had been discussing crowdfunding,4 25 and
promised a staff review of "the impact of our regulations on
capital formation for small businesses," specifically including
"the regulatory questions posed by new capital raising
strategies. "426
This promise, made prior to President Obama's
endorsement, should not have caused undue optimism
among crowdfunding's supporters. The SEC often pays lip
service to small business needs, but it seldom acts on those
concerns. 427  The annual forum it holds on small business
issues has produced "repeated and strongly-worded
recommendations from small business advocates to lessen
the SEC's regulatory burdens on raising capital . . . [, but]
with rare exception, the SEC has turned a deaf ear to the
Forum's recommendations and concerns."428 However,
President Obama's subsequent endorsement may make a
crowdfunding exemption more likely. At the House
subcommittee hearing, Meredith Cross, director of the SEC's
Division of Corporation Finance, indicated- that she expects
the SEC to consider crowdfunding in the near future.429
422 Id. at 1.
424 Id. at 22 n.77.
425 Id. at 22-23.
426 Id. at 24.
427 See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 11, at 64 ("Despite the SEC
profession of interest in small business, there has been a great deal more
smoke than fire.").
428 Id. at 3-4.
429 Yin Wilczek, SEC Under Pressure to Allow Crowdfunding; Agency
to Consider Issue Soon, Official Says, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1872
(Sept. 19, 2011).
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F. The SEC's Authority to Exempt Crowdfunding
The SEC clearly has the authority to exempt
crowdfunding from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act and to exempt crowdfunding web sites from
registration as brokers or investment advisers. Two
separate provisions of the Securities Act are possible sources
of authority for the SEC to exempt crowdfunding from the
Act's registration requirements. Section 3(b) of the
Securities Act 3 o authorizes the SEC to exempt offerings of
less than a specified dollar amount, currently $5 million.4 31
To authorize a Section 3(b) exemption, the SEC must find
that "enforcement . . . with respect to such securities is not
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of
investors by reason of the small amount involved or the
limited character of the public offering."432  The SEC has
used its Section 3(b) authority rather extensively: Rules 504
and 505 of Regulation D are both Section 3(b) exemptions,4 33
as is Regulation A.434
The SEC's authority under Section 28 of the Securities
Act is even more extensive, authorizing the SEC to exempt
"any person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes
of persons, securities, or transactions," from any provision of
the Act or associated rules.435 Unlike Section 3(b), Section 28
40 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2010).
43 The Sustainable Economies Law Center petition points to Section
3(b) as a potential source of authority. See Request for Rulemaking to
Exempt Securities Offerings up to $100,000 with $100 Maximum per
Investor from Registration, supra note 400, at 8-9. The Center also
argued that its proposed exemption could be a safe harbor for Section 4(2)
of the Securities Act. See id. at 9. But cf. supra Part III.B.2.a (suggesting
that it is doubtful that the Center's proposed exemption could be a safe
harbor for Section 4(2) given how the section has been interpreted).
4 Request for Rulemaking to Exempt Securities Offerings up to
$100,000 with $100 Maximum per Investor from Registration, supra note
400, at 8-9.
41 See Securities Act Rules 504(a) and 505(a), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(a),
230.505(a) (2012).
4 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251.
" 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3.
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does not limit the dollar amount of exempted offerings. To
use its Section 28 exemption authority, the SEC must find
that the "exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest and is consistent with the protection of investors."436
The SEC has similar authority to exempt those who
would otherwise be regulated as brokers under the Exchange
Act or regulated as investment advisers under the
Investment Advisers Act. Section 36(a) of the Exchange Act
authorizes the SEC to "conditionally or unconditionally
exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class or
classes of persons, securities, or transactions" from any
provisions of the Act.437 To adopt such an exemption, the
SEC would have to find that it "is necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, and . . . consistent with the protection
of investors."4 38 Section 202(a)(11) of the Investment
Advisers Act, which defines "investment adviser," authorizes
the SEC to exclude "other persons not within the intent of
[the definition]."43 More broadly, Section 206A of the
Advisers Act authorizes the SEC to "conditionally or
unconditionally exempt any person or transaction, or any
class or classes of persons, or transactions," provided that
the exemption "is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest and consistent with the protection of investors and
the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of
this [Act]."440
G. The Congressional Response
Congress may not give the SEC an opportunity to develop
a crowdfunding exemption. The House has passed a
crowdfunding bill, and a similar bill has been introduced in
436 Id.
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 36(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)
(2010). The exception to the SEC's authority involving government
securities and government securities brokers is provided at 15 U.S.C. §
78mm(b). This exception would not apply to crowdfunding.
4s 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a).
4 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(G), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(11)(G) (2006).
40 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6a.
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the Senate. Thus, it is possible that there will soon be a
statutory crowdfunding exemption.
1. House Bill 2930
On November 3, 2011, the House passed House Bill 2930,
the Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, introduced by
Congressman Patrick McHenry.4 41 The bipartisan 407-17
vote came shortly after the Obama administration released a
statement supporting the bill.442 The bill, which would add to
the Securities Act a new statutory exemption for crowd-
funding, incorporates many of the policy recommendations
made in this article.443
House Bill 2930 allows sales of securities either directly
by the issuer or through intermediaries."4  Intermediaries
who meet the requirements of the exemption are protected
from treatment as brokers under the Exchange Act."'
The maximum offering amount allowed by the bill is $1
million, or $2 million if the issuer provides investors with
audited financial statements.4 46 The aggregate amount sold
to any investor in a twelve month period may not exceed the
lesser of $10,000 or 10% of the investor's annual income.447
441 See Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong.
(2011).
442 See Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration
Policy (Nov. 2, 2011), available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr2930r 20111102.pdf ("The Administration
supports House passage of H.R. 2930.").
4" A draft of this article was publicly available on the Social Science
Research Network long before any of these bills was introduced. The
author had an extensive discussion with a member of Congressman
McHenry's legislative staff after Congressman McHenry first introduced
his bill. The original bill was rather spartan; the bill that passed the
House added many of the provisions recommended in this article.
However, the author was not directly involved in drafting the bill.
' H.R. 2930 § 2. Certain issuers are disqualified from using the
exemption. See id. § 2(d).
44 Id. § 2(b).
446 Id. § 2(a). These limits are for a twelve month period.
447 Id.
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However, the issuer and any intermediary may rely on
investors' self-certifications of income. 4 4 8
Investors who purchase crowdfunded securities generally
may not resell them for one year, except in limited
circumstances.44 9 In addition, those investors are not
counted as record shareholders for purposes of Exchange Act
registration requirements.4 50
House Bill 2930 includes a number of disclosure-related
provisions. To qualify for the exemption, issuers (or
intermediaries if the issuer is selling through an
intermediary) must45 1:
(1) warn investors about the speculative nature of
the securities, the risk of illiquidity, and the
restriction on resale;
(2) require investors to answer questions
demonstrating an understanding of the risk,
including the risk of illiquidity, and any other
matters that the SEC adds by rule;
(3) provide the SEC with limited information about
the intermediary, if one is used;
(4) provide the SEC and potential investors with
information about the issuer, its principals, the
purpose of the offering, the target offering amount,
and the deadline for reaching that amount;452 and
(5) when the offering is completed, provide the SEC
with a notice of the aggregate offering amount and
the number of purchasers.
If the offering is being made directly by the issuer, the
issuer must also disclose its interest in the offering.5 If an
intermediary is used, the intermediary must do a
448 Id. § 2(b).
" Id.
4o Id. § 3.
451 See id. § 2(b).
452 Issuers may not draw on the pledged funds un'til investors have
pledged at least 60% of the target amount. Id. § 2(b). ,
453 Id.
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background check on the issuer's principals.454 The issuer or
the intermediary must also take "reasonable measures to
reduce the risk of fraud with respect to such transaction,"
although the bill provides no guidance as to what this
requires."5
The bill also includes several structural requirements.
Investors and issuers must be able to communicate with
each other on the web site used for the offering.45 6 The SEC
must be granted investor-level access to the site.5 ' Cash-
management functions must be outsourced to a third-party
custodian, such as a registered broker-dealer or an insured
depository institution.5 The issuer or intermediary
(depending on whether it is a direct or intermediated
offering) must maintain such books and records as the SEC
deems appropriate.' Finally, neither the issuer nor the
intermediary may offer investment advice.460
House Bill 2930 preempts state offering registration
requirements, but otherwise leaves state authority intact.4"'
In addition, the SEC must make the information it receives
pursuant to the exemption available to state securities
administrators.6 2
2. Senate Bill 1791
On November 2, 2011, Senator Scott Brown introduced
Senate Bill 1791, the Democratizing Access to Capital Act of








461 Id. § 4.
462 Id. § 2.
4' Democratizing Access to Capital Act of 2011, S. 1791, 112th Cong.
(2011).
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incorporates several of this article's policy
recommendations.4 64
Senate Bill 1791, unlike House Bill 2930, would allow
offerings to be conducted only through a crowdfunding
intermediary. 465  The annual offering amount would be
capped at $1 million, with individual investments limited to
$1,000 or less.4 66 To qualify for the exemption, issuers would
have to file such notice with the SEC as it shall require and
"disclose to investors all rights of investors, including
complete information about the risks, obligations, benefits,
history, and costs of offering."4 67  As in House Bill 2930,
resale of crowdfunded securities would be restricted for one
year,4 68 and crowdfunded securities-holders would not count
as record shareholders for purposes of Section 12(g) of the
Exchange Act.469
Most of the conditions in Senate Bill 1791 are imposed on
crowdfunding intermediaries as requirements to obtain an
exemption from regulation as brokers.o Some of the
disclosure-related requirements 471 mirror those in House Bill
2930. The intermediary must:
(1) warn investors about the investments' speculative
nature, the problem of illiquidity, and the one-year
restriction on resale;
(2) require every potential investor to answer
questions demonstrating competency as to the level
4 Id. § 2. The author had no direct contact with anyone on Senator
Brown's staff prior to the introduction of his bill, and the author was not
involved in its drafting. The author has, however, had discussions with
several other Senate staff members.
465 Id. As in H.R. 2930, certain issuers would be disqualified from
using the exemption under disqualification provisions to be determined




469 Id. § 3.
470 Id. § 7.
471 See id. § 6.
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of risk, the risk of illiquidity, and other areas as
determined by the SEC;
(3) provide information to the SEC about the
intermediary and its employees; and
(4) provide a notice to the SEC that includes
information about the issuer, its principals, the
purpose of the offering, the intended use of proceeds,
and the target offering amount.
In addition, as in House Bill 2930, the intermediary must
do a background check on the issuer's principals and take
"reasonable measures to reduce the risk of fraud."4 7 2
Senate Bill 1791 also imposes various structural
requirements on crowdfunding intermediaries. They must47.
(1) be open to the public and provide investor-level
access to the SEC;
(2) provide public communication portals for
investors and potential investors;
(3) prohibit their employees from investing in the
offerings or having any financial interest in issuers
posting offerings;
(4) refrain from offering investment advice or
recommendations;
(5) require the issuer to state a target offering
amount and withhold funds from the issuer until at
least 60% of that target amount has been raised;
(6) outsource cash-management functions to a third-
party custodian, such as a broker or an insured
depository institution;
(7) maintain such books and records as the SEC
requires; and
(8) provide a complaint-resolution mechanism for
investors.
472 Id. § 6.
'7 Id.
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Senate Bill 1791 would preempt state offering
registration requirements.4 74  However, the issuer's state of
organization and any state in which the purchasers of 50% or
more of the offering amount reside could still collect fees and
require that any documents filed with the SEC also be filed
with the state securities commission.475
3. Senate Bill 1970
On December 8, 2011, Senator Jeff Merkley introduced
Senate Bill 1970, the Capital Raising Online While
Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of
20 11.476 Senator Merkley's bill also incorporates several of
the policy recommendations made in this article.477
Senate Bill 1970 requires that the securities be sold
through a broker or an intermediary that meets specific
criteria.4 78 The bill makes it very difficult for a non-broker to
facilitate crowdfunding. Non-broker intermediaries must
register with the SEC as "funding portals,"479 and are subject
to regulation by the SEC.4 80 These funding portals may not
solicit purchases or sales and may not handle investor funds
or securities. 48 1 They also may not compensate employees or
third parties for solicitation or based on the sale of securities
on the site. 4" Finally, funding portals may not offer
investment advice or recommendations to investors.48 3
4' Id. § 4.
47 Id. § 6.
476 Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-
Disclosure Act of 2011, S. 1970, 112th Cong. (2011).
4 The author had an extensive discussion with members of Senator
Merkley's staff prior to the introduction of Senator Merkley's bill.
However, the author was not directly involved in drafting the bill.
478 S. 1970 § 2.
47 Id.





Senate Bill 1970 caps the annual offering amount at $1
million,4 84 and also includes investor limits, but the investor
limits are more complicated than in the other bills. For a
single offering, the limit is the greater of $500 or an amount
that depends on the investor's annual income.485  If the
investor's annual income is between $50,000 and $100,000,
the limit is 1% of income.48 6 If the investor's annual income
is more than $100,000, the limit is 2% of income. 487 The bill
provides no alternative limit for investors whose income is
$50,000 or less, so presumably their investment limit is the
$500 alternative.
These limits are for a twelve-month period for a single
issuer.488 The bill also includes cumulative annual limits for
all crowdfunded offerings in which a given investor
participates." 9 Crowdfunding intermediaries are required to
take such steps as the SEC deems appropriate to verify that
no investor has purchased securities from all crowdfunding
issuers that exceed the greater of $2,000 or an income-based
limit, in any twelve-month period. 49 0 The income limit would
be 4% of income for those investors in the $50,000-$100,000
range and 8% of income for those with incomes greater than
$100,000.491
Senate Bill 1970 does not allow issuers to advertise their
offerings, except to direct people to the intermediary,49 2 and
also imposes fairly substantial filing and disclosure
requirements on issuers. Crowdfunding issuers must file
with the SEC, and must provide to investors and potential
investors, among other information4 1:
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(1) the names of the issuer's officers and directors,
and of persons owning more than 20% of the issuer's
shares;
(2) a description of the business of the issuer and its
anticipated business plan;
(3) financial statements reviewed by an independent
public accountant, and audited for offerings of more
than $500,000;
(4) a description of the purpose of the offering and
the intended use of the proceeds; and
(5) "a description of the ownership and capital
structure of the issuer, how the securities being
offered are being valued, what the rights of the
securities are, and how rights may be exercised by
the issuer and shareholders."494
Issuers must also provide investors and the SEC with
regular updates about the issuer's progress toward meeting
the target offering amount, as well as quarterly reports on
operations and financial statements.49 5
Crowdfunding intermediaries, including brokers, must
also meet certain disclosure-related requirements.
Intermediaries must provide SEC-required disclosures and
investor education materials and must "ensure" that each
investor (1) reviews those materials; (2) "positively affirms"
her understanding that her entire investment is at risk and
that she could bear such a loss; and (3) answers questions
demonstrating an understanding of the risk, including the
risk of illiquidity, and such other matters as the SEC deems
appropriate.49 6 In addition, at least one month prior to any
offering, the intermediary must provide, in writing, to both
the SEC and investors, any information that has been
provided by the issuer pursuant to the issuer's filing






such measures as the SEC requires to reduce the risk of
fraud, including criminal background checks and securities
enforcement regulatory checks on the issuer's officers and
directors, and on holders of more than 20% of the issuer's
shares.498
Senate Bill 1970 includes a number of other structural
restrictions on intermediaries. Intermediaries may not allow
issuers to draw on offering funds until the capital
contributed by investors is equal to the target offering
amount, and must allow investors to cancel their
commitments to invest under rules to be adopted by the
SEC .499 The directors, officers, partners, and employees of an
intermediary may not have a financial interest in any of the
issuers using the intermediary."oo The intermediary may not
compensate promoters, finders, or others for finding
potential investors.01 Finally, intermediaries must take
steps to protect investors' privacy, as mandated by SEC
rules.5 02
Senate Bill 1970 adds a miscellany of other conditions.
Certain issuers, brokers, and other intermediaries are
disqualified from using the exemption.50' Resales are
restricted for two years, with certain exceptions. 504 The SEC
is allowed, but not required, to exclude crowdfunding
investors from the calculation of record shareholders for
purposes of Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act.05 Senate Bill
1970 also requires the SEC to periodically review the
exemption's effects on investor protection. 506 Furthermore,









60 Id. § 5.
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crowdfunding issuers and their officers and directors liable
for materially false and misleading statements."o'
Unlike the other bills, Senate Bill 1970 does not preempt
state securities law. It does, however, require that the SEC
make the information it receives pursuant to the exemption
available to state securities regulators.0 "
VI. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A
CROWDFUNDING EXEMPTION
A crowdfunding exemption, like any securities law
exemption, requires a complicated balancing of two
sometimes conflicting goals: investor protection and capital
formation.50 9 The SEC has long seen its mission as "investor
protection in the sense of remedying information
asymmetries and rooting out fraud,"o10 but all of the SEC's
foundational statutes require it to consider, "in addition to
the protection of investors, whether the . . . [SEC's] action
will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.""51  Balancing those competing interests is "a
fundamental challenge of securities regulation,"5 12 and the
507 Id. § 2.
508 Id.
" See generally C. Steven Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the
Securities Act of 1933: An Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591 (1996)
[hereinafter Bradford, Transaction Exemptions] (discussing the costs and
benefits of registration and the justifications for exemptions from the
registration requirement).
.o Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The
SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975,
1005 (2006). See also Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors, Not Issuers: A
Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALF. L. REV. 279, 280 (2000) ("Securities
regulation in the United States revolves around investor protection.").
51, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c)
(2010); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c)
(2010);. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (2010); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2010).
512 Paredes, supra note 510, at 1005.
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SEC usually tilts the balance in favor of investor
protection.a
A crowdfunding exemption would undoubtedly facilitate
capital formation. Very small businesses, particularly
startups, have an unmet need for capital that securities
crowdfunding would help to meet.
The investor-protection consequences of a crowdfunding
exemption, however, are less clear. Small business
investments are inherently risky, posing not only greater
risks of business failure, but also of fraud and overreaching
by controlling entrepreneurs. A crowdfunding exemption
would expose members of the general public to those risks
without ensuring that they have the financial sophistication
necessary to deal with them. The structure of crowdfunding
might, to some extent, ameliorate those risks, but investors
would still face a significant chance of loss.
But this risk of loss is inherent in small business
startups. The only way to completely eliminate it would be
to bar small business financing altogether. Crowdfunding
exemption proposals are structured so that losses to any
single investor would be relatively small and bearable.
Moreover, the public is already contributing billions of
dollars to non-securities crowdfunding, and those
crowdfunding investments are subject to the same risks as
securities crowdfunding. A securities crowdfunding
exemption would, therefore, not open investors to new risks,
but merely allow entrepreneurs to offer a higher return to
offset those risks. The net effect on investors could,
therefore, be positive.
513 Id. at 1006. According to Paredes, now himself an SEC
commissioner, securities regulators "have an exaggerated concern over
fraud and investor losses and, at least by comparison, a dulled sensitivity
to the costs of greater investor protection." Id. at 1009. Recently, several
of the SEC's rules have been overturned because of the Commission's
failure to adequately consider the cost of the rules. See Bus. Roundtable v.
SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC,
613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890
(D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
99No. 1: 1] CRO0WD FUNDING AND SECURITIES LA WS
A. Capital Formation: The Need for a Crowdfunding
Exemption
Small businesses face a capital funding gap."" Some
estimates indicate that the financial markets fall $60 billion
short each year "in meeting the demand of small companies
for early-stage private equity financing.""' Equity capital is
"widely viewed as less accessible and more costly per dollar
raised for small businesses compared with large
businesses."516  Finding funding is particularly difficult for
businesses seeking to raise funds in the $100,000 to $5
million range.s1 ' Many entrepreneurs with promising
projects may go unfunded as a result, costing the United
States an unknown number of jobs and innovations.1 8
Early-stage entrepreneurial activity in the United States is
steadily declining, and the United States has lost its lead
over other innovation-driven economies.19
" See Cable, supra note 254, at 108; Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet
Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 57, 59-64 (1998); Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So)
Puzzling Behavior ofAngel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1417 (2008).
51 Sjostrom, supra note 198, at 3.
516 GAO Report, supra note 200, at 2. See also Fisch, supra note 514,
at 63 (small business funding "is often viewed as inadequate"); Sjostrom,
supra note 198, at 586 (financing options available to small companies "are
generally viewed as inadequate").
' Ibrahim, supra note 514, at 1417 (amounts above $100,000); GAO
Report, supra note 200, at 12-13 ($250,000-$5 million); Cable, supra note
254, at 108 ($500,000-$5 million).
... Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Small Firm Financing Problem: Private
Information and Public Policy, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 177, 178
(1998); Sjostrom, supra note 198, at 3.
.19 Abdul Ali et al., 2009 National Entrepreneurial Assessment for the
United States of America: Executive Report, GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
MONITOR, 2009, at 1, 7, http://www.gemconsortium.org/docs/download/666
[hereinafter National Entrepreneurial Assessment]. The amount of total
early-stage entrepreneurial activity in the United States dropped from
10.6% in 2005 to 6.9% in 2009. Id. at 7. Nascent entrepreneurial activity
declined from 8.7% of the U.S. population in 2005 to 4.9% in 2009. Id. at
33.
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The small business financing problem has at least two
causes. The first cause is informational inefficiency-a
failure to match potential sources of capital with potential
investment opportunities.5 20 Even if money is available, it
will not be utilized if the entrepreneur who needs it fails to
connect with the investors who have it. Not surprisingly,
investments by the major sources of small business capital
tend to be concentrated in certain geographical areas, such
as Silicon Valley."' Crowdfunding allows an entrepreneur to
publish her request for funding to the entire world,
"mak[ing] it . . . easier to harness spare capital and route it
to those who need it most."522
The second element of the capital gap is the
unavailability of traditional sources of small business
financing-bank lending, venture capitalists, and angel
investors-to most startups and other very small businesses.
Entrepreneurs typically begin new ventures using personal
funds, including savings, credit card debt, second mortgages,
and money from friends and family.52 3 Some entrepreneurs
might raise $100,000, or even $500,000, from those personal
sources, 524  but many entrepreneurs with good ideas,
particularly those who are not in the upper and middle
classes, have very little access to funds.
520 Sjostrom, supra note 198, at 3-4.
521 See GAO Report, supra note 200, at 3 (venture capitalists); SIMON
C. PARKER, THE EcONOMICs OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 249-50 (2009) (angel
investors).
522 HOWE, supra note 1, at 248. A study of Dutch crowdfunding site
Sellaband found that only 13.5% of successful crowdfunders' capital came
from investors within fifty kilometers of the entrepreneur. Almost 40% of
the amounts received came from investors more than 3,000 kilometers
away. Ajay Agrawal, Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, The Geography of
Crowdfunding 22 tbl. 2a (NET Institute Working Paper No. 10-08, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1692661.
523 Fisch, supra note 514, at 60; National Entrepreneurial Assessment,
supra note 519, at 8; Sjostrom, supra note 198, at 5. See also PARKER,
supra note 521, at 250 ("Families are the most commonly used source of
business loans in the USA after banks and other financial institutions.").
524 See Cable, supra note 254, at 108; Ibrahim, supra note 514, at
1417.
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Furthermore, when those personal resources are
exhausted, funding is difficult to find. Other common
sources of business financing are not available to small
startups. Bank loans are one possible source of capital, but
most small startups do not have the collateral, the cash flow,
or the operating history to qualify for bank loans in the
amount needed.525
Venture capital funds are another possible source of
funding,526 but venture capitalists tend to focus on companies
that have passed the initial startup phase and are seeking to
grow further.' Less than a quarter of venture capital
investments are for early-stage funding." Venture capital
funding is also not available in the relatively small amounts
that new companies need,52 9 and the problem is worsening as
the average minimum amount invested by venture capital
funds increases.5 30 A typical venture capital investment
averages between $2 million and $10 million.3 ' Venture
capitalists sometimes provide smaller amounts,53 2 but high
transaction costs usually make smaller investments
impractical.53 3 These investments also tend to focus on
specific industries 3' and on firms with potential for rapid
525 See Cable, supra note 254, at 121; George W. Dent, Jr., Venture
Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 1029, 1032
(1992); Fisch, supra note 514, at 60; Sjostrom, supra note 198, at 5.
526 For a good, short introduction to the venture capital industry, see
Cable, supra note 254, at 112-15.
527 Fisch, supra note 514, at 62; Ibrahim, supra note 514, at 1416.
" GAO Report, supra note 200, at 21.
529 See id. at 3. See also Cohn & Yadley, supra note 11, at 80-81;
Ibrahim, supra note 514, at 1416.
.o GAO Report, supra note 200, at 13. One source claims that the
total amount of venture capital funding has also declined recently, from
$106 billion in 2000 to $40 billion in 2001 and $30.5 billion in 2007.
PARKER, supra note 521, at 238.
531 Ibrahim, supra note 514, at 1416.
52 See GAO Report, supra note 200, at 11 (amounts ranging from
$250,000 to $5 million).
533 Dent, supra note 525, at 1080.
" GAO Report, supra note 200, at 3.
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growth."' Furthermore, venture capitalists are extremely
selective, rejecting 99% of the business plans submitted to
them.536
So-called "angel investors," wealthy individuals with
substantial business and entrepreneurial experience," are
the other major possibility for initial funding. Angel
investors often invest on a smaller scale than venture capital
firms,'53  and they are usually more willing to invest in
startup companies.5 39 A typical financing round for an angel
investor ranges from $100,000 to $2 million.5 40 Some angel
investors may be willing to provide as little as $25,000,41' but
one source indicates that the minimum deal size for most
angel investors in the United States is about $1 million."
Also, like venture capitalists, angel investors generally look
for "high-growth, high-return investment opportunities,"5 13 so
many small companies would not qualify. Angel investors by
themselves are not currently filling the small business
funding gap.5"
Crowdfunding makes new sources of capital available to
small businesses.4 5 It opens business investment to smaller
. Fisch, supra note 514, at 62; GAO Report, supra note 200, at 10.
..6 Fisch, supra note 514, at 20; GAO Report, supra note 200, at 20.
.. Sjostrom, supra note 198, at 5.
538 Cable, supra note 254, at 115; Fisch, supra note 514, at 62.
. GAO Report, supra note 200, at 10; Ibrahim, supra note 514, at
1406. According to Amatucci and Sohl, the percentage of angel deals
involving the seed and startup stages of business was 45% in 2004, 52% in
2003, and 50% in 2002. F. M. Amatucci & J. E. Sohl, Business Angels:
Investment Processes, Outcomes and Current Trends, in A. ZACHARAKIS &
S. SPINELLI, JR., 2 ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE ENGINE OF GROWTH 87, 88
(2007).
o Ibrahim, supra note 514, at 1418; Sjostrom, supra note 198, at 6.
See also Amatucci & Sohl, supra note 539, at 88 (average angel investment
of $470,000 in 2004).
" GAO Report, supra note 200, at 10.
54 PARKER, supra note 521, at 249.
w GAO Report, supra note 200, at 10.
See generally Cable, supra note 254 (suggesting regulatory changes
to enable more angel investing).
" See Heminway and Hoffman, supra note 142, at 931 (arguing that
crowdfunding "enables entrepreneurs to more quickly and easily identify
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investors who have not traditionally participated in private
securities offerings. Those investors have less money to
invest, so they would be willing to fund smaller business
opportunities that the venture capitalists and angel
investors would not touch. Crowdfunding also gives poorer
entrepreneurs whose friends and family lack the wealth to
provide seed capital somewhere else to turn.
But what about the other benefits that venture capitalists
and angel investors provide to small business entrepreneurs?
In addition to the capital they invest, venture capitalists and
angel investors typically provide companies with managerial
and monitoring services."4 6  If startups turn to passive,
unsophisticated public investors, they will not receive the
collateral services provided by sophisticated venture
capitalists and angel investors.5 47 However, crowdfunding is
not a substitute for venture capital or angel investing; it is
aimed at entrepreneurs who do not have access to such
funding. The entrepreneurs most likely to engage in
crowdfunding would not, in any event, have access to the
other services that venture capitalists and angel investors
provide.
Crowdfunding is not a panacea for small businesses'
financing issues. It will not completely eliminate the capital
gap. It will, however, open investment to new sources of
capital and provide a platform that allows investors with
unused capital to connect with entrepreneurs who need it.
B. Investor Protection: The Effects of Crowdfunding on
Investors
Crowdfunding sites make it possible for relatively
unsophisticated members of the general public to invest in
particularly risky ventures. Investor protection is, therefore,
supporter-investors who are willing and able to fund their businesses or
projects").
' PARKER, supra note 521, at 239-40; Fisch, supra note 514, at 84;
Ibrahim, supra note 514, at 1419; GAO Report, supra note 200, at 11.
" See Fisch, supra note 514, at 86 (arguing that if angel investor
funding were "replaced by dispersed passive public investors, the
collateral monitoring and managing services are likely to be eliminated").
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an important issue. A crowdfunding exemption, properly
structured, can ameliorate some, but not all, of the risk. But
investments in small businesses, whether or not those
investments are facilitated through crowdfunding, are
inherently risky. Crowdfunding possesses no magical
properties that prevent investors from losing money just like
other investors.
However, at the margin, the cost to investors of a
crowdfunding exemption is likely to be low. Investors are
already contributing substantial amounts of money to
unregulated crowdfunding offerings, although not for
securities. Those crowdfunding investments are subject to
the same risk of loss as crowdfunded securities, but do not
offer the upside potential of a securities investment.
Allowing crowdfunding entrepreneurs to sell securities
would, therefore, be a net gain to investors, increasing the
possibility of gains without any increase in the risk.
1. The Risks of Small Business Investment
Investing in small businesses is very risky. Small
business investments are illiquid, and small businesses,
especially startups, are much more likely to fail than are
more established companies.5' Losses due to fraud and self-
dealing are also much more likely.4
Small business investments expose investors to a
disproportionate risk of fraud."'o The abuses in the penny
stock market in the 1980s "typify the securities fraud
potential associated with direct marketing of microcap
securities to individual investors.""' The SEC's experience
when it eased the requirements of the Rule 504 small
offering exemption in the 1990s also illustrates the potential
fraud associated with unregulated small offerings. The
changes freed Rule 504 offerings from federal mandatory
disclosure requirements even when those offerings were not
5 Id. at 58. See also Sjostrom, supra note 198, at 586.
54 Fisch, supra note 514, at 58; Sjostrom, supra note 198, at 586.
"o Fisch, supra note 514, at 58; Sjostrom, supra note 198, at 586.
... Fisch, supra note 514, at 82.
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registered at the state level. In New York, which has no
state registration requirement, "Rule 504 was being used by
nefarious promoters to distribute up to $1 million of
securities in New York to a select favored group, followed
promptly by boiler-room promotions that artificially drove up
the secondary market price until such time as the initial
purchasers could sell their shares at a handsome profit,
leaving the gullible crop of new investors with suddenly
deflated shares and irrecoverable losses."5 52
Even absent fraud, investors in small businesses must
deal with the potential agency costs and problems of
opportunism that arise from uncertainty and information
asymmetry.53 Uncertainty is inherent in startup businesses.
At the time of investment, "virtually all of the important
decisions bearing on the company's success remain to be
made, and most of the significant uncertainties concerning
the outcome of the company's efforts remain unresolved."5 54
Entrepreneurs typically have a business plan laying out a
strategy but, at the startup phase, that plan is little more
than a "best guess."55 At that point, many major strategic
decisions remain to be made56 , and they will be made by a
management whose quality is unknown to investors.5 ' The
entrepreneur's intentions and abilities are both "not easily
observable by an investor and difficult for an entrepreneur to
communicate credibly."*5  In the case of high-technology
companies, there may also be uncertainties about the
technology itself, including whether the product works and
552 Cohn & Yadley, supra note 11, at 71-72. See also Revision of Rule
504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption, Securities Act Release
No. 7644, 1999 WL 95490, at *2 (Feb. 25, 1999).
56. See Cable, supra note 254, at 121-22 (2010); Ronald J. Gilson,
Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076-77 (2003); Ibrahim, supra note
514, at 1407.
"" Gilson, supra note 553.
... Cable, supra note 254, at 121-22.
55 Id. at 122.
.' Gilson, supra note 553, at 1077.
.. Cable, supra note 254, at 122. See also Gilson, supra note 553, at
1077.
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can be viably and widely adopted. The entrepreneur is
almost certain to understand those issues better than most
investors.669
In short, the entrepreneur holds all the cards. Investors
have little information about what is to come and little
control over what the entrepreneur does. This presents
entrepreneurs with opportunities for self-dealing, excessive
compensation, misuse of corporate opportunities, and
dilution of investors' interests-issues similar to those faced
by investors in closely-held corporations."'
Sophisticated venture capital funds deal with these
problems by negotiating control rights and negative
covenants requiring investor approval for certain actions."'
Staged financing complements these protections.56 2
Entrepreneurs and investors "recognize that the company
will need additional rounds of financing" requiring the
cooperation of the venture capitalists."' The need to go back
to investors for future funding should constrain self-dealing,
opportunistic behavior by the entrepreneur.
Most crowdfunding investors will not have the
sophistication to understand the need for or benefits of
control rights or protective covenants. Even if they were
sophisticated enough to seek such protection, it is unclear
how they would negotiate for it, or whether it would be worth
their effort. The small amount invested by each
crowdfunding investor and the remote, impersonal nature of
crowdfunding preclude any meaningful negotiations.56 4
. Gilson, supra note 553, at 1077.
560 See Dent, supra note 525, at 1052-57.
... See Dent, supra note 525, at 1035, 1044-61; Gilson, supra note 553,
at 1074; Ibrahim, supra note 514, at 1407.
562 Gilson, supra note 553, at 1074.
' Dent, supra note 525, at 1065.
" Belleflamme et al., supra note 10, at 26-27 ("From a more general
perspective, crowdfunding practices raise questions with respect to
corporate governance and investor protection issues if most individuals
only invest tiny amounts. Crowdfunders are most likely offered very little
investor protection. This may lead to corporate governance issues, which
in turn may turn into reputation concerns if some cases of fraud or bad
governance are uncovered. Crowdfunders have very little scope to
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Even in the absence of fraud or self-dealing, many
crowdfunded small. businesses will fail. The small startups
to which crowdfunding appeals pose a disproportionate risk
of business failure.565 Approximately 80% of new businesses
"either fail or no longer exist within five to seven years of
formation . . . ."6" Even the small businesses selected for
investment by sophisticated venture capital funds are
predominantly failures. One-third of those companies end
up in bankruptcy, while another third meet their expenses
but are unable to go public or pay significant dividends.6
Investors in startups also face liquidity risk, because
there is no ready public market in which to resell their
investments.' Crowdfunding sites will not provide such a
trading market because, if they did, they would risk having
to register as exchanges or alternative trading systems.'
Therefore, crowdfunding investors may have to wait quite
some time to realize any return. 7 o Some existing
crowdfunding sites require repayment within a few years,
which limits the illiquidity problem but may exacerbate the
risk of business failure because entrepreneurs could be
forced to repay investments before their business has
intervene to protect their interests as stakeholders. Moreover, the fact
that their investment is small is likely to create a lack of incentive to
intervene.").
"5 See Fisch, supra note 514, at 58; Howard M. Friedman, On Being
Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in Contemporary
Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 306 (1994); Sjostrom, supra
note 198, at 586.
.. GAO Report, supra note 200, at 19.
567 Dent, supra note 525, at 1034. See also GAO Report, supra note
200, at 19 ("[O]nly about ten percent of venture capital investments meet
their expected rate of return.").
" Cable, supra note 254, at 122; Fisch, supra note 514, at 79.
569 Crowdfunding sites that facilitate resales would bring together
multiple buyers and sellers, increasing the likelihood that they would be
exchanges. See supra Part IV.A.
570 See Cable, supra note 254, at 122 (An investor in a startup "can
expect to wait more than five years for any return on the investment.").
571 See, e.g., Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 4
(three-year notes); Lending Club Registration Statement, supra note 81, at
3 (three-year notes); Lang, supra note 106 (maximum of five years).
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developed sufficiently to do so. And, if startups take time to
become profitable, such short repayment periods may
preclude meaningful profit-sharing.
2. The Financial Sophistication of the Crowd
The risks associated with crowdfunding ventures would
be a less significant concern if crowdfunding investors were
sophisticated enough to protect themselves. But
crowdfunding is open to the general public, and many
members of "the crowd" are not that financially well-
informed.' In one study, 34% of American adults gave
themselves a "C" grade or below on their knowledge of
personal finance, and only 22% awarded themselves an
.72 Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia Mitchell, Financial Literacy and
Retirement Planning: New Evidence from the Rand American Life Panel 4
(Michigan Retirement Research Center, Working Paper 2007-157, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095869 ("Financial literacy surveys
in many developed nations show that consumers are poorly informed
about basic economic and financial concepts."). See also B. Douglas
Bernheim, Financial Illiteracy, Education, and Retirement Savings, in
LIVING WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: REMAKING RESPONSIBILITY
FOR RETIREMENT 38, 42 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber, eds.,
1998) ("Collectively, existing studies paint a rather bleak picture of
Americans' economic and financial literacy.").
For specific survey results, see APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC,
FINANCIAL CAPABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: INJTIAL REPORT OF RESEARCH
FINDINGS FROM THE 2009 NATIONAL SURVEY (Dec. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.finrafoundation.org/web/groups/foundation/@foundation/docum
ents/foundation/p120536.pdf; NAT'L COUNCIL ON ECON. EDUC., WHAT
AMERICAN TEENS AND ADULTS KNow ABOUT ECONOMICS (Apr. 26, 2005),
available at http://www.councilforeconed.org/cel/WhatAmericansKnowAbo
utEconomics_042605-3.pdf; NAT'L FOUND. FOR CREDIT COUNSELING, THE
2010 CONSUMER FINANCIAL LITERACY SURVEY: FINAL REPORT (Apr. 2010),
available at www.nfcc.org/newsroomlFinancialLiteracy/files2010/201OCon
sumerFinancialLiteracySurveyFinalReport.pdf; Bernheim, supra note 572;
Marianne A. Hilgert, Jeanne M. Hogarth & Sondra G. Beverly, Household
Financial Management: The Connection Between Knowledge and Behavior,
Federal Reserve Bulletin 309 (July 2003); Annamaria Lusardi, Financial
Literacy: An Essential Tool for Informed Consumer Choice?, 26-30 (Paolo
Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2009-35, June 2008), available at http://
ssm.com/abstract=1336389; Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 572, at 26-30.
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"A."573  Self-assessment is probably not the best way to
measure financial knowledge, but people's self-assessments
are strongly correlated with their actual financial
knowledge."'
Many Americans are not financially literate. In a survey
of 3,512 adults and 2,242 high school students in 2005, only
17% of the adults and 3% of the students scored an "A" on a
twenty-four-question financial literacy quiz. 5 6 Sixty-six
percent of the adults and 91% of the students had grades of
"C" or worse.5 76 In 2009, respondents in a survey of
American adults answered an average of only 2.72 out of 5
financial literacy questions correctly.5 7 Forty-eight percent
of those respondents did not understand that investing in a
mutual fund generally provides a safer return than investing
in a single stock.5 7 ' Thirty-five percent missed a very simple
question about calculating compound interest.79  Seventy-
nine percent did not understand the relationship between
57 NAT'L FOUND. FOR CREDIT COUNSELING, supra note 572, at 9. But
see APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, supra note 572, at 37 (70% of
American adults rated their overall financial knowledge in the top three
levels on a seven-point scale. Only 13% put themselves in the bottom
three levels.)
57 Bernheim, supra note 572, at 48.
57 NAT'L COUNCIL ON ECON. EDUC., supra note 572, at 44.
576 Id. There was a positive correlation between students' grade level
and their scores, indicating that the students were learning over time. Id.
at 48.
5" APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, supra note 572, at 41.
171 Id. at 40. See also NAT'L COUNCIL ON ECON. EDUC., supra note 572,
at 42 (only 44% of adults and 15% of high school students understood that
diversification was a reason for preferring mutual funds to individual
stocks).
.. APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, supra note 572, at 39. See
also Bernheim, supra note 572, at 44 (In a 1993 survey of American adults
aged twenty to forty-seven, nearly one-third indicated that $1,000 left in
the bank for thirty years with compound interest of 8% would earn less
than $5,000; the correct answer is more than $10,000.); Lusardi &
Mitchell, supra note 572, at 21 (In a survey of American adults, only 75%
correctly answered a multiple-choice question about compound interest.).
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interest rates and bond prices."so Another survey asked
Americans aged fifty or older three questions about
compound interest, the relationship between investment
return and inflation, and the value of diversification.68 1 Only
one-third of the respondents were able to answer all three
questions correctly.582
This financial ignorance extends beyond general
principles of finance to more specific questions about
economic facts. In a 2001 survey, only 52% of the
respondents knew that mutual funds do not pay a
guaranteed rate of return; only 33% knew that not all
investment products purchased at a bank are federally
insured; and only 56% knew that, over the long term, stocks
offer the highest rate of return.'
Still, the numbers are not totally disheartening. A large
percentage of American adults do get many basic financial
literacy questions right.5 84 In one recent survey, two-thirds
of the respondents correctly answered most basic questions
about the function of stock markets, mutual funds,
diversification, and risk.58 6 However, these respondents were
relatively highly-educated and wealthy, so the results
580 APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, supra note 572, at 38. See
also Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 572, at 22 (noting that, in a survey of
American adults, only 37% knew the relationship between bond prices and
interest rate.).
581 See Lusardi, supra note 572, at 5. The questions were as follows:
(1) Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was
2% per year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the
account if you left the money to grow: more than $102, exactly $102, less
than $102? (2) Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was
1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, would you be
able to buy more than, exactly the same as, or less than today with the
money in this account? (3) Do you think that the following statement is
true or false? "Buying a single company stock usually provides a safer
return than a stock mutual fund."
582 Id. at 6.
3 Hilgert et al., supra note 572, at 313.
584 See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 572, at 21.
s See Lusardi, supra note 572, at 8-10, 26.
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probably "overstate the level of financial literacy in the
general population."586
The precise numbers are irrelevant, however. It is clear
that a significant portion of the American public lacks basic
financial literacy. Since crowdfunding sites are usually open
to the general public, at least some of the people investing in
crowdfunding offerings will not have the basic financial
knowledge required to understand the risks.
3. Crowdfunding and Small Business Investment
Risk
Crowdfunding offers relatively risky investments to
relatively unsophisticated investors. Some of its features
may reduce the risk of loss, and a crowdfunding exemption
could be structured to provide additional investor protection.
But, no matter how an exemption is framed, many
crowdfunding investors will lose money. The risks
associated with crowdfunding cannot be completely
eliminated.
Consider first the effect of crowdfunding on the risk of
fraud. No matter how the exemption is structured, there will
be fraud. "[N]o amount of technical exemption requirements
will hinder the fraud artists from their endeavors."" But, of
course, registration itself does not completely eliminate
fraud. The question is a comparative one: whether Internet-
based crowdfunding will increase the incidence of fraud, and,
if so, by how much.
Paul Spinrad, who proposed the first crowdfunding
exemption, argues that fraudsters will not find crowdfunding
appealing because of the small amounts involved and the
open, public nature of crowdfunding.8 " It is not clear if that
586 Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 572, at 5.
58. Cohn & Yadley, supra note 11, at 72.
" Scott Shane, Let the Crowd Buy Equity in Private Companies,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 3, 2011, available at http://www.
businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/may20l1/sb2011052_710243.htm. See
also SBE Council Proposal, supra note 247, at 4 (arguing that the
companies that would use its proposed rule "are small enough and
transparent enough to prevent fraud").
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is true. On the one hand, the Internet allows fraudulent
offerings to be distributed widely at low cost,"' so
crowdfunding sites are an obvious target for fraudsters. On
the other hand, fraud is "more detectable on the Internet,"5 90
especially when it must be mediated through an independent
crowdfunding site that is open to the public. The net effect is
indeterminate. However, it is important to remember that a
crowdfunding exemption would not legitimize fraud or
protect fraudulent offerings from the antifraud rules in the
securities statutes. The SEC and private parties would still
have the usual remedies for any fraud.
The crowdfunding structure does have some features that
could help limit some of the risks of investing in small
business ventures. First, like venture capital, crowdfunding
sometimes involves staged financing.5 1 The need to come
back for additional funds could moderate entrepreneur
behavior, especially if prior-round investors are able to
comment publicly on the crowdfunding site about the
entrepreneur's behavior. Second, investors could use
crowdfunding discussion boards to point out problems with
proposed ventures, to coax concessions from entrepreneurs
prior to investing, and to monitor investments after they
invest. Lenders on peer-to-peer ("P2P") lending sites "show a
remarkable propensity to shoulder the burden of monitoring
underlying loan debts. Web forums and message boards are
replete with the adventures of [a] P2P lender qua detective,
ferreting out frauds that have been overlooked by the
platform."5 92
"9 Fisch, supra note 514, at 58.
59 Id. at 81.
591 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), INDIEGoGo,
http://www.indiegogo.com/about/faqs (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (indicating
that fundraising can be continued after the close of a campaign by starting
a new campaign); Creating a Project, KICKSTARTER, http://www.
kickstarter.com/help/faq/creating%20a%20project#StarAProj (discussing
splitting funding for a project into stages). See also LAWTON & MAROM,
supra note 2, at 112 (noting that with crowdfunding, the discrete rounds of
financing are being replaced with the "rolling close," which provides
continuous funding).
592 Verstein, supra note 12, at 15.
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Under the right conditions, crowdfunding could benefit
from "the wisdom of crowds,"" the notion that "even if most
of the people within a group are not especially well-informed
or rational . . . [the group] can still reach a collectively wise
decision."9 The knowledge gap that once separated
professionals from the general public has shrunk as
information has become more readily accessible through the
Internet. 95  Moreover, investment expertise does not
necessarily translate into success, and experts often make
extraordinarily poor judgments.9 6 One of the lessons of
crowdsourcing is that a diverse group of less-expert decision-
makers can often make better choices than an expert
working individually.' It is at least possible that
crowdfunding investors will do a better job compared to
venture capitalists and angel investors than their relative
lack of sophistication would predict.'
Additionally, unsophisticated crowdfunding investors are
likely to become more sophisticated over time."" A study of
59 See SUROWIECKI, supra note 123.
5' Id. at xiii-xiv.
.' See HOWE, supra note 1, at 39-40.
596 See DAN GARDNER, FUTURE BABBLE: WHY EXPERT PREDICTIONS ARE
NEXT TO WORTHLESS (2011). James Surowiecki quotes Wharton professor
J. Scott Armstrong, who surveyed expert forecasts and analyses in a
number of fields and concluded that he "could find no studies that showed
an important advantage for expertise." SUROWIECKI, supra note 123, at 33.
.. See HOWE, supra note 1, at 131-45.
598 Even so, crowdfunding investors may not necessarily enjoy higher
investment returns. Venture capital funds and angel investors are highly
selective, and venture capitalists especially tend to focus on larger, high-
growth companies that are past the startup phase. See supra Part VI.A.
Crowdfunding sites appeal to entrepreneurs who cannot otherwise obtain
adequate funds-those, in other words, who could not attract funding from
venture capitalists and angel investors. Even if crowdfunding investors
are better at discriminating among available investments, they are
picking from a different, more risky pool than venture capitalists and
angel investors.
". See Seth Freedman & Ginger Zhe Jin, Do Social Networks Solve
Information Problems for Peer-to-Peer Lending? Evidence From
Prosper.com 3 (Net Inst., Working Paper No. 08-43, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1304138 ("[Miany Prosper lenders make mistakes
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lenders on Prosper.com found that, over the two-year period
studied, lenders moved from lower-performing loans to loans
with a higher rate of return.6 0 0 However, crowdfunding is
still relatively young and has not been exhaustively studied.
Only more experience will demonstrate its success in
protecting investors from risk.
Critics have argued that a crowdfunding exemption will
result in increased fraud and investor losses.601  This
argument is overstated. It supposes a horde of bicephalous
con men eager to violate the antifraud rules but unwilling to
violate the offering registration requirements. It is unlikely
that fraudsters are so selective in their willingness to violate
the law.
Nevertheless, the argument that fraud and investors'
losses will increase is surely correct. The investors on
crowdfunding sites, like other small-business investors, will
suffer significant losses.'0 Fraudsters will use crowdfunding
sites to deceive investors and take their money.
Entrepreneurs will take advantage of their control to benefit
themselves at the expense of outside investors.
Unsophisticated investors will make ill-advised investments.
But the argument that fraud and investor losses will
increase is trivial. More securities offerings of any kind-
whether those offerings are registered, pursuant to a
crowdfunding exemption, or pursuant to some other
exemption-are going to result in more fraud and greater
in loan selection and therefore have a negative rate of return on their
portfolios, but they learn vigorously and the learning speeds up over
time.").
00 Freedman & Jin, supra note 599, at 25.
601 See, e.g., Jay Hancock, Businesses Also Seek "Crowdfunding," so
Watch Out, BALT. SUN, Nov. 14, 2011, available at http://articles.baltimore
sun.com/2011-11-14/business/bs-bz-hancock-crowdfunding-danger-2011111
2_1_small-business-crowdfunding-business-plan; Thomas Lee Hazen,
Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities
Laws-Why any Specially Tailored Exemption Should be Conditioned on
Meaningful Disclosure, N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 18-
22), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954040.
602 See LAWTON & MAROM, supra note 2, at 180 (finding that numerous
losses will occur, either through fraud, or, more likely, business failure).
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investor losses. The real question is whether the benefits of
a crowdfunding exemption outweigh these costs.
The structural features mentioned above and the
presence of a neutral intermediary will help reduce the risk
to investors. In addition, each of the proposed exemptions
limits the maximum amount a single investor may
contribute and therefore limits each investor's possible
loss.' Such limits ensure that even if investors do lose
money, those losses are unlikely to be catastrophic.
Investors are already investing substantial amounts in
non-securities crowdfunding. Those investments are as risky
as securities crowdfunding. People who make pure
donations to entrepreneurs are guaranteed to "lose" all of
their money and receive nothing in return. People who
contribute to crowdfunding appeals in return for small
rewards or to pre-purchase a product might never receive the
promised reward, or the reward or product may not be as
valuable as they anticipated. People who make no-interest
loans on Kiva may never recover their principal.
Securities crowdfunding increases the potential gains to
these investors. Instead of making a donation or settling for
some reward, investors in crowdfunded securities can receive
interest or a share of the entrepreneur's profits. They may
not receive the promised return, but even the possibility of
interest or profit is better than no financial return at all.
The risk of fraud or self-dealing is the same in the non-
securities crowdfunding context as in the securities
crowdfunding context. The gain to the fraudster or the self-
dealing entrepreneur depends on the amount invested, not
on the type of return offered to investors. A $1,000
contribution provides the same opportunity for diversion
whether the offering is for a non-interest loan on Kiva, a pre-
purchase on Kickstarter, or a purchase of stock on a
securities crowdfunding site. The absence of any serious
fraud problem in non-securities crowdfunding (at least as far
as we know) is reassuring.
603 See supra Part V.
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VII. A CROWDFUNDING EXEMPTION PROPOSAL
A crowdfunding exemption could be beneficial, but the
exemption must minimize investor losses as much as
possible without destroying its utility to entrepreneurs
raising capital. However, investor protection and capital
formation are, to some extent, incompatible goals. It is not
possible to maximize both. Adding additional requirements
to protect investors will in most cases impose an additional
cost on small business issuers using the exemption. Subpart
A, below, discusses the requirements an exemption should
impose on crowdfunded offerings. Subpart B discusses the
requirements an exemption should impose on sites hosting
those offerings.
The locus of any regulation should be the crowdfunding
sites, not the entrepreneurs making the offerings. The small
companies and entrepreneurs most likely to engage in
crowdfunding are poorly capitalized and legally
unsophisticated. They do not have and cannot afford
sophisticated securities counsel to guide them through a
labyrinth of complex regulations.604 Too much complexity at
the entrepreneurial level will produce a host of unintended
violations and destroy the exemption's utility.
Crowdfunding sites, in contrast, are repeat players. They
can spread any regulatory costs over a large number of
offerings. They are better capitalized than the
entrepreneurs using their sites and can afford securities
counsel. Crowdfunding sites are also much more visible to
the SEC for regulatory enforcement purposes. Thus,
crowdfunding sites are a more desirable locus for any
conditions necessary for investor protection.
Conditions may be imposed on the offerings or on the
companies making the offerings, but those restrictions
should be enforceable at the site level, with the
crowdfunding sites acting as gatekeepers to enforce the
restrictions. For example, a crowdfunding site can easily
monitor and enforce a restriction on the dollar amount of
"6 The cost of securities counsel could easily exceed the amount being
raised in smaller offerings.
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crowdfunding offerings, since the money flows through the
site. But the entrepreneur's off-site activities are not as
easily monitored. If, for example, the available amount is
affected by fundraising the entrepreneur does off-site, the
site has no effective means to enforce the limit.
A. Restrictions on the Offering
The dollar amount of offerings qualifying for the
crowdfunding exemption should be limited, as should the
amount that any single investor may invest. It is not clear
what the exact amounts of those limits should be; there is no
magic number. This article proposes an annual offering
limit of $250,000 to $500,000, with an annual limit on
individual contributions equal to the greater of $500 or 2% of
the investor's annual income. Integration and aggregation
concepts should not be applied to the offering limit. A limit
on the size of companies eligible to engage in crowdfunding
offerings is not necessary, but if the SEC believes such a
limit is appropriate, limiting the exemption to non-reporting
companies would do little damage. Finally, crowdfunding
should be exempted only if it occurs on a crowdfunding site
that meets the requirements specified in subpart B below.
1. Offering Amount
An absolute, unconditional exemption of smaller offerings
from Securities Act registration requirements makes
sense. 605  The cost to register a relatively small offering
605 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see C. Steven
Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 and the
Case for an Unconditional Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. LAW 1
passim (2001) [hereinafter Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small
Business]. The argument for a Securities Act exemption for smaller
offerings is just a specific case of the more general economic argument for
small business exemptions. See C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter? An
Economic Analysis of Small Business Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUs. LAw 1, 17-20 (2004) [hereinafter Bradford, Does
Size Matter?].
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exceeds any benefit that registration could provide."o' This is
true even if fraud is more likely in smaller offerings.
Although the likelihood of fraud affects the dollar amount
below which offerings should be exempted, it does not affect
the case for such an exemption.60 7 Economies of scale make
registration inefficient for smaller offerings, even if
registration creates a net benefit for larger offerings.o6
For example, consider an attempt to raise $20,000. The
maximum amount investors could lose in that offering is
$20,000. Even if registration could reduce the probability of
any loss to zero, the maximum possible benefit of
registration would only be $20,000. The cost to register an
offering is substantially more than $20,000, so requiring
registration of the offering costs more than allowing
investors to bear the risks of an unregistered offering.
The case for exempting a $20,000 offering is thus fairly
obvious, but the exact level at which registration ceases to be
cost-effective is less clear. If the exemption is not absolute-
if it includes requirements designed to protect investors-a
higher limit makes sense.609 The proposed limits in the
various crowdfunding exemption proposals range from
$100,000 to $2 million.610 There is no magic number. Given
6 See Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business, supra
note 605, at 29-33.
607 Assume, for example, that the average loss in smaller offerings for
all reasons, including fraud, is 60% of the amount invested. Now make the
unlikely assumption that registration would prevent all those losses. If
the total cost of registering a $100,000 offering is $70,000, it still makes
sense to exempt such offerings. In the absence of registration, the average
loss will be $60,000, but registration imposes an even greater cost of
$70,000. Society is better off exempting such offerings. See id. at 39-47
(calculating the optimal exemption amount, given various assumptions
about fixed costs, the proportion of losses, and the proportion of losses
prevented by registration).
' See Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business, supra
note 605, at 24-27; Bradford, Does Size Matter?, supra note 605, at 5-15.
6 See Bradford, Transaction Exemptions, supra note 509, at 618-22
(explaining the efficiency of intermediate, conditional exemptions).
610 See supra Part V.
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the cost of registering an offering,6 " the case for exempting
offerings of less than $250,000 to $500,000 is solid. A
plausible case can be made for exempting larger offerings,
particularly with a strong limit on the amount of each
person's investment. But an exemption limit above $500,000
requires stronger assumptions about the cost of registration,
the risk of loss, and the extent to which registration reduces
that risk.6 12
2. Aggregation/Integration
Any proposal for a Securities Act exemption must deal
with the frustrating problem of integration-that is, whether
two offerings that are ostensibly separate should be treated
as part of the same offering."' The integration doctrine was
developed by the SEC "to prevent issuers from artificially
dividing a single, non-exempt offering into two or more parts
in an attempt to obtain an exemption for one or more of the
parts."14 Integrating two offerings could result in the loss of
each offering's exemption. Unfortunately, the integration
doctrine is an uncertain, confusing mess.6 15 Scholars have
proposed its elimination 6 16 or substantial modification,"' and
the SEC itself has created several safe harbors that protect
against application of the doctrine."'
611 See supra Part III.B.1.
612 For a set of hypothetical calculations, see Bradford, Securities
Regulation and Small Business, supra note 605, at 47.
613 For a general introduction to integration, see Bradford,
Transaction Exemptions, supra note 509, at 649-57.
614 Id. at 649. See also Darryl B. Deaktor, Integration of Securities
Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 465, 473 (1979).
615 See Bradford, Transaction Exemptions, supra note 509, at 651-52
(discussing the lack of clarity in SEC releases that detail the standard for
integrated offerings).
616 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Overwhelming Case for
Elimination of the Integration Doctrine Under the Securities Act of 1933,
89 KY. L.J. 289 (2001).
617 See C. Steven Bradford, Expanding the Non-Transactional
Revolution: A New Approach to Securities Registration Exemptions, 49
EMORY L.J. 437 (2000).
61 See Bradford, Transaction Exemptions, supra note 509, at 652-57.
Even if two offerings are not integrated, the related
concept of aggregation can pose problems for small issuers.
The aggregation provisions in Regulation A and Rules 504
and 505 of Regulation D reduce the maximum amounts
available under those exemptions by the amount of certain
other offerings.619 The $1 million limit in Rule 504 would, for
example, be reduced if the issuer had completed a Regulation
A offering in the previous twelve months.620
The dollar limit of any crowdfunding exemption should be
applied on an aggregate basis to all crowdfunding within any
twelve-month period by the same issuer. If the limit is
$500,000, the total an entrepreneur raises through
crowdfunding should not exceed $500,000 in a year, even if
the entrepreneur conducts multiple, separate rounds of
fundraising. Securities sold in non-crowdfunded offerings
should not count against the exemption's limit. This is
consistent with the SEC's approach in Regulation A. Rule
251(b) limits the offering amount in Regulation A offerings to
no more than $5 million in any twelve-month period, but
only offerings pursuant to Regulation A are counted against
that limit.621
The concepts of integration and aggregation should not be
applied beyond that. Small business entrepreneurs seeking
to raise money through crowdfunding cannot afford the legal
expertise needed to navigate the integration doctrine. These
entrepreneurs can count how much money they receive
619 See Securities Act Rule 251(b), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(b)
230.504(b)(2), 230.505(b)(2)(i) (2012). See generally Bradford, Transaction
Exemptions, supra note 509, at 657-58 (explaining the concept of
aggregation).
620 The available aggregate offering amount is reduced by "the
aggregate offering price for all securities sold within the twelve months
before the start of and during the offering of securities under . . . [Rule
504] in reliance on any exemption under section 3(b) . . . ." 17 C.F.R. §
230.504(b)(2). Regulation A is a Section 3(b) exemption. See 17 C.F.R. §
230.251.
621 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b). Other exemptions with dollar limits use a
similar twelve-month period, although the amounts charged against those
limits include other specified offerings. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(b)(2),
230.505(b)(2)(i).
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through crowdfunding, but they are not in a position to
consider the effect of other fundraising efforts on the
availability of crowdfunding-whether, for example, the
private solicitation of money from Aunt Agnes will count
against the crowdfunding limit.62 2 They also cannot
anticipate their future capital needs62 3 or the potential
retroactive application of integration to destroy their
crowdfunding exemption. The incorporation of integration
concepts into the crowdfunding exemption would function as
a trap for unsophisticated, unwary entrepreneurs.
Integrating or aggregating non-crowdfunded offerings is
also inconsistent with the idea of crowdfunding sites as
gatekeepers. Crowdfunding sites can monitor how much
each entrepreneur raises through crowdfunding since the
money passes through their portal. However, they cannot
easily ascertain how much entrepreneurs have raised
through other, outside sources.
Two of the proposed bills have provisions that might be
construed as protecting against integration. Both House Bill
2930 and Senate Bill 1970 provide that nothing in the
exemption "shall be construed as preventing an issuer from
raising capital through methods not described under" the
exemption.624
3. Individual Investment Cap
All of the crowdfunding exemption proposals limit not
only the total amount of the offering, but also the amount
that each investor may invest. Such a limit is sensible.
622 The WALL STREET JOURNAL provides an excellent example.
Bronson Chang raised $54,000 on ProFounder from family members,
friends, and customers. He then sought another $60,000 through a "public
raise" on ProFounder. Emily Maltby, Tapping the Crowd for Funds, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274
870349350 4576007463796977774.html. It is likely that Chang never
even considered whether his subsequent offering negatively affected the
status of his earlier Rule 504 "private raise."
62. See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 11, at 50 (stating that small
companies' capital needs "are often sporadic and immediate").
6"' H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); S. 1970, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
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Small business offerings are very risky and losses are
likely.62 5 A properly set cap on the amount an individual
may invest eliminates the possibility of catastrophic loss and
limits losses to what each investor can bear.626 As with the
offering amount, there is no magic number. This article
proposes that each investor be able to invest annually in,
crowdfunding no more than the greater of $500 or 2% of the
investor's annual income.
a. The Individual Cap Related to Existing
Exemptions
None of the current exemptions limit the amount an
individual investor may invest. Many of the exemptions cap
the total dollar amount of an offering,"6  but as long as the
total offering amount does not exceed the cap, the amount
that any single investor purchases does not matter. The
exemption would be available even if a single investor
purchased the entire offering.
However, some of the existing exemptions do consider an
investor's ability to bear losses in a less direct way. Both
Rule 506 of Regulation D and Section 4(5) of the Securities
Act restrict the purchasers to whom sales may be made.'
Section 4(5) of the Securities Act limits sales to accredited
investors. 6 29 Rule 506 limits sales to purchasers who either
are accredited investors or who have "such knowledge and
experience in financial and business matters that . . . [they
625 See supra Part VI.B.1.
.2. See Request for Rulemaking to Exempt Securities Offerings up to
$100,000 with $100 Maximum Per Investor from Registration, supra note
400, at 7 (arguing that the proposed $100 individual investment limit
would prevent investors "from incurring significant financial risk" because
"[elven a total loss of $100 is unlikely to be financially crippling for
anyone").
627 See Securities Act Rule 251(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2012) (cap of
$5 million); 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (cap of $1 million); 17 C.F.R. §
230.505(b)(2)(i) (cap of $5 million).
628 See Securities Act Rule 506(b)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii);
Securities Act § 4(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(5) (2010).
6" Securities Act of 1933 § 4(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(5) (2010).
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are] . . . capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
prospective investment .. ."630
Rule 506 is a safe harbor for Section 4(2) of the Securities
Act, and the sophistication requirement is consistent with
the Supreme Court's analysis of the Section 4(2) exemption
in Ralston Purina. In Ralston Purina, the Court indicated
that the availability of the Section 4(2) exemption turns on
whether the offerees "need the protection of the Act" or are
"able to fend for themselves.""s' But under Rule 506, sales
may be made even to unsophisticated investors, as long as
they are accredited.6 3 2
. Some of the categories of accredited investors are
individuals or institutions who are undoubtedly
"sophisticated."3 In those cases, accredited status is merely
a more objective proxy for sophistication. Other parts of the
accredited investor definition focus solely on an investor's
wealth or income. Any individual whose net worth, either
alone or with a spouse, exceeds $1 million is accredited,6 34 as
are corporations, partnerships, and certain other entities
with total assets in excess of $5 million.3 An individual is
also an accredited investor if she has had an income of
630 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). Even if a non-accredited investor does
not meet the sophistication requirement, the exemption is still available if
the investor is represented by someone who meets the requirement or if
the issuer reasonably believes that the purchaser meets the sophistication
requirement. Id.
631 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). See also 1
HAZEN, supra note 42, at 565.
632 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (requiring "each purchaser who is
not an accredited investor" to meet a sophistication requirement).
Moreover, the information requirements that would otherwise apply in a
Rule 506 offering do not apply to sales to accredited investors. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.502(b).
" For example, the definition includes registered securities brokers
or dealers, registered investment companies, banks, and insurance
companies. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.215(a), 230.501(a)(1). Directors and
executive officers of the issuer, who ordinarily have access to information
about the issuer, are also accredited investors. See 17 C.F.R. §§
230.215(d), 230.501(a)(4).
63 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.215(e), 230.501(a)(5).
63 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 215(c), 230.215(c), 230.501(a)(3).
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$200,000, or a joint income with her spouse of $300,000, over
the two previous years, provided she reasonably expects to
reach the same income in the year of the offering.6 36
Many people who are accredited investors solely because
of wealth or income are unsophisticated investors.6 37
Consider, for example, the high school dropout who wins $10
million in a lottery.638 She would be an accredited investor,
even though the way in which she accumulated her wealth
does not demonstrate that she is capable of evaluating the
merits and risks of investing in the offering.
The SEC's reasons for including wealthy but
unsophisticated investors in the definition of "accredited
investor" are unclear. One possibility is that wealth and
income are just extraordinarily imperfect proxies for
sophistication. 639 A more plausible reason, though, is that
wealthy investors can afford to lose the money. 40
63 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.215(f), 230.501(a)(6).
" See Choi, supra note 510, at 311 (stating that the definition of
accredited investor may include "financial neophytes"); Friedman, supra
note 565, at 299 (stating that wealthy investors are "easy prey for
securities sales personnel"); Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of
Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings
Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 382 (1984)
("Experience indicates that the wealthy often do not have the
sophistication to demand access to material information or otherwise to
evaluate the merits and risks of a prospective investment.").
6" This example is derived from a problem in JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT
W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 270-71 (6th ed. 2009). See also Wallis K. Finger, Note,
Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC's "Accredited Investor"
Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 754 (2009).
63 See Finger, supra note 638, at 747 (noting that the SEC's goal in
Regulation D was to use wealth as a proxy for whether an investor is
capable of fending for herself); C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated
Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1124
(1988) (arguing that "the SEC assumes either that wealthy investors are
always sophisticated or that they, no matter how naive, do not need the
protection of the . .. registration provisions"); Friedman, supra note 565,
at 301; Marvin R. Mohney, Regulation D: Coherent Exemptions for Small
Businesses Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 121,
165 (1982) (noting that "the SEC has equated wealth with sophistication
and with access to information"); Warren, supra note 637, at 381 (noting
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If that is the rationale, the existing exemptions do not fit
it well. Neither Section 4(5) nor Rule 506 limits the amount
that any single investor may invest in the offering.641 Thus,
an individual with a net worth of only $1 million could invest
all of his wealth in a single risky offering, and a total loss on
that one investment would leave the investor penniless. And
an investor whose accredited status is based solely on net
income could actually be insolvent at the time of purchase.642
The crowdfunding exemption proposals focus on the
investor's ability to bear the loss in a much more coherent
way.
b. How to Structure the Cap
Unfortunately, some of the crowdfunding exemption
proposals leave questions about the individual investment
limit unanswered. Should the limit be applied on a per-
offering basis or applied cumulatively across all of a person's
that the SEC presumes that these investors can fend for themselves). See
also Susan E. Satkowski, Rule 242 and Section 4(6) Securities Registration
Exemptions: Recent Attempts to Aid Small Businesses, 23 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 73, 81 (1981) (noting that Rule 242, the predecessor to Regulation D,
attempted to dispense subjective criteria of sophistication and access to
information with more "definitive and objective standards").
64 See Friedman, supra note 565, at 299-300 (suggesting that the
basis for making wealthy but unsophisticated investors accredited is "the
ground that they can afford to lose money"). Edward Fletcher also seems
to believe that this basis underlies the accredited investor categories. He
asks, "Should the law presume that wealthy investors, who can bear
investment risks, are sophisticated investors, and treat them as such, no
matter how financially naive they may be?" Fletcher, supra note 639, at
1123 (emphasis added).
641 This has not always been the case. When Regulation D was
adopted, an investor was accredited if she purchased at least $150,000 of
the securities being offered and if the purchase price did not exceed 20% of
the purchaser's net worth. See Revision of Certain Exemptions from
Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales,
Securities Act Release No. 6389 (Mar. 8, 1982). See also Mohney, supra
note 639, at 135; Warren, supra note 637, at 369. Presumably, this 20%
floor "assures . . . [investors] . . . are able to bear the risk of the
investment." Mahoney, supra note 639, at 136.
642 See Warren, supra note 637, at 382.
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crowdfunding investments? Should it be an annual limit or
a cap on the total amount of all outstanding crowdfunding
investments? Should the limit be a uniform dollar amount
or a percentage of each person's wealth or income? Most
importantly, what should the limit be? The proposals range
from $100 to $10,000 per person, and some of the proposals
add an alternative cap based on the investor's income.64 3
This article proposes to limit each investor's annual
crowdfunding investments to the greater of $500 or 2% of the
investor's annual income.
Consider first whether the investment limit should be the
same for all investors or should vary depending on the
investor's financial circumstances. A fixed limit of, for
example, $500 per person would be simple and easy to apply.
But a uniform limit, unless it is very small, does not
necessarily limit all investors to an amount they can afford
to lose. Many investors have very little savings or
uncommitted income.6" A loss of even $500 could be
catastrophic to those investors.
A limit tailored to the particular investor's wealth or
income would better fit the policy rationale. For example, an
individual investor might be limited to investing no more
than 5% of her net worth or annual income. But this type of
limit would make the exemption more costly and more
difficult to administer. Either the crowdfunding site or the
issuer would have to determine the investor's income or net
- See supra Part V.
"" A 2010 survey found that 30% of all adults had no savings
(excluding retirement savings). NAT'L FouND. FOR CREDIT COUNSELING,
supra note 572, at 5. See also Hilgert et al., supra note 572, at 310 (earlier
survey finding that only 80% of the respondents had a savings account).
Another survey found that fewer than half of American adults had an
emergency fund that would cover expenses for three months. APPLIED
RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, supra note 572, at 16. Forty-nine percent
of those respondents found it difficult merely to pay all of their bills each
month. Id. at 15. But see Hilgert et al., supra note 572, at 310 (finding
that 63% of the respondents had some emergency fund and that 49% of the
respondents set aside money out of each paycheck).
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worth before allowing the investor to invest."' Because
crowdfunding depends on small contributions from a large
number of investors, the number of such income and wealth
determinations could be prohibitively expensive.
There are two ways to incorporate an income- or wealth-
based limit without unduly increasing administrative costs.
One option, adopted by House Bill 2930, is to allow the
issuer (and, presumably, the crowdfunding site as well) to
rely on the investor's self-certification of income. 6  The site
or the issuer would still have to collect and track income
figures for each investor, but no verification would be
required. Once the investor stated an income, the site's work
would be complete. However, a self-certified income
standard is essentially the same as no standard at all.
Investors who want to invest more would quickly learn to
exaggerate their income.
The second, preferable option is to state the limit per
investor in the alternative-as the greater of a specified
dollar amount or a percentage of the person's income.
Senate Bill .1970 takes this approach. Under such a
standard, crowdfunding sites would not be required to check
or verify anyone's income. Since the limit is the greater of
the two, sites could simply limit investments to the specified
1 Both the Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council petition and
the White House proposal provide alternative individual investor limits:
either $10,000 or 10% of the investor's income. See supra Parts V.B and
V.D. Neither proposal indicates how the limit will be applied if an
investment is within one of those limits but not the other. In House Bill
2930, the limit is the lesser of $10,000 or 10% of the investor's annual
income. See supra Part V.G.1.
6 House Bill 2930 provides that "an issuer or intermediary may rely
on certifications as to annual income provided by the person to whom the
securities are sold to verify the investor's income." H.R. 2930, 112th Cong.
§ 2 (2011). It is unclear what would happen under this proposal if the
issuer knows or reasonably should know that the investor's self-
certification is false. What if, for instance, the investor states one income,
then changes it when she wants to invest more money?
" S. 1970, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
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dollar amount."*8  An income determination would be
required on a case-by-case basis only if the site chose to allow
a particular investor to contribute more than that dollar
limit. It would, therefore, be left to the site to decide
whether to incur the additional costs of determining an
investor's income."*
Both the dollar amount and the income percentage should
be low enough that most people could afford to lose that
amount. Neither theory nor empirical analysis can specify
the precise amount, but an investment limit of around $500
per person seems reasonable."'o This amount is more than
' If, as in some of the other exemption proposals, the limit is the
lesser of the two alternatives, crowdfunding sites would still have to
determine each investor's income in order to know which of the two
numbers is smaller.
" If a site does choose to use the income-based limit, it should only
have to establish a reasonable belief that the investor qualifies. The
easiest way to do this would be to obtain the first two pages of the
investor's federal tax return.
..o See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 142, at 948 (proposing an
individual limit of $100 to $250 per offering); Shane, supra note 588
(arguing that allowing people to invest only $100 "doesn't seem to impose
a significant risk of financial loss on individuals").
The limit could be applied individually or on a household basis. An
individual limit would be easier to administer because neither the site nor
the issuer would have to determine who belongs to the same family or
household. However, risk is typically borne by a household as a whole; if
one family member loses money, the entire family suffers. The dollar limit
should be adjusted to account for the individual-versus-family choice. If
the limit is applied on an individual basis, the limit can be slightly less. If
it is applied on a household basis, it can be slightly more.
The author's colleague, Steve Willborn, suggests a mandatory
diversification requirement-requiring investors to spread the maximum
in smaller amounts across several different offerings. He points out that
this could reduce some of the company-specific risk, and thus reduce the
expected loss. However, the question is not what the average, expected
loss will be, but how much of a loss the investor can bear. Diversification
would not eliminate the risk of a complete loss, so the question is still the
maximum amount an investor can afford to lose. Moreover, a
diversification requirement would increase the cost of using the exemption
in two ways. First, enforcing the diversification requirement would
increase the administrative cost. Second, a diversification requirement
would reduce the average investment amount in each offering, and thus
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some investors could afford to lose, but, at some point,
potential investors must be trusted to decide for themselves
what they can afford. The $10,000 individual limit in some
of the proposals seems excessive; it is doubtful whether most
investors could afford an annual loss of that magnitude.6 5 '
The alternative limit in the exemption proposals varies
from 1% to 10% of the investor's annual income.652 Again,
there is no magic number. How much an investor can afford
to lose depends on a number of factors other than annual
income. An investor whose wealth is tied up in illiquid
assets and who has little free income can afford to lose very
little of her income. A cap of 10% seems too high for most
people. A more cautious cap of 2% makes more sense, at
least until investors have some experience with the
exemption. Thus, an investor should be able to invest no
more than the greater of $500 or 2% of the investor's annual
income.6 53
increase the number of purchasers, increasing the cost of making an
offering under the exemption.
6 Pope proposes a limit of $1,000 per investor, arguing that "many
consumers already spend [that much] on items such as laptop computers
and tablets, designer footwear and high-definition televisions." Pope,
supra note 99, at 997. That may be true of some people, but $1,000 would
be a catastrophic loss to some investors, particularly when considered on
an annual basis.
652 See supra Part V.
65. Heminway and Hoffman suggest limiting the cap to investors who
are not accredited or sophisticated, and allowing accredited and
sophisticated investors to invest without any limit. See Heminway &
Hoffman, supra note 142, at 953. Issuers can already offer securities to
accredited and sophisticated investors using Rule 506 of Regulation D.
The author's proposal would preclude integration of any Rule 506 offerings
with offerings pursuant to the crowdfunding exemption. See infra Part
VII.A.2. Therefore, the only thing that would preclude simultaneous, side-
by-side Rule 506 and crowdfunding exemption offerings on the same web
site is Regulation D's general solicitation restriction. See supra text
accompanying notes 225-27. The author would prefer that the SEC
eliminate the general solicitation restrictions for all Rule 506 offerings
rather than carve out an exception in the crowdfunding exemption for
sales to accredited and sophisticated investors.
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Whatever the limit, it should be applied to all of an
individual's crowdfunding investments in any given year, not
on a per-offering basis. Otherwise, an investor could quickly
invest more than she could afford to lose by investing the
maximum amount in a large number of offerings-$500 in
offering A, $500 in offering B, $500 in offering C, and so on.
An investment limit fits the policy argument only if it is
applied on an aggregate basis."
Only crowdfunding investments should be considered in
applying this annual cap. Other investments, even other
securities investments, should not count. People have
numerous other investments with various levels of financial
risk-mutual funds, houses, cars, friends' businesses. All of
a person's assets and liabilities are relevant in assessing the
risk that a particular investment adds to the person's
portfolio, but the SEC has to draw a line somewhere. The
SEC is not a general risk protection agency, and going
outside the crowdfunding exemption to calculate the limit
would make the exemption unworkable.'
Finally, the limit should be an annual one. An investor
who invests $500 in 2012 should be free to invest another
$500 in 2013, even if she still holds the 2012 investment.
The amount of the cap obviously should be lower for an
annual limit than it would be for a cumulative limit, but an
annual limit is much easier to administer. A cumulative cap
would have to account for withdrawals of money, dividends,
and bankruptcies, and could pose difficult computational
issues.656
"6 The only proposal that clearly takes this approach is Senate Bill
1970. It imposes investor limits both for each offering and for all offerings
collectively. See supra Part V.
655 See also supra Part VII.A.2 (rejecting application of integration and
aggregation concepts).
656 If, for example, an investor loses her entire $500 investment, would
or should she be forever barred from again investing in crowdfunding?
She has, after all, lost the total amount it was determined she could afford
to lose. One might want to bar her on the theory that she is a bad
investor, but given the high percentage of startup failures, a total loss does
not necessarily reflect negatively on that person's capabilities as an
investor.
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4. Should There Be Company Size Limits?
The proposed crowdfunding exemption is designed to help
very small businesses raise capital. Should larger
businesses therefore be excluded from using it? The SEC
already limits the use of the Regulation A and Rule 504
exemptions to non-reporting companies."' Heminway and
Hoffman suggest that any crowdfunding exemption should
be similarly limited."' However, the justification for small
offering exemptions depends on the size of the offering, not
on the size of the company making the offering.' There is
no reason to prevent larger companies from using the
exemption, but such a limit, if imposed, would be relatively
easy to administer and would have no dramatic effect on the
use of the crowdfunding exemption.6 60
Larger businesses are unlikely to use the exemption even
if they are allowed to. Most large businesses are unlikely to
seek external funding for such small amounts, particularly
given the cost of raising money through investments of $500
or less. Big companies usually have enough cash to meet
small funding requirements internally. Apple Computer, for
instance, had $11.2 billion in cash and cash equivalents at
the end of its 2010 fiscal year.6" The Buckle, Inc., a much
smaller company, reported over $116 million in cash and
cash equivalents at the end of its most recent fiscal year.662
6.. See Securities Act Rule 251(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(a)(2),
230.504(a)(2) (2012).
.5. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 142, at 948. They also
propose to exclude foreign issuers and investment companies. Id.
659 See supra text accompanying notes 592-95.
' If, however, the rule's exception is expressed in terms of a
company's total or net assets, crowdfunding sites would have to review
documentation from each issuer to verify that it does not exceed the cap.
The cost of administering the restriction would be higher.
6 Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 47 (Oct. 27, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/00011931251
0238044/d10k.htm#tx37397_2.
6 The Buckle, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 31 (Mar. 30,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/885245/000115
752311001807/a6663779.htm#statements.
These companies are not going to be using a crowdfunding
exemption.
Larger non-reporting companies have another reason to
avoid the crowdfunding exemption. Companies in the
United States with more than $10 million in total assets and
a class of equity security held of record by 500 or more people
must register with the SEC under the Exchange Act.'6
Selling equity to a large number of investors in small
amounts would increase the number of equity holders and
could trigger Exchange Act reporting requirements.
B. Restrictions on Crowdfunding Sites
Offerings that fall within the limitations discussed above
should be exempted only if they are sold through
crowdfunding sites that meet standards designed to protect
investors. Crowdfunding sites should be open to the general
public and should provide publicly accessible
communications portals that allow potential investors to
communicate about each offering. Investors should be
allowed to invest on those sites only after viewing a brief
investor education video or taking a short quiz.
Entrepreneurs posting on those sites should be required to
specify a funding goal and should be allowed to close an
offering only if that goal is reached. Until then, investors
should be free to withdraw their commitments.
Crowdfunding sites should not be allowed to recommend or
rate investment opportunities, or to advise investors about
those opportunities, unless they are willing to register as
brokers or investment advisers. Neither the crowdfunding
sites nor their employees should be able to invest in any of
the offerings that appear on the site.
Crowdfunding sites that meet these standards and notify
the SEC that they are engaged in crowdfunding should not
be required to register as brokers or investment advisers
6" See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. §
781(g)(1)(B) (2010) (requiring the registration of companies with more than
$1 million in total assets and 500 or more record holders of a class of
equity security); Rule 12g-1 (raising the asset amount to $10 million).
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unless they also engage in activities other than their
crowdfunding activities that would make them such.
1. Open Sites, Open Communication
Crowdfunding sites that want to take advantage of the
proposed exemption should be open to the general public and
should be required to provide some means, such as an
electronic bulletin board, that allows investors to
communicate freely and openly about each offering. These
requirements will allow crowdfunding sites to take
advantage of "the wisdom of crowds" that is the foundation of
crowdsourcing, including crowdfunding.6 6
An open communications platform will help to prevent
fraud by allowing investors with particular knowledge about
an offering or an issuer to communicate it to other investors.
Investors who are aware of a particular entrepreneur's shady
business background can communicate that knowledge to
others. Investors with local knowledge of facts inconsistent
with the entrepreneur's claims can inform others. For
example, if the entrepreneur falsely claims to own a facility
in North Platte, Nebraska, people in North Platte can expose
the fraud.
In addition to preventing fraud, open communication will
lead to better-informed investors. Investors with knowledge
of the particular industry or type of product can share that
knowledge with other potential investors. Investors who are
also potential customers can explain why the proposed
product or service will or will not succeed and can suggest
modifications of the product or service. Investors with
business or accounting expertise can point out problems in
the entrepreneur's business plan or projections. Investors
with legal expertise can point out regulatory issues the
a See SuRowIEcKI, supra note 123, at 230 (Peer monitoring is a
fundamental part of the virtual world.); Schwienbacher & Larralde, supra
note 14, at 12 (Although crowdfunders might not have any special
knowledge about the industry in which they are investing, they can be
more efficient as a crowd than a few equity investors alone.). See also
Freedman & Jin, supra note 599, at 2.
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entrepreneur has not considered. Not only would these
communications provide investors with more and better
information, they might even help the entrepreneur refine
her business plan.
Openness like this can also lead to better monitoring after
an investment is made. From a purely economic standpoint,
it makes little sense for someone who has invested a couple
hundred dollars to devote a substantial amount of time and
effort to monitoring. But the social aspects of crowdfunding
and other crowdsourcing applications often lead people to
contribute inordinate amounts of time and effort to the
enterprise.65  A crowdfunding site that facilitates open
communication allows these monitors to share their findings
with other investors.
Open communication is not an unmitigated positive. It
can also lead to group-think. Deliberative discussion "is the
enemy of collective intelligence because it reduces
diversity."66 6 James Surowiecki, promoter of "the wisdom of
crowds," notes that group judgment is most likely to be
accurate if each person's opinion is not determined by the
opinions of those around them." According to Surowiecki,
"The more influence a group's members exert on each other,
and the more personal contact they have with each other, the
less likely it is that the group's decisions will be wise ones."668
If people can see what others have done before they act, they
tend to follow the actions of others, creating an "information
cascade" problem.66 9
There is also a risk that these open forums will be the
target of spammers or advertisements, or that users will post
fraudulent comments. Crowdfunding sites should not be
" "In many cases, the financial return seems to be of secondary
concern for those who provide funds. This suggests that crowdfunders care
about social reputation and/or enjoy private benefits from participating in
the success of the initiative." Belleflamme et al., supra note 10, at 27.
666 HOWE, supra note 1, at 175.
6 SUROWIECKI, supra note 123, at 10.
668 Id. at 42.
669 Id. at 63-64.
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liable for the content of the comments and should be free to
remove irrelevant or fraudulent material.
2. No Investment Advice or Recommendations
A key determinant of whether a person is a broker or an
investment adviser is whether she offers recommendations
or investment advice to investors.67 0 Unless crowdfunding
sites are willing to register as brokers or investment
advisers, they should not recommend or rate the offerings
that appear on the sites and should not advise investors
about the merits or risks of those offerings. Without this
restriction, a crowdfunding exemption could become a way to
circumvent the regulation applicable to ordinary brokers and
investment advisers. If crowdfunding sites act as anything
other than a neutral intermediary, they should have to face
the regulatory consequences. Similarly, if crowdfunding
sites set up a secondary trading market for crowdfunded
securities, the crowdfunding exemption should not free them
from having to register as exchanges or alternative trading
systems if such registration would otherwise be required.
3. Prohibition on Conflicts of Interests
Crowdfunding sites and their employees should not be
allowed to invest in the offerings on their sites, or to have
any financial interest in the companies posting offerings on
the site. Some of the SEC no-action letters involving
matching services condition relief on the non-participation of
the site and its employees in any of the posted offerings.
Although typically unstated by the SEC staff, its concern is
presumably conflicts of interest. If the site and its employees
participate in advertised offerings, they will have a financial
interest in favoring or promoting particular offerings.67 2 If
670 See supra Parts IV.B.2.c.i and IV.C.4.
671 See, e.g., Angel Capital Elec. Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996
WL 636094, at *1 (Oct. 25, 1996); Atlanta Econ. Dev. Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1987 WL 107835, at *1 (Feb. 17, 1987).
672 The receipt of transaction-based compensation already gives
crowdfunding sites a financial incentive to promote all of the offerings
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recommendations and other investment advice are
prohibited, the potential dangers of -such conflicts are
reduced. Nevertheless, a conflict-of-interest prohibition
would eliminate any remaining incentives to manipulate the
system to promote or favor particular offerings. Such a
condition would also prevent an issuer from setting up a
sham site to promote the issuer's own securities. Whether or
not it is necessary, a conflict-of-interest prohibition like this
could enhance the public reputation of crowdfunding sites.673
Such restrictions seem relatively harmless, and the cost to
the site of imposing such a policy would be small.6"
4. Notification to the SEC
Crowdfunding sites that meet the requirements of the
exemption should not have to register as brokers, investment
advisers, or exchanges, and no other special registration
should be required. However, sites should have to notify the
SEC that they are acting as crowdfunding sites pursuant to
the exemption. The SEC, understandably, will want to
monitor how the crowdfunding exemption is being used and
whether sites are in compliance. It can do that only if it
knows where crowdfunding is occurring. A simple notice
containing the site's name and URL would be sufficient to
make the SEC aware of sites that are engaged in
crowdfunding under the exemption. Since the sites will be
open to the public, including the SEC, the SEC will have
access to all of the information being provided to investors.
collectively. The concern here is the incentive to promote particular
offerings in which the site's operators have invested or plan to invest.
673 Of course, if that is the case, individual sites have a competitive
incentive to impose and promote such policies, whether or not the SEC
requires them.
674 No employer can guarantee that its employees will abide by any
conflict-of-interest policy. If the crowdfunding site has a conflict-of-
interest policy, informs its employees of its policy, and makes a good faith
effort to enforce the policy, it should qualify for the exemption. The site
should not be liable if an employee, without its knowledge or complicity,
invests in one of the site's offerings-for example, through a false identity.
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This notice should not trigger any other regulatory
requirements. The more the SEC requires from these sites,
the greater the cost that will be passed along to
crowdfunding entrepreneurs, and the less effective the
crowdfunding exemption will be.
5. Investor Education
Many of the investors on crowdfunding sites will be
unsophisticated.6 75 The participation of so many
unsophisticated investors offers a rare investor-education
opportunity. Before she is given access to any offerings, each
crowdfunding investor should be required to complete a brief
investor-education video or quiz prepared by the SEC.6 6
This article is not suggesting that the SEC certify
whether investors are qualified to invest or that the
education be in the form of a full course on investment.'
Such requirements would unduly burden crowdfunding and
chill its development. This article merely suggests the use of
a brief educational film or quiz with feedback that would
take no more than five or ten minutes to complete. Such a
short presentation would not make crowdfunding investors
sophisticated, but it would allow the SEC to warn them of
the potential pitfalls and risks associated with small
business investments.
The mechanics would be relatively simple. When
investors first register with the crowdfunding site, they could
be linked to the SEC material; they would be returned to the
crowdfunding site when the educational video or quiz is
67, See supra Part VI.B.2.
676 See SBE Council Proposal, supra note 405 (proposing that investors
be required to take an online test prior to investing).
677 Others have suggested certification of investors. See, e.g., Choi,
supra note 510, at 310-11 (proposing that investors be licensed); Finger,
supra note 638, at 759-62 (2009) (proposing that investors be licensed).
See also Hass, supra note 198, at 112 (arguing that unseasoned issuers
should have to make a suitability determination before selling securities to
unsophisticated retail investors).
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completed.67 8 There is no easy way to guarantee that
investors actually pay attention-or, in the case of a video,
even watch it. However, this requirement would at least
give unsophisticated investors an opportunity to learn
something. Those who choose not to take advantage of this
opportunity have only themselves to blame.
Heminway and Hoffman propose to accomplish the same
objective in a slightly different way-by requiring each
crowdfunding web site to include cautionary language and
certain other limited disclosures.67 9 This is a plausible
alternative, but the proposal set forth above has two
advantages. First, it allows a disinterested party-the
SEC-to control the disclosure and the context in which it is
presented. Second, cautionary language and mandatory
disclosures tend to be ignored, as anyone who has dealt with
the detailed scroll-down licenses on the Internet can attest.
Under this proposal, investors would be forced to engage on
some level with a non-graded quiz, even if they breeze
through it.
6. Funding Goals and Withdrawal Rights
Entrepreneurs should be required to include a funding
goal in their online proposals and should not be allowed to
close offerings unless and until investors have pledged at
least that amount. Until then, investors should be free to
change their minds and withdraw their pledges.
These requirements allow the social networking aspect of
crowdfunding to work fully. Investors can communicate with
each other while the offering is open and withdraw their bids
678 Crowdfunding sites would not be required to present the SEC
material to investors or to endorse the SEC educational materials as their
own, only to limit access to investors who have viewed such material.
Therefore, any claim that the exemption compels speech in violation of the
First Amendment seems weak. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1001-02 (4th ed. 2011)
(discussing the compelled speech issue under the First Amendment);
RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 63-64 (4th ed. 2008) (same).
' See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 142, at 957-59.
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if they conclude, based on the information shared, that the
offering is not a suitable investment. The all-or-nothing
condition also protects the most optimistic and foolhardy
investors from their own improvidence. Unless the
entrepreneur can convince other, more rational, investors to
participate, the foolhardy are not at risk."
The all-or-nothing condition also forces the entrepreneur
to carefully consider her financing needs before posting her
proposal. Since overreaching could cause the offering to fail,
the entrepreneur has an incentive to request only the true
minimum amount needed to fund the project. This should
lead to more careful budgeting before the funding request is
posted.
Some of the existing crowdfunding sites already impose
all-or-nothing requirements, 8' and such requirements are
common in other areas of securities regulation. Some
securities offerings include minimum sales conditions.68 2
Completing an offering when that minimum is not met
' This all-or-nothing restriction "'imposes a lot of market discipline. .
You can see whether an artist or organizer can get sufficient attention
to a project.'" Tina Rosenberg, On the Web, A Revolution in Giving, N.Y.
TIMEs (Mar. 31, 2011), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/on-
the-web-a-revolution-in-giving/ (quoting Ethan Zuckerman, senior
researcher at Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet and Society).
"81 See, e.g., Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.
com/help/faq/kickstarter%20basics#AlloFund (last visited Mar. 5, 2012);
Company Terms and Conditions for Services, PROFOUNDER, supra note 112
("If the aggregate value of pledges that Company receives in its Raise does
not meet Company's Raise Goal within the time period allotted,
ProFounder will no longer continue to support the making or collection of
pledges for that particular Raise, pledges will not be converted to
Investments and funds distributed to Company, and no money will change
hands on the Website."). But cf Frequently Asked Questions, INDIEGOGO,
http://www.indiegogo.com/about/faqs (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (follow
"Creating a Campaign" hyperlink) ("With Flexible Funding you still keep
the money you raise with your campaign. You will be charged a 9% fee on
the money you raise, despite the unmet funding goal. With Fixed Funding,
IndieGoGo will refund all your campaign's contributions if your goal is
unmet, and you will not be charged any fees.").
682 See Regulation S-K, Item 501(a)(8)(ii), Example B, 17 C.F.R. §
229.501(a)(8)(ii) (2012) (requiring that any such conditions be disclosed on
the front cover of the registration statement).
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constitutes securities fraud.' Since no contract of sale is
allowed before a registration statement is effective,6
investors who express interest before that time are free to
change their minds and withdraw their offers. Similarly,
shareholders whose shares are subject to a tender offer are
free to withdraw their tenders at any time prior to closing of
the offer.' Crowdfunding investors should receive similar
protection.6 86
C. Other Possible Requirements
1. Non-Profit Versus Profit Status
Crowdfunding sites should not be required to have non-
profit status. The SEC no-action letters applying the
definitions of broker and investment adviser to Internet
matching sites have often focused on the provider's non-
profit status.8 A for-profit provider obviously has a stronger
incentive to push investors and entrepreneurs to complete
the proposed transactions, even if those transactions are not
in the investors' best interests." This is especially true
" Exchange Act Rule 10b-9(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-9(a)(2) (2012).
See also In the Matter of Richard H. Morrow, Exchange Act Release No.
40,392 (Sept. 2, 1998) (violation to sell securities after the deadline set in
the offering document for raising the required minimum amount).
m See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (2010).
Exchange Act Rule 14d-7(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1) (2012).
6 Another possibility would be to impose a minimum time period that
offerings must be open before they may close, similar to the minimum
offering period the SEC requires for tender offers. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.143-1(a). In many cases, it will take time for the entrepreneur to
convince sufficient investors to meet the entrepreneur's funding goal; no
regulatory minimum is needed in such cases. But a regulatory minimum
would insure that investors have time to consider the offering and
communicate with each other even in the most popular offerings. The
author does not advocate such a minimum limit, but, if it is sufficiently
short, it would not substantially burden issuers using the exemption.
6.. See supra Part IV.B.2.e and text accompanying note 363.
' See Verstein, supra note 12, at 18 (arguing that peer-to-peer
lending platforms "have an incentive to encourage lending . . . while
lenders bear the brunt of the loss if the lending is imprudent").
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when the site operator's compensation depends on
completion of the transaction, as in the case of many existing
crowdfunding sites.
But that profit motive also gives companies incentives to
establish crowdfunding sites in the first place and to develop
and improve those sites.689 With the exception of Kiva
(admittedly a big exception), for-profit sites have driven
business-related crowdfunding. Limiting crowdfunding to
non-profits would seriously restrict its development. Some of
the proposed restrictions on crowdfunding sites, such as the
prohibition of investment advice and the conflicts-of-interest
bar, should temper some of the adverse effects of the profit
motive. Reputational constraints should also moderate a
site's interest in pushing investors toward inappropriate
investments; a site that develops a reputation for losing
investments will suffer a loss of customers as investors move
to more reputable sites.90
2. Mandatory Disclosure by Entrepreneurs
Senate Bill 1970 imposes extensive mandatory disclosure
requirements as a condition of the exemption. It would
require detailed standardized disclosure about the issuer, its
business and business plan, its ownership and capital
structure, the offering, the rights of the securities being sold,
and even financial statements prepared by independent
accountants and audited in some cases. Mandatory
disclosure requirements like those will unduly increase the
cost of crowdfunding."1 1 Entrepreneurs will need to hire
689 See Olivia L. Walker, The Future of Microlending in the United
States: A Shift from Charity to Profits?, 6 OHIO ST. Bus. L.J. 383, 393-95
(2011) (arguing that, for microlending to succeed in the United States, it
needs to be transformed into a for-profit industry).
690 See Verstein, supra note 12, at 14 (arguing that peer-to-peer
lending platforms "have long-term incentives to cultivate impressive
returns to gain customers").
69. Heminway and Hoffman concede that one of "[t]he major
disadvantagels] of this type of disclosure requirement [is] its cost."
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 142, at 959. Broad, ambiguous
disclosure requirements are equally dangerous. Senate Bill 1791, for
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attorneys and accountants to comply, and the increased cost
will drive away small, marginal entrepreneurs.
Crowdfunding site operators might help entrepreneurs to
complete the required disclosure, but that does not eliminate
the cost, and such advice increases the likelihood that the
site operator will be treated as a broker or investment
adviser.69 2 A better option for crowdfunding filings would be
the very simple notice filing required by House Bill 2930.'
The proponents of strong mandatory disclosure
requirements are missing one of the important facets of the
argument for small business exemptions. For offerings
below a certain size, the cost of any regulatory
requirements-even a minimal disclosure requirement-
exceeds the benefit. For those small offerings, an
unconditional exemption makes sense.694  No matter how
attractive registration and standardized disclosure seem in
the abstract, they make no economic sense for the very small
offerings that crowdfunding facilitates.
Although it allows easier comparisons among investment
opportunities and therefore has some value to investors,9
standardization of disclosure is a bad idea for another
reason. Crowdfunding is still in a very early stage of
development. Standardization of what appears on
crowdfunding sites could discourage experimentation and
instance, requires issuers to disclose "all rights of investors, including
complete information about the risks, obligations, benefits, history, and
costs of offering." S. 1791, 112th Cong. § 2(b)(1)(A) (2011). What does it
mean to provide "complete" information about all the risks of the offering?
This uncertain requirement merely provides fodder for subsequent
investor lawsuits against issuers who were not advised by sophisticated
securities counsel.
692 See supra Parts IV.B.2.c.i and IV.C.4.
693 See H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2(b) (2011) (requiring information
about the issuer, its principals, the purpose of the offering, the target
offering amount, and the deadline for reaching that target).
694 The author explains this point in much greater detail elsewhere.
See Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business, supra note 605,
at 29-33; Bradford, Transaction Exemptions, supra note 509, at 614-22.
699 See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 142, at 938-39 (arguing that
standardization promotes efficiency).
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freeze its development. Instead of forcing all crowdfunding
sites into a federally mandated standard disclosure model,
regulators should allow them to search for the format that
investors find most useful.
3. Restrictions on Resale
The three bills outstanding in Congress all restrict the
resale of crowdfunded securities." Heminway and Hoffman
argue that such restrictions are necessary because a resale
market may not provide new investors with direct access to
the information available on the crowdfunding site itself, so
resales are more conducive to fraud.69 7
Restrictions on resale are neither necessary nor desirable,
although their presence will not unduly chill use of the
exemption. The existing crowdfunding sites do not maintain
trading markets, and they cannot easily establish such
markets without registering as exchanges or alternative
trading systems.6 6 If crowdfunding platforms do establish
their own trading platforms, information about the
entrepreneur and the offering is available on-site. Given the
small amounts invested, active trading markets are unlikely
to develop outside the crowdfunding site.'
Resale restrictions are likely to serve only as a trap for
the unwary. Unsophisticated investors, who are unlikely to
understand or even be aware of such restrictions, would be
exposed to liability whenever they sell their crowdfunded
securities to Uncle Ernie or Aunt Emma. And, if resale
restrictions are given any teeth, such resales could cause
6 See supra Part V.G.
697 See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 142, at 954.
69 See supra Part IV.A.
69 However, the notes offered by Prosper and Lending Club are traded
on a platform maintained by FOLIOIfn, a registered broker-dealer. See
Prosper Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 11; Lending Club
Registration Statement, supra note 81, at 11. It is not clear how actively
those notes are traded.
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issuers to lose their exemptions.'o Given the limited danger,
resale restrictions are undesirable.
D. Preemption of State Law
Securities regulation in the United States is a polycentric
combination of federal and state regulation. Issuers offering
securities must deal not only with the registration
requirements of the federal Securities Act, but also with the
registration requirements in all of the states in which they
offer the securities. Congress has preempted state
registration requirements for the offering of certain
securities,70' but the securities sold by small issuers on
crowdfunding sites do not fall within the preempted
categories. Even if the SEC adopts a crowdfunding
exemption, the states would remain free to regulate
crowdfunding.702
State securities laws also require the registration of
brokers and other agents engaged in securities activities.70 s
Exempting crowdfunding sites from federal regulation as
brokers or investment advisers would not protect them from
similar state regulation. The Exchange Act limits the power
of states to regulate brokers and their associated persons,704
but, as explained earlier, crowdfunding sites would not be
brokers under the proposed crowdfunding exemption. The
700 Heminway and Hoffman recognize this issue. They note that "any
regulatory solution should address the manner in which investor
violations of any resale prohibition impact the issuer's exemption."
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 142, at 954 n.367.
701 See Securities Act of 1933 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a), (b) (2010).
702 Cohn & Yadley, supra note 11, at 13 ("Even when the issuer is able
to qualify for exemption from the 1933 Securities Act, there is no
guarantee, other than Rule 506, that the offering will be exempt from
state securities regulation."). A crowdfunding site could avoid the
application of a particular state's securities law by not selling in that
state. Most states have adopted an exemption for Internet offerings when
(1) the offer specifically indicates it is not being offered to the residents of
that state; (2) no offer is specifically directed to anyone in that state; and
(3) no securities are sold in that state. See Sjostrom, supra note 198, at 30.
703 See generally 12A LONG, supra note 148, at 8-3-8-6.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i).
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states would be free to construe the term "broker" more
broadly than under federal law. However, the SEC probably
could effectively preclude state regulation of crowdfunding
sites as investment advisers. The Investment Advisers Act
provides that states may not require the registration,
licensing or qualification of advisers excepted from the
federal definition in Section 202(a)(11) of the Act,705 and one
of the exceptions in 202(a)(11) is for advisers designated by
the SEC.7 0
States could develop coordinated exemptions that would
also free crowdfunded offerings from state regulatory
requirements. This would not be unprecedented. Many
states, for example, have adopted a Uniform Limited
Offering Exemption ("ULOE") that coordinates with Rule
505 of Regulation D.701 However, states have been unwilling
to extend the ULOE to Rule 504,"as and it is unlikely they
will extend it to any other exemption for offerings to
unaccredited, unsophisticated investors.o' The North
American Securities Administrators Association is working
on a model crowdfunding rule, but it has not yet been
705 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203A(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
3a(b)(1)(B) (2010).
" Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(G), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(11)(G) (2010).
.o. There are actually two versions of the Uniform Limited Offering
Exemption. See 12B LONG, supra note 148, apps. C, C-1. For a general
discussion of the ULOE, see 12 LONG, supra note 148, 7-85-7-107.
70s Only four states have exemptions for offerings under Rule 504, and
at no time has there been any serious effort to coordinate the ULOE with
Rule 504. 12 LONG, supra note 148, at 7-199.
7 Most states have adopted a uniform private offering exemption
that exempts offerings to no more than a few people in the state. See 12
LONG, supra note 148. That exemption is unlikely to work for most
crowdfunded offerings. It focuses on the number of offerees in the state,
not the number of purchasers, effectively precluding publicly advertised
offerings. Id. Some states have altered their versions of the exemption to
focus on the number of purchasers, but even some of those states still put
an outside limit on the number of offerees. Id. Other states read a
sophistication requirement into the exemption, which would preclude
public offerings. Id.
146 [Vol. 2012
CRO WDFUNDING AND SECURITIES LAWS
publicly released .7 " Even if a model rule is developed, its
success would depend on uniform adoption by all the states,
and the history of other state-coordinated exemptions is not
encouraging.
Because of state securities law, a federal crowdfunding
exemption would not by itself allow entrepreneurs to avoid
the cost of regulation. Unless state law was preempted, a
federal exemption would merely shift the cost to another
level in the federal system. Absent corresponding state
exemptions, a federal exemption would therefore accomplish
little.1 ' Compliance with state regulation alone is
"prohibitively costly if companies are seeking to raise only
small amounts of money."712 Therefore, states should be
preempted from requiring the registration of offerings that
comply with the proposed crowdfunding exemption."'3
The most effective way to preempt state law is through
congressional action.1  Congress could simply add
crowdfunded securities to the existing list of preempted
offerings." This is precisely what House Bill 2930 proposes
710 See NASAA Completes Draft of Model Crowdfunding Rule, Sec. L.
Daily (BNA) (Dec. 5, 2011). The model rule apparently would not exempt
issuers from filing a state disclosure document. Id.
71 Rutheford Campbell argues that requiring federally exempted
small business offerings to comply with state registration requirements is
inconsistent with the SEC's reckoning of the appropriate balance between
investor protection and capital formation and imposes an "unwarranted
drag on capital formation." Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws
and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175, 208
(1997) [hereinafter Campbell, Blue Sky Laws]. More recently, Campbell
has called for the complete preemption of all state registration
requirements. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Federalism Gone Amuck:
The Case for Reallocating Governmental Authority Over the Capital
Formation Activities of Businesses, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 573 (2011).
712 Shane, supra note 588.
711 Others agree that any crowdfunding exemption should preempt
state law. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 142, at 960; Pope, supra
note 99, at 1000.
714 See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 11, at 82 (calling for congressional
action to preempt state registration requirements for all federally
exempted offerings except the intrastate exemption).
711 See Securities Act of 1933 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2010).
No. I:1] 147
to do. However, even House Bill 2930 preempts only state
offering registration requirements. It leaves the states
free to regulate crowdfunding intermediaries as brokers.
Another possibility is intriguing, but it is less likely.
Section 18(b)(3) of the Securities Act preempts state
securities requirements "with respect to the offer or sale ...
[of securities] . . . to qualified purchasers, as defined by the
Commission by rule."n' The statute itself does not define
"qualified purchaser;" instead, it says that the SEC "may
define the term . . . differently with respect to different
categories of securities, consistent with the public interest
and the protection of investors.""' The SEC could define the
term "qualified purchaser" to include everyone who
purchases in a federally exempted crowdfunding offering,
thereby exempting crowdfunding offerings from state
registration requirements." This would not solve the
"broker" or "investment adviser" issues under state law, but
it would exempt the offerings themselves from registration.
However, it is reasonably clear that when Congress added
this provision to the Securities Act, in the National
Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, it intended
"qualified purchaser" to encompass only "sophisticated
investors, capable of protecting themselves in a manner that
716 Senate Bill 1791 takes a slightly more conservative approach. It
preempts state offering registration requirements, but allows the issuer's
home state, and any state in which the purchasers of more than 50% of the
offering amount reside, to require notice filings and charge fees. See supra
Part V.G.2.
" Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2010).
718 Id.
71 Others have made similar suggestions. Shortly after these
preemption provisions were added by the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996, Campbell proposed that the SEC define
"qualified purchaser" to include all purchasers in offerings pursuant to the
Rules 504, 505, 147, and Regulation A exemptions. Campbell, Blue Sky
Laws, supra note 711, at 207. See also Sjostrom, supra note 198, at 587-
88 (noting this as a possible solution to the problem state regulation poses
to Internet offerings).
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renders regulation by State authorities unnecessary."7 20
Rutheford Campbell argues that this legislative history
should not limit the SEC, 721 but the SEC proposal to
implement Section 18(b)(3), still not adopted, equates the
term qualified purchaser with the term "accredited investor"
in Regulation D. 722 Because most crowdfunding investors are
not accredited investors, the SEC is unlikely to include them
within the definition of "qualified purchaser" for purposes of
preemption.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The SEC should adopt an exemption to facilitate
crowdfunded securities offerings. That exemption should
include the basic features outlined above. Issuers should be
able to raise a maximum of $250,000-$500,000 each year
without registration or other information requirements,
provided that each investor invests annually no more than
either $500 or 2% of the investor's annual income, whichever
is greater. Those crowdfunded offerings should include a
funding goal and should not close until that goal is met.
Until then, investors should be free to withdraw from the
offering.
The exemption should also require that the offering be
made on a crowdfunding site that:
720 H.R. Rep. No. 622-104, pt. 1, at 31 (1996). See also S. Rep. No. 293-
104, at 10 (1996).
721 Campbell, Blue Sky Laws, supra note 711, at 207-08. Campbell
notes that the statute itself contains no such restriction and states that
the legislative history is "so disjointed and confusing as to be essentially
worthless." Id. at 208. Section 18 requires the SEC to define the term
"consistent with the public interest." Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b)(3), 15
U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2010). Campbell also points out that, in considering
what is in "the public interest," the SEC must consider not only investor
protection, but also "whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation." Campbell, Blue Sky Laws, supra note
711, at 207.
722 See Defining the Term "Qualified Purchaser" Under the Securities
Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 33-8041, SEC Docket S7-23-01
(Dec. 19, 2001).
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(1) notifies the SEC that it is facilitating
crowdfunding offerings under the exemption;
(2) is open to the general public;
(3) provides a communication portal that allows
investors to communicate about each offering;
(4) requires investors to fulfill a simple education
requirement before investing;
(5) does not invest, and does not allow its employees
to invest, in the site's offerings; and
(6) does not offer investment advice.
The enactment of a crowdfunding exemption would be no
panacea. None of the requirements that this article proposes
will guarantee that investors receive their expected returns.
None of these requirements will protect investors from the
losses often incurred by investors in small businesses. None
of these requirements will prevent fraud. That is not the
point of the proposed crowdfunding exemption.
Instead, the proposed crowdfunding exemption is an
attempt to promote small business capital formation by
exempting offerings where the cost of registration clearly
exceeds any possible benefits. The proposed exemption
allows smaller, unsophisticated investors to act as capitalists
and to learn by doing, while protecting those investors from
catastrophic losses they cannot bear. Finally, the proposed
exemption attempts to bring securities regulation into the
modern world of social networking and the Internet-to
reconcile the regulatory requirements of 1933 with the
realities of the twenty-first century.
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